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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The first shoots of what we now understand as liberal political philosophy 
appeared in Renaissance and Reformation Europe, finding early expression in the 
English philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, and coming to full flower 
two to three centuries later in the writings of Immanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Benjamin Constant, Wilhelm von Humboldt and John Stuart Mill.1  
Then followed a period of decline, in which liberal theorising was eclipsed, to 
some extent, by the vigorous growth of Marxism, Fascism, and various forms of 
anti-colonialism in the first three-quarters of the twentieth century.  But, as is now 
frequently remarked upon, liberalism was revived with the publication, in 1971, of 
John Rawls’s A theory of justice,2 in response to which an avalanche of 
scholarship was produced.3 
 A theory of justice took itself to be building on the “social contract” tradition, an 
important stream within European liberalism which represented political morality 
as constructed (in different ways by different theorists) by an agreement between 
free and equal citizens.4  The book directed much of its fire against the ethical 
tradition that was, until a generation ago, held to be the most promising 
philosophical basis for liberal politics: utilitarianism, the doctrine of the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number.  “Intuitionism,” by which Rawls meant the 
adherence to a set of unstructured ethical principles, and what he called “the 
principle of perfection,” were also sharply criticised, but at considerably less 
                                                
1 The classic texts in this story include Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), John Locke’s Two 
treatises of government as well as his Letter concerning toleration, published together by Yale University Press  in 2003, 
Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals (tr HJ Paton) (New York: Harper, 1964), The metaphysics of morals 
(tr Mary Gregor) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and “Perpetual peace: A philosophical sketch,” in Immanuel 
Kant, Political writings (tr HB Nisbet) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The social 
contract and other later political writings (tr Victor Gourevitch) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Wilhelm von 
Humboldt’s On the limits of state action (tr JW Burrow) (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1969) and John Stuart Mill’s On liberty 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956).  Benjamin Constant’s writings are usefully collected in the volume of his Political writings 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), which forms part of the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought 
series, and John Gray’s Liberalism (2ed) (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995) opens with a useful history of the 
development of liberal political philosophy. 
2 John Rawls, A theory of justice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).  First edition published in 1971. 
3 The volume of writing on Rawls is discussed in the introductions to the volumes Reading Rawls, edited by Norman Daniels 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1975) and The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, edited by Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
4 Rawls famously states on page xviii of the preface to A theory of justice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999) that he has attempted ‘to generalise and carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional theory of the social contract 
as represented by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.’  Later on in the same passage he comments that ‘[t]he theory that results is 
highly Kantian in nature,’ disclaiming any originality for his views, which he describes as ‘classical and well known.’   
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length.5 At least partially as a result of the book’s influence, utilitarianism has 
faded as an intellectual force, but, ironically, the principle of perfection, now 
usually referred to as “perfectionism,” has found more defenders as a result of 
Rawls’s challenge. 
 Perfectionism endorses the claim that the state may legitimately promote 
(primarily by means of legislation, it is envisaged) certain human virtues or 
“excellences” or, to use the phrases most commonly used in the contemporary 
debate, “conceptions of the good,” by which is meant, roughly, the moral, 
philosophical, or religious views held by citizens.6  To this Rawls did not explicitly 
oppose a doctrine of “state neutrality.” In fact the term “neutrality” does not rate a 
mention in the index of A theory of justice, and Political liberalism7, his second 
major work, merely includes a brief discussion of the term in which it is described 
as “unfortunate,” on the grounds that ‘some of its connotations are highly 
misleading,’ and that ‘others suggest altogether impracticable principles.’8 His 
opposition to perfectionism, however, and his adherence to the doctrine which has 
subsequently come to be called “liberal neutrality” was unmistakable.9   
 Liberal neutrality, or “the principle of state neutrality,” as I will refer to it, is the 
doctrine that the state may not take sides between the conflicting conceptions of 
the good life adhered to by citizens.  Briefly put, it follows from the fact that, in A 
theory of justice, parties to a fair contract for the purpose of designing the social 
order must come to an agreement in ignorance of their race, sex, positions in 
society, as well as their conceptions of the good. The principles of justice which 
emerge from contracting parties so situated – two principles which, taken 
together, Rawls names justice as fairness – can therefore endorse no claims to 
greater entitlements on the basis of superior race, sex, social position or 
conception of the good. As a result they are neutral between these potential 
sources of bias, as is any legislation which conforms to them.   
 
 
                                                
5 On page 46 of the revised edition of A theory of justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Rawls remarks that ‘no 
constructive alternative theory [to utilitarianism] has been advanced which has the comparable virtues of clarity and 
system…Intuitionism is not constructive, perfectionism is unacceptable.’  Later on – in section 50 of A theory of justice – Rawls 
devotes a little more attention to refuting perfectionism, but at nothing like the length at which he attacks utilitarianism. 
6 I examine exactly what these conceptions of the good life might be in greater detail in the introductory section of chapter one. 
7 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 
8 Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 191. 
9 This is made explicit in §50 of A theory of justice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 285-92. 
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 A theory of justice was followed shortly afterwards by another landmark in the 
history of liberal political theory: the publication of Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, state 
and utopia, in which the author explicitly argued that a legitimate ‘state or 
government…must be neutral…between its citizens.’10  Four years later Ronald 
Dworkin, who has subsequently come to be regarded as the second great figure 
in post-war liberal philosophy (after Rawls) published an essay entitled simply 
‘Liberalism,’11 in which he argued that ‘political decisions must be, so far as is 
possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what 
gives value to life.’12 This is a theme to which Dworkin has repeatedly returned,13 
and in taking an interest in which he has been far from alone.14 
 In fact Dworkin has not merely defended the doctrine of state neutrality. He has 
also described it, at one point, as ‘a fundamental, almost defining, tenet of 
liberalism,’15 and in this he was echoed by Bruce Ackerman, who remarks in 
Social justice in the liberal state that “constrained conversation” – his version of 
the neutrality principle – is ‘the organising principle of liberal thought,’ and that the 
liberal tradition is ‘best understood as…an effort to define and justify broad 
constraints on power talk.’16 Similarly, Charles Larmore, whose 1987 book 
Patterns of moral complexity17 influenced Rawls’s later writings, has claimed that 
‘the fundamental liberal principle is that the state should remain neutral toward 
disputed and controversial ideals of the good life’18 and that ‘the distinctive liberal 
notion is that of the neutrality of the state’19 and even Joseph Raz, an avowed 
enemy of anti-perfectionism, comments that ‘when anti-perfectionist principles are 
used to provide the foundation of a political theory they can be regarded as 
                                                
10 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, state, and utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 33. 
11 Ronald Dworkin, “Liberalism,” in A matter of principle (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 181-
204. 
12 Ronald Dworkin, “Liberalism,” in A matter of principle (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 191. 
13 See also his “Foundations of liberal equality” in Stephen Darwall, (ed) Equal freedom: Selected Tanner Lectures on human 
values (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1995), pp. 190-306, where he writes, on page 191, that  
 
It is a fundamental, almost defining, tenet of liberalism that the government of a political community should be 
tolerant of the different and often antagonistic convictions its citizens have about the right way to live: that it 
should be neutral, for example, between citizens who insist that a good life is necessarily a religious one and 
other citizens who fear religion as the only dangerous superstition. 
 
14 See Bruce Ackerman, who says that ‘[a] power structure is illegitimate if it can be justified only through a conversation in 
which some person (or group) must assert that he is (or they are) the privileged moral authority.’  Social justice in the liberal 
state (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 10-1. 
15 Ronald Dworkin “Foundations of liberal equality” in Stephen Darwall, (ed) Equal freedom (Ann Arbor:, University of Michigan 
Press, 1995), p.191.   
16 Bruce Ackerman, Social justice in the liberal state (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p.10. 
17 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
18 Patterns of moral complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. ix 
19 Patterns of moral complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 42 
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attempts to capture the core sense of the liberal ethos.’20 
 
Clearly, if neutrality is the distinctive liberal notion, then we might associate 
perfectionism with illiberal politics.  And history gives us good reason to do so.  
But, of course, the fact that all anti-liberals have also been perfectionists does not 
imply that all perfectionists are anti-liberals.  And, as one might expect, claims by 
prominent theorists about the alleged centrality of the principle of state neutrality 
to the liberal project provoked liberals who did not reject perfectionism to show 
their hands.   
 Briefly put, liberal perfectionists argue that liberalism is not a doctrine of 
limited government, but rather, as Raz puts it, ‘a doctrine about political morality 
which revolves around the importance of personal liberty.’21  Thomas Hurka, who 
offers what is perhaps the most detailed contemporary defence of a perfectionist 
ethic,22 argues that perfectionism can value liberty by making the free choice of 
one’s form of life itself an objective good. Liberty, or personal autonomy, is 
understood by such liberals as a virtue or excellence which the state is obliged to 
promote. And this obligation cannot be understood as the principle of neutrality. 
 The first book-length liberal perfectionist response to liberal neutralism was 
Vinit Haksar’s Equality, liberty, and perfectionism, which appeared in 1979. As he 
indicates in the introduction to the book, Haksar sets out to refute the Rawlsian 
position ‘that perfectionism can and should be bypassed as a political principle,’23 
devoting two chapters to detailed exegesis and criticism of the positions advanced 
in A theory of justice. Haksar’s book did not receive the publicity it deserved, and 
liberal perfectionism had to wait for the publication, in 1986, of Raz’s The morality 
of freedom before it was able to take centre stage. A theory of justice also looms 
large in Raz’s book, being described in it as ‘[t]he most serious attempt to specify 
and defend a doctrine…of… neutrality,’24 and as such is the principal focus of 
critical attention for Raz.  Even the work of more recent liberal perfectionists, such 
                                                
20 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 108 
21 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p.17. 
22 As opposed to a perfectionist liberal politics, the defence of which has been undertaken in the most detail by Raz, as we shall 
see.  Furthermore, it is fair to say that Sher has offered a detailed defence of a perfectionist ethic which is in many ways as 
impressive as that of Hurka.  I will come to discuss Sher as well in what follows. 
23 Vinit Haksar, Equality, liberty, and perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 1. 
24 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 117.  On page 122 Raz distinguishes between 
comprehensive neutrality which, as he puts it, ‘consists in helping or hindering the parties in equal degree in all matters relevant 
to the conflict between them’ and narrow neutrality, which he takes to consist in ‘helping or hindering them to an equal degree 
in those activities and regarding those resources that they would wish neither to engage in nor to acquire but for the conflict.’   
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as Hurka’s Perfectionism (1993), George Sher’s Beyond neutrality (1997), and 
Steven Wall’s Liberalism, perfectionism, and restraint (1998), all written more than 
twenty years after A theory of justice, devote considerable space and effort to 
responding to the anti-perfectionism articulated and developed by Rawls, ensuring 
that assessing the competing attractions of neutralism and perfectionism has 
become one of the central concerns of contemporary liberals.  
Perfectionism is the idea that the state may take sides in the conflict 
between the various moral, philosophical and religious ideals held by citizens, 
promoting some and discouraging others.  This should not be understood as 
being equivalent to the idea that the state should take sides in the inevitable 
conflicts of interests between citizens (unless one holds the implausible view that 
citizens’ identities are exhausted by their ideals). Nor should it be understood as 
the idea that state neutrality between the various ideals is always illegitimate, as 
there are many cases in which there are good reasons for it which have nothing to 
do with a general principle of neutrality; if, for example, there is nothing to choose 
between two ideals (and there is no imperative that one be chosen), or also, 
perhaps, where taking sides would be the cause of major strife and remaining 
neutral would not have comparably undesirable consequences. 
 What remains unclear, however, is whether saying that the state should 
promote ideals of the good means that it should do so whenever it can, and also 
whether it should do so to the greatest extent possible. These are similar issues, 
in that they both go to the question of how stringent the perfectionist requirement 
that the state promote the good is. It seems obvious, at least prima facie, that if 
the state is capable of promoting the good, then there is no excuse for it not doing 
so.  But even perfectionists might accept that the state has certain obligations 
which forbid it from promoting the good under certain circumstances. A 
perfectionist might accept, for example, that citizens have a right to autonomy. 
The state’s obligation to recognise this right would obviously place obstacles in 
the way of its promoting the good. And the greater the number and/or stringency 
of such obligations recognised by the perfectionist, the greater the likelihood that 
the politics he or she advocates comes to resemble that of the neutralist. There is 
nothing incoherent, however, in a perfectionism which recognises even a great 
number of important right-based constraints on the state’s promotion of the good. 
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To remain perfectionist one must merely deny that the state may never promote 
the good.   
 
So contemporary perfectionists think the state should take sides between ideals.  
How do they make their case? Firstly, as we have already noted, a great deal of 
effort is expended in attempting to debunk the case for state neutrality. Raz, for 
example, devotes two chapters of The morality of freedom25 to this, Sher no less 
than four of his Beyond neutrality,26 and a similar pattern is noticeable in the 
writings of Haksar27 and Wall.28 
 There is good reason for proceeding this way. This is because it is 
uncontroversial that one ought to pursue that which is good. And it is therefore 
also uncontroversial that the state should promote the good, unless, of course, 
there are weightier reasons not to. Now the principle of state neutrality purports to 
offer precisely such reasons. It is, as Raz says, a principle of restraint. It ‘den[ies] 
the government’s right to pursue certain valuable goals, or require[s] it to maintain 
undisturbed a certain state of affairs, even though it could, if it were to try, improve 
it.’29  So the dispute between perfectionists and neutralists turns on whether or not 
there are reasons (and, if so, what they are) for the state to refrain from pursuing 
the good when it can.  Neutralists claim that there are always such reasons 
(although the exact reasons offered differ from one writer to another). Showing 
that these alleged reasons do not hold, as arguments such as those of Raz and 
Sher attempt to do, leaves the way clear for an acceptance of the standard 
perfectionist view of the state: that it has a duty to improve the lives of citizens, or, 
to put it another way, a duty to promote the good.   
 We must note that these attacks on neutrality do not mean the abandonment 
of liberalism, and that they most emphatically do not mean abandoning a 
commitment to the value of personal autonomy. In fact, as we shall see in chapter 
three, Raz argues that state neutrality between ideals of the good runs the risk of 
diminishing the autonomy of citizens. It makes it more difficult for citizens to lead 
good lives, in that many of the valuable forms of life which citizens might choose 
                                                
25 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 
26 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
27 Vinit Haksar, Equality, liberty, and perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) 
28 Steven Wall Liberalism, perfectionism, and restraint (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
29 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 110 
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cannot be pursued as individuals, and require state support for their continued 
existence.  The demise of these forms of life would result in a restricted palette of 
opportunities, leaving many citizens without sufficient valuable options for them to 
be able to make genuinely autonomous choices. Succinctly put, neutrality 
undermines autonomy. And, if this is indeed so, liberals have another reason for 
adopting the perfectionist view of politics.   
 
Having acquired some sense of what it means for a state to take sides between 
ideals, I now turn to its opposite, neutrality, and make a few clarificatory remarks 
about what neutralists expect from the state.   
 The concept of neutrality is frequently associated with (and sometimes 
confused with) related concepts such as justice, fairness, and impartiality, 
although it is not to be equated with these. It presupposes, as Jeremy Waldron 
points out, a contest or conflict of some kind, and is predicated of the actions of 
parties not directly involved in the conflict.30  Furthermore, the idea is “most at 
home” in the context of international relations, particularly during times of war.31  
So, for example, we would say that Sweden was neutral during the Second World 
War, on the grounds that no military units acting on behalf of the Swedish nation 
intervened in order to influence the outcome of the war.32   
 More precisely, taking a stance of neutrality is, following Alan Montefiore, ‘to 
do one’s best to help or to hinder the various parties concerned in an equal 
degree.’33 This, according to Raz, is the ‘primary sense of neutrality.’34 Raz goes 
on to say that one is neutral in the primary sense ‘only if one can affect the 
fortunes of the parties and if one helps or hinders them to an equal degree and 
one does so because one believes that there are reasons for so acting which 
essentially depend on the fact that the action has an equal effect on the fortunes 
of the parties.’35   
                                                
30 Jeremy Waldron, “Legislation and moral neutrality,” in Robert Goodin and Andrew Reeve, (eds) Liberal Neutrality (London: 
Routledge, 1989), pp. 61-83 at p. 44. 
31 Jeremy Waldron, “Legislation and moral neutrality,” in Robert Goodin and Andrew Reeve, (eds) Liberal Neutrality (London: 
Routledge, 1989), pp. 61-83 at p. 66. 
32 Swedes certainly volunteered for combat in their personal capacities, on both sides of the conflict, and were therefore 
absorbed into both Allied and Axis military units.  It is conceivable, in conflict situations, that voluntary participation could reach 
a level (and partisanship) sufficient for it to be no longer plausible to assert that the country of which such volunteers are 
citizens is neutral.  The participation of Swedes in World War II does not appear to have reached this level, however. 
33 Alan Montefiore in the book he edited, Neutrality and impartiality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 5. 
34 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 113. 
35 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 113. 
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 Following Raz, then, we should say that being neutral in this sense requires, 
firstly, at least the possibility of affecting the outcome of the conflict: one might, if 
one so chose, be able to help or hinder one of the parties. A party which can have 
no influence on the outcome, whatever it does, is not neutral in the primary sense.  
And secondly, neutrality in Raz’s primary sense is not accidental. It is the outcome 
of a decision grounded in reasons for refraining from helping or hindering the 
parties unequally.36 
 We should note therefore that there are not always reasons for being neutral, 
simply because neutrality is not always (or even prima facie) desirable. It might 
signify indifference to that which ought to arouse partisan passions, and it can be 
the occasion of regret.37 Even neutrality in times of war is not necessarily to be 
approved of: while many may think that Sweden’s wartime neutrality was 
understandable, few found it admirable. So the advocate of neutrality must explain 
not only the context in which neutrality is to be endorsed, but also the reasons for 
which it is to be endorsed.  
 If we are to understand what reasons might be put forward in support of a 
policy of neutrality, we must move away from the idea of neutrality in general, and 
narrow our focus. This dissertation is concerned with state neutrality between 
conceptions of the good, which, following Raz, we will understand as the refusal 
on the part of the state to use its power to privilege or discriminate against any 
citizen on the basis of their adherence to a particular conception of the good life.  
It is neutrality in this context that I will now turn to focus on. 
 
It is widely held that the populations of contemporary constitutional democracies 
are uniquely diverse. More specifically, the claim is that citizens of contemporary 
constitutional democracies adhere to a great variety of moral, philosophical, and 
religious views, and that this was not usually the case in these territories in earlier 
times.38   
                                                
36 Raz notes that there is a further, secondary, sense, in which may one be neutral without intending so to be.  See The morality 
of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 113. 
37 See Thomas Hardy’s poem ‘Neutral tones’ in Paul Keegan (ed) The New Penguin Book of English Verse (London: Penguin, 
2000), p. 823. 
38 What we are to say in this regard about contemporary societies which are not, strictly speaking, constitutional democracies in 
the style of West, is a tricky question.  Some appear to be relatively homogenous: China would be such an example, at least if 
we think of ethnic homogeneity.  Others appear to be rather diverse (although powerful ethnic or religious factions within them 
have generally not adopted anything like the principle of state neutrality in the face of diversity). 
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 Rawls offers a typical historical narrative in his introduction to Political 
liberalism, where he says, in the course of outlining the trajectory of liberalism and 
its precursors over the past three or four centuries, that the Reformation 
‘fragmented the religious unity of the Middle Ages and led to religious pluralism, 
with all its consequences for later centuries. This in turn fostered pluralisms of 
other kinds, which were a permanent feature of culture by the end of the 
eighteenth century.’39   
 Furthermore, many liberals have held that contemporary social heterogeneity 
calls forth the idea of state neutrality. Larmore, for example, contends that ‘[i]n 
modern times we have come to recognise a multiplicity of ways in which a fulfilled 
life can be lived, without any perceptible hierarchy among them. And we have also 
been forced to acknowledge that even where we do believe that we have 
discerned the superiority of some ways of life to others, reasonable people may 
often not share our view.’40  He goes on to say that ‘pluralism and disagreement 
about the good life…make political neutrality reasonable’41 and mounts a defence, 
which we will examine in chapter two, of state neutrality which he takes to be the 
most appropriate response to the pluralism we encounter in modern constitutional 
democracies. 
 There are of course dissenters from the view that past societies were largely 
homogenous.42 There is reason to think that many past societies, including those 
which later developed into liberal societies, exhibited as great an ethnic and 
religious diversity as contemporary democracies (if not greater). And there is also 
reason to think that, at least in some cases, past societies managed such diversity 
without either requiring neutrality of their states or dissolving in ethnic and 
religious bloodshed.   
 But there is little doubt that contemporary constitutional democracies are very 
morally, philosophically, and religiously diverse. And there is also little doubt that 
the history of political philosophy in the West reveals an increasing concern with 
impartiality, and an increasing opposition to what we now understand as 
discrimination, whether accompanied by an increase in social heterogeneity or 
                                                
39 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. xxiv.     
40 Charles Larmore, Patterns of moral complexity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 43. 
41 Charles Larmore, Patterns of moral complexity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 50-1. 
42 See, for example, Derek Phillips’s Looking backward (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), for an account of the 
diversity of past societies often taken to have been examples of social unity. 
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not.   
 It might be most accurate to understand this development as a concern with 
stability. The insistence on a state religion, especially where adherents of 
competing religions are of roughly equal strength, has often seemed to be a 
catalyst for instability and civil strife: the bloody wars of the seventeenth century in 
what is now Germany were a particularly ugly example. So there are good 
pragmatic reasons for responding to diversity with impartiality, and this was well 
understood by early modern writers such as Locke,43 who proposed “toleration” as 
a means of damping potential religious conflict and winning the co-operation of a 
diverse populace.  And once the idea of toleration gained momentum in Europe, it 
seemed there was no stopping it. By the eighteenth century the public position of 
European monarchs such as Frederick the Great of Prussia was that citizens were 
free to adhere to whatever “metaphysical fictions” they wished to44 and by the end 
of the nineteenth, dissent from the Christian tradition was no longer an 
impediment to advancement in Europe. The sectarian character of European 
states faded into ever more insipid forms of civil religion. 
 It is of course also the case that twentieth-century European history did not 
evince much in the way of stability, despite religious toleration. This does not 
prove, of course, that things would not have been even worse had religious 
toleration not become an accepted principle. But it ought to lead us to note that a 
concern with stability is not the only possible motivation for requiring states to hold 
back from supporting (or being supported by) partisan conceptions of the good 
life.  And if we look at the development of opposition to discrimination in the 
political philosophy of the West, we see that it is as much grounded in an ideal of 
equal treatment as it is in a pragmatic concern with avoiding strife.   
 This ideal emphasised the necessity of treating the social standing or religion 
of a citizen, and, with time, his or her race, gender, or sexual orientation, as 
irrelevant in the distribution of the burdens and privileges of living in a democratic 
society.  And, as we see in the later work of Rawls,45 it also emphasised the moral 
unacceptability of requiring some citizens, but not others, to live by principles they 
did not share and had no part in formulating.   
                                                
43 See his “A letter concerning toleration” in Two treatises of government and A letter concerning toleration (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003), which had great influence on the American founding fathers. 
44 In Frederick’s case this does not seem to have been because of any aversion to violent conflict, however. 
45 Especially Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
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 Again, we must be careful. A thorough historical study of the rise of the ideal 
of equal treatment (which this dissertation does not attempt to be) would 
undoubtedly find traces, or precursors, of it in many pre-modern eras (not to 
mention in non-Western cultures). One has merely to think of the golden rule of 
Jesus Christ in order to summon a similar norm of great antiquity and long-lasting 
influence.  But the loosening of the bonds of aristocratic and clerical power in the 
early modern period in Europe did see the ideal of equal treatment clearly and 
forcefully articulated, notably by Kant and Rousseau, and also by the signatories 
of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. And the principle of state neutrality 
appears to many to fall naturally into this tradition. It appeals to our sense that a 
state which treats its citizens differentially, as, it seems, it must do, if it advances 
certain conceptions of the good life and not others, is perpetrating precisely the 
kind of injustice which our culture has come to abhor, regardless of whether or not 
those against whom it discriminates are able to destabilise the society. 
 In what follows we will look at both pragmatic arguments for state neutrality, 
as well as appeals to the ideal of equal treatment, and assess their 
appropriateness as responses to what we might call “the circumstances of 
diversity”. It will be my contention that, while understandable, the demand that the 
state be neutral is misguided. In order to establish this, I examine, in chapter one, 
the various formulations the principle of state neutrality has taken, in chapter two, 
the main arguments for the principle, and, in chapter three, I examine, in 
particular, Joseph Raz’s liberal case for the acceptability of perfectionist 
legislation, even in the circumstances of diversity. I conclude that, given the failure 
of the arguments for the principle of state neutrality, a modified version of Raz’s 
perfectionism is the most acceptable liberal political morality. 
 
      ***************  
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2 FORMULATING THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE 
NEUTRALITY 
 
e have now briefly traced the history of the idea of neutrality as it has been 
d in the introduction, the idea did not meet with acceptance across the 
at what anti-neutralist liberals have to say, 
nerally taken 
                                                
W
deployed in English-language liberal political philosophy over the past three 
decades.   
 As note
board. For some critics, such as the so-called communitarians, who rose to 
prominence in the 1980s, it was evidence of the misguided nature of liberalism,46 
for others it stymied liberal goals.47 This thesis will not devote serious discussion 
to the communitarians, but will focus instead on the latter attack: criticism, in other 
words, from those writers who claim to share the commitment, the implications of 
which the prominent neutralists discussed in the thesis take themselves to be 
working out in their writings, to the paramount value of freedom and equality for all 
individuals within society, but who take the neutrality principle to be a misguided 
attempt at expressing these values 
 Before we get on to looking 
however, we need to fix, to the extent that this is possible, what exactly it is that 
neutralists are advocating, and why they do so. And here the picture gets 
complicated. I therefore devote this chapter to surveying a number of important 
formulations of the principle of state neutrality which have been offered by its 
advocates. An assessment of the perfectionist attack will have to wait until chapter 
three, after I have looked, in chapter two, in greater depth at the connections 
between formulating the principle of state neutrality and defending it. 
 As we have seen in the introduction, the neutrality principle is ge
to mean that principle of political morality which requires the state, in a pluralist 
society, to maintain a position of neutrality towards those large-scale moral, 
philosophical, or religious frameworks typically referred to in the literature as 
conceptions of the good or conceptions of the good life, which claim the 
adherence of citizens. And the expression “pluralist society” is generally used to 
46 The most prominent of whom were Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer.   
47 Raz’s The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) contains the most obvious case of such an argument, but the 
suggestion that state neutrality is a bogus ideal can also be found in the writings of the other liberal perfectionists discussed in 
this thesis.   
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mean a society in which there is not widespread agreement on any such 
conception of the good, in contrast to the homogeneity which, we are told, 
characterised pre-modern western cultures and still, frequently, is said to 
characterise contemporary non-western cultures.   
 With respect to the conceptions of the good, between which the state is 
t pleasing God, experiencing pleasure, or 
Dworkin say that the state 
required to be neutral, it is important to note that they are nowhere taken to 
include all the moral values held by citizens. This is because the term “the good” 
has, as used by contemporary political theorists, acquired a quasi-technical 
sense, and in this context is standardly contrasted with “the right.” Roughly 
speaking, the good is understood as that which is worth pursuing, whereas the 
right is that which one is obliged to do.   
 So, for example, one might hold tha
expressing oneself artistically, is worth devoting one’s time and energy (or even 
one’s life) to, in which case these beliefs or attitudes would be part of one’s 
conception of the good. They could even be, as may be likely in the case of the 
first example, the entirety of one’s conception of the good. One might, however, if 
one is a good liberal, recognise that promoting that which is good or valuable is 
not the only claim on one’s moral attention. One might think, also, that one’s 
pursuit of the good ought to be limited or constrained by the obligation one has to 
take others into account. This might be because one recognises that others do not 
always value what one values oneself, and that it would therefore be unfair, or 
unreasonable, to expect them to sacrifice their own pursuits in favour of one’s own 
(should it come to that). Or one might hold that unlimited pursuit of what one held 
to be valuable would create an undesirable level of conflict with one’s neighbours.   
 And one might, of course, have quite different reasons for holding back from 
all out pursuit of any particular good. But the important point to recognise is that 
there is an aspect of morality which involves the acceptance of such limits. This 
aspect twentieth-century English-language moral philosophers have called the 
right, and its relation to, and apparent or alleged independence from, the good as 
a source of value has been the topic of much debate. 
 So, when liberal neutralists such as Rawls and 
must be neutral between the various conceptions of the good life held by citizens, 
they do not mean that the state takes no position on how far citizens may go in 
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promoting or pursuing the good, let alone that the state enforces no values 
whatsoever. On the contrary, the limits of the good are precisely what the neutral 
state enforces, and indeed it can be said to demonstrate its neutrality in doing so.  
Liberal neutralism can be understood as the view that the state should enforce the 
right, while standing aloof from the conflicts about the good.   
 This formulation is very general, however, and therefore admits of a number 
y initial purpose in what follows is simply to offer a rough characterisation of the 
he first ambiguity I wish to discuss concerns what it means to say that the state 
2.1 Rival conceptions of the good  
eutralists raise no controversy (amongst each other, that is) if they claim that the 
of ambiguities. And here is where the trouble starts, for the effect of these 
ambiguities is, as we shall see in the remainder of this chapter, that the principle 
has been interpreted in a number of ways, ways which may well conflict with one 
another.   
 
M
different interpretations of the principle of state neutrality. Questions about the 
plausibility of the principle will be left to chapter two, where I discuss what grounds 
there might be for adhering to any interpretation of the neutrality principle in 
greater detail, and where we will also see in greater detail how different grounds 




must remain neutral between rival conceptions of the good. Thereafter I will look 
at two questions regarding the range of application of the principle, after which I 
will turn to what I take to be the crucial issue facing interpreters of the principle of 
state neutrality: the controversy regarding what it means to say that the state may 




state must be neutral between rival conceptions of the good. But we might wonder 
under what circumstances conceptions of the good might be said to be rivals. We 
might, in particular, wonder whether conceptions of the good which are largely 
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unchallenged can be accurately said to have rivals. Obviously any conception of 
the good whatsoever could be challenged, but a good many of them are in fact not 
challenged, or not seriously challenged, at least within particular societies. The 
question then arises as to whether a state which intentionally and/or successfully 
promotes goods on whose value there is an overwhelming consensus does in fact 
take sides between rival conceptions. 
Typical of one side of the argument is the view of Larmore, who holds that 
the ide
 have writers like Rawls and Dworkin, who express 
                                                
al of political neutrality ‘demands only that so long as some view about the 
good life remains disputed, no decision of the state can be justified on the basis of 
its supposed intrinsic superiority or inferiority.’48 In fact contemporary 
constitutional democracies, the vast majority of which pay lip service to neutrality 
in some sense, frequently act on the basis of (relatively) uncontroversial 
conceptions of the good. This is apparent, for example, in the subsidisation of 
museums and galleries, or the special place monogamous marriage has in law; 
here the state clearly proceeds on the basis that the cultivated or the 
monogamous, life is particularly valuable.49   
 Against Larmore we
serious misgivings about the possibility of state endorsement of any conception of 
the good. Rawls remarks, for example, in A theory of justice that ‘the principles of 
justice do not permit subsidising universities and institutes, or opera and the 
theatre, on the grounds that these institutions are intrinsically valuable,’50 
(although his position appears to soften in his later writings).51 Dworkin’s position 
is similar to that of the Rawls of A theory of justice, although he devotes 
considerably more effort to discovering allegedly neutral reasons as to why the 
state should indeed subsidise various forms of (uncontroversially valued) high 
48 Charles Larmore, Patterns of moral complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) p. 47. 
49 Of course it might be possible to defend the legal enshrinement of monogamous marriage, and possibly even the 
subsidisation of museums and galleries, purely on the basis of right, although those who do so may be suspected of casuistry.  
My guess is that the enshrinement of monogamous marriage is likely to become increasingly threatened in contemporary 
Western democracies as its basis in a conception of the good which is no longer quite as widespread as it once was becomes 
clear, and right-based justifications of it become ever less plausible. 
50 John Rawls, A theory of justice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 291. 
51 In a rather obscure passage on page 215 of Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), he remarks 
that ‘it is usually desirable to settle political questions by invoking the values of public reason.  Yet this may not always be so.’  
Rawls uses the term “public reason” in his later writings to describe a form of justification which, amongst other features, 
appeals to no particular conception of the good.  This passage ought therefore to be understood as suggesting that state policy 
with regard to constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice ought to be justified neutrally – in other words without 
reference to any particular conception of the good – after which it is also suggested that this stricture does not always hold.  
The circumstances under which it would not hold remain unclear.. 
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culture.52   
 Ultimately, as we shall see in chapter two, this dispute has its roots in the 
reasons philosophers bring for advocating state neutrality in the first place. Here it 
suffices to say that if one is moved to support state neutrality solely out of, say, a 
concern for political stability, then it is indeed unclear why one would hold that the 
state should refrain from backing monogamous marriage. In a culture where 
marriage of this kind is taken almost unanimously to be the most valuable form of 
life for purposes such as the raising of children and the nurturing of serious sexual 
relationships, and where these purposes are almost unanimously regarded as 
worthy goals, state support for monogamous marriage will in no way threaten 
social stability – in fact it will in all likelihood contribute towards it.   
 If, on the other hand, one’s primary reasons for advocating neutrality lie in the 
fact that one particularly values ethical or social diversity, one might think that the 
society could do with a little more variety in its sexual or familial arrangements 
than that engendered by the predominance of monogamous marriages. One 
might also advocate state neutrality on the basis of a commitment to personal 
autonomy, in which case one might argue that in a society where monogamous 
marriage is legally enshrined the choices citizens make for or against it do not 
amount to genuinely autonomous choices.53 And so one might wish for the state 
to remain aloof from the conflict (if conflict it is) between monogamy, bigamy, and 
promiscuity, or that between heterosexuality and the various alternatives to it, 
leaving citizens to have maximum opportunity to arrive at their own conclusions 
about the respective values of these sexual strategies.   
Whatever one’s position on how the neutral state should respond to 
consensus on the good, it cannot be defended without reference to the arguments 
for the neutrality principle. Because of this, we must postpone serious discussion 
of these alternatives until the second chapter, where I will examine the 
connections between arguments for neutrality and the various formulations of the 
neutrality principle in depth. For now I continue to survey these different 
formulations, turning next to the first of two questions concerning the range of the 
neutrality principle – questions concerning, in other words, which state actions, 
                                                
52 See in particular the essay “Can a liberal state support art?” in A matter of principle (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), pp. 221-33. 
53 See Waldron’s remarks to this effect in his “Autonomy and perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of freedom” Southern California 
Law Review 62 (1989), pp. 1098-1152 at pp. 1151-2. 
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institutions, policies or processes must be neutral, and which need not be. 
 
2.2 The range of the neutrality principle: comprehensive or 
narrow 
 
he first way in which advocates of the principle of state neutrality come to 
ussions of the neutrality principle to 
 of 
                                                
T
different interpretations of the principle arose out of an ambiguity in the term 
“rival”. The second, as we shall see, arises out of the fact that the word “state” can 
be understood in different ways. 
 One might use the term “state” in disc
apply strictly or primarily to the constitutional essentials of a society – those 
‘fundamental principles that specify the general structure of government and the 
political process: the powers of the legislature, executive and the judiciary; the 
scope of majority rule’ and those ‘equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that 
legislative majorities are to respect: such as the right to vote and to participate in 
politics, liberty of conscience, freedom of thought and of association, as well as 
the protections of the rule of law,’ to use Rawls’s formulation.54   
 And one might, in accordance with the use of the term “state” in this narrow 
sense, take the principle of state neutrality to apply only to such essentials, as do, 
for example, Rawls and Brian Barry,55 understanding the essential principles and 
rights to function like the rules of a game within which individuals and interest 
groups may legitimately attempt to promote their conceptions of the good. This 
view of the range of the principle I will refer to as the narrow neutrality principle.56 
 Principles and rights such as these do not, of course, exhaust the business
legislation. Much governmental activity involves making laws in contexts and with 
respect to matters less fundamental than those listed above, and which specify in 
a more fine-grained manner the rights and duties of citizens and their 
organisations. To many, if not most, the term “state” is just as applicable to 
legislation other than the constitutional essentials, and so, therefore, is the 
54 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 227.  Obviously, one might formulate 
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice differently.  I present Rawls’s formulation here so as to give the reader a 
general sense of what characterises the distinction between such essentials and broader legislative functions. 
55 Brian Barry, Justice as impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 161. 
56 See Steven Wall and George Klosko’s “Introduction” to the volume they edit entitled Perfectionism and neutrality (Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), p. 6. 
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principle of state neutrality. This view we will call the comprehensive neutrality 
principle,57 and it rules out the promotion of the good in any governmental context.   
 
It goes (almost) without saying that the reason why state neutrality of any range is 
es primarily by means of 
 expresses this view when he writes that his aim, in Political 
liberal
                                                
required is that the state has immense influence over the lives of citizens: 
whatever reason one has for thinking a non-neutral state to be an evil assumes in 
the first place that the state has significant influence.   
 Furthermore, given that the state affects our liv
legislation, and that constitutional provisions determine the nature and limits of 
other laws rather than vice versa, it is in the provisions of the constitution, rather 
than in the provisions of less fundamental legislation, that the state exercises its 
greatest influence. This is why the parties to the debate on this aspect of the 
range of the principle of state neutrality are divided in the way they are; this is 
why, in other words, there is no “the constitution can be partisan, but wider 
legislation must be neutral” party. The great influence of the constitutional 
essentials means that no one who was discriminated against by the constitution 
on the basis of their adherence to a particular conception of the good is likely to 
be satisfied by the reassurance that that all other legislation was neutral (were 
such a dispensation to be possible, which is doubtful), whereas one might 
certainly draw some comfort from a neutral constitution in cases where one’s 
conception of the good life was disadvantaged by the policies of the government 
of the day.   
Rawls
ism,  
is to consider first the strongest case where the political questions concern the most 
fundamental matters. If we should not honour the limits of public reason here, it would 
seem we need not honour them anywhere. Should they hold here, we can then 
proceed to other cases.58   
We might sum this up by saying that if anything ought to be neutral, it should be 
the constitution.   
57 See Steven Wall and George Klosko’s “Introduction” to the volume they edit entitled Perfectionism and neutrality (Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), p. 6.   
58 Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 215. 
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Richard Arneson has suggested that ‘something approaching a consensus has 
formed around…[the view that state neutrality]… applies not to each and every 
policy the state pursues, but only to constitutional essentials and basic justice, or 
the principles that regulate the basic structure of society’59; around the principle of 
narrow neutrality, in other words.   
 As examples of important consensus-makers of this kind he cites Rawls, who 
writes that  
 [o]ur exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in 
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal 
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable 
60
g drawn up, no conception of 
within the limits set by neutral principles of 
                                                
to their common human reason   
and Barry, who writes that ‘nobody is to be allowed to assert the superiority of his 
own conception of the good over those of other people as a reason for building 
into the framework for social co-operation special advantages for it’61 and that ‘at 
the point where basic principles and rules are bein
the good should be given a privileged position.’ 62   
 Accepting the narrow principle would mean accepting that just as a neutral 
constitution does not forbid citizens from promoting the good in their individual 
capacities, it might also, under specified circumstances, allow some functionaries 
of the state to promote the good. This it might do, for example, by allowing local 
institutions to promote certain goods, while insisting that national institutions 
refrain from doing likewise. It should then be possible to interpret a constitution 
which conforms to the neutrality principle to allow, say, local educational 
institutions to decide which excellences or virtues their curricula will attempt to 
inculcate in schoolchildren, local governments to fund galleries and museums and 
sporting events of a particular nature, and so on. In all such examples, however, 
the important point to remember is that peripheral legislation, as we might call it, 
would be to some extent analogous to private action, in that it would be a sphere 
in which the good may be pursued 
59 Richard Arneson, “Liberal neutrality on the good: An autopsy,” in Steven Wall and George Klosko (eds) Perfectionism and 
neutrality (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 191-218 at p. 206. 
60 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 137.  (The so-called principle of liberal 
legitimacy, which we encounter again in chapter three.) 
61 Brian Barry, Justice as impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 160.   
62 Brian Barry, Justice as impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 160.   
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right, enshrined in the constitution.   




the good, and it is 
                                                
 
One might, of course, ask why the domain of political morality should be split into 
two like this. Is it not simpler, and more in accordance with liberal tradition, merely 
to distinguish between private morality and political, or public, morality? And if we 
do this, and if we think that the principle of state neutrality applies to political 
morality, then surely it applies to the whole of political morality? 
 Put very roughly, the problem seems to be that comprehensive neutrality 
seems too much, even for neutralists. (Obviously it is also too much for 
perfectionists, but they can see this as a reason to call the appropriateness of 
neutrality at any level into doubt.) Working out why writers like Rawls and Barry 
take the position they do involves a certain amount of speculation, as, as can be 
seen in the passages quoted above, both appear to favour the narrow principle 
out of caution; both passages express the suggestion that at least neutrality in the 
constitutional sphere can be defended, as if defending comprehensive neutrality 
would take them into treacherous territory, but should not in principle be ruled out.  
This way of proceeding cannot be straightforwardly taken as an argument for 
narrow, as opposed to comprehensive 
y for defending neutrality per se.   
Barry does offer hints as to why he adopts the cautious attitude when he 
writes that ‘public policy [not constitutional matters] will in many m
 conception of the good,’ and further, to illustrate his point, that  
 [i]t would be absurd to suggest that there is some way of determining a [public 
school] curriculum that is neutral between all conceptions of 
significant that those who support the idea of legislative (as against constitutional) 
neutrality have never attempted to lay out a neutral curriculum.63 
This passage seems best interpreted to mean that it is impractical to demand that 
all essential state activity,64 at all levels, conform to the neutrality principle.  Hence 
the cautious defence of neutrality; if its ambitions are scaled down, restricting 
themselves to the basic essentials, the accusation that neutrality of any kind is 
63 Brian Barry, Justice as impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 161. 
64 This argument assumes, of course, that the provision of a public school curriculum is not a function that the state can simply 
drop. 
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unachievable is less likely to stick. The practicability of a constitution which does 
not promote any particular conception of the good is at least prima facie plausible, 
 the neutral state is 
t to adopt the neutrality of 
                                                
regardless of the plausibility of an entire legal apparatus which is neutral in this 
way.   
 Is this a strategy that neutralists ought to follow?  As we saw in the previous 
section,65 answering one question about the requirements of the neutrality 
principle may require already having answers to other questions about the 
meaning and justification of the principle.  In the case under discussion, we need 
to know whether to interpret state neutrality to mean neutrality of effect or 
neutrality of justification; whether, in other words, a neutral state is one which 
ensures that nothing it does leaves anyone any worse off as a result of their 
adherence to any particular conception of the good, or whether
one which does not to appeal to any particular conception of the good in justifying 
its policies, whatever the effects of these policies might be.66   
 Adopting the neutrality of effect interpretation does indeed render implausible 
the idea that the entire corpus of legislation, as opposed to the constitutional 
essentials, could be neutral. This is because ensuring that no one’s fate is 
adversely affected as a result of the effect any law or policy has on the adherents 
of any particular conception of the good would surely paralyse the state. Hence 
anyone who thinks that neutrality must be understood as neutrality of effect must 
prefer the narrow neutrality principle (if they are willing to stick with the principle of 
state neutrality at all), as requiring that nothing in the constitution leaves anyone 
worse off on account of their adherence to a particular conception of the good 
looks somewhat more achievable. (Whether one ough
effect interpretation is another matter, of course; one I discuss in the section 
below entitled “Favouring a conception of the good”).   
 On the other hand, if the neutrality principle is understood as requiring simply 
that the state not appeal to any conception of the good in making law and policy, 
then comprehensive neutrality looks more plausible. Richard Arneson points 
out,67 in response to Barry’s claim that any education must appeal to the value of 
65 The section on the question whether the state should remain neutral between all conceptions of the good, or merely between 
disputed conceptions of the good. 
66 I discuss this matter in greater depth in the section below entitled “Favouring a conception of the good”. 
67 See his “Liberal neutrality on the good: An autopsy,” in Steven Wall and George Klosko (eds) Perfectionism and neutrality 
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 191-218, at p. 210.  
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certain activities or experiences in comparison to others, that it is surely possible 
to justify educational goals in neutral terms. As Arneson puts it, ‘we can appeal to 
the idea that it is fair that every person have…opportunity to attain some 
reasonable threshold level of literacy and mathematical competence, and run 
public schools on this basis.’68 Furthermore, if one endorses Larmore’s position 
that state neutrality is not violated by legislation which promotes uncontroversial 
conceptions of the good, then it is even simpler to imagine how a policy of 
ion to which Rawls and Barry give further attention – 
deed, one might expect Rawls’s response to be simply that peripheral legislation 
                                                
comprehensive state neutrality might successfully be applied to, for example, 
public school curricula.69     
 In the absence of compelling examples of the impossibility of justifying 
legislation neutrally,70 narrow neutralists face the accusation that there is 
something arbitrary about failing to extend the requirement of neutrality beyond 
the constitutional essentials. If there is a good case for state neutrality, and if it is 
just as feasible for legislation to be neutral as it is for the constitutional essentials, 
what grounds could there be for permitting state perfectionism on the legal 
periphery? This is not a quest
in
is not the focus of his work.   
 
But perhaps there are such grounds – grounds for regarding peripheral legislation 
as sufficiently unimportant for state neutrality such that the state may legitimately 
promote the good by means of it. Obviously, no neutralist case for the narrow 
principle can succeed without first establishing that there is a case for any version 
of the principle of state neutrality. What the neutralist then has to do is explain why 
the reasons for adopting the neutrality principle in the first place – be they the 
importance of personal autonomy, the importance of stability, the impossibility of 
68 See his “Liberal neutrality on the good: An autopsy,” in Steven Wall and George Klosko (eds) Perfectionism and neutrality 
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 191-218, at p. 210.  
69 Some, such as Russell Keat in his Cultural goods and the limits of the market, have argued that the inculcation of certain 
cultural values (such as, for example, the idea that a life with art is superior to a life without it) promote autonomy in individuals.  
If one takes the – admittedly controversial – view that autonomy is a neutral value, Keat’s argument can also establish that a 
neutral public school curriculum is possible. 
70 I do not address the matter here of the desirability of peripheral as well as constitutional legislation being neutrally justified, 
merely whether it would be possible.  We will see in chapters three and four that liberal perfectionists do not consider such 
neutrality desirable; Raz in fact thinks that it damages personal autonomy.   
Furthermore, I come, in chapters two and three, to discuss the possibility that avowedly anti-perfectionist political 
moralities do in fact rely on (controversial) conceptions of the good.  However the subject of these later discussions is the 
difficulty the possibility that these anti-perfectionist moralities in fact rely on unacknowledged conceptions of the good raises for 
any form of the principle of state neutrality, narrow or comprehensive.  Given that the current matter under discussion is simply 
whether it is necessary or wise for neutralists merely to defend a narrow neutrality principle, as opposed to a comprehensive 
one, I do not raise deeper theoretical difficulties for neutralism in general at this point. 
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knowledge of the good, or any of a number of others – demonstrate the necessity 
of a ne
the ambiguities in the formulation of the principle, turning next to discuss 
hether the neutralist state must refrain only from using coercion to promote the 
 
2.3 The range of the neutrality principle: only coercive promotion 
of the good? 
 required even when the policy in question involves no 
coerciv
t
te’s acquiring the right to coerce 
                                                
utral constitution or neutral principles of basic justice with that much more 
urgency than they do the necessity of neutral legislation.   
Whether this is possible is a matter I will discuss in chapter two, when I 
come to discuss the cogency of the various arguments for neutrality in general.  
For the moment it suffices to note that neutralists divide into comprehensive and 
narrow neutralists, and that deciding which of the two strategies is the more 
promising depends, as with so much in this debate, on what reasons one has for 





Another way in which the range of the principle of state neutrality is open to 
different interpretations concerns the issue of coercion; in particular, whether the 
principle requires the state to refrain from acting on the basis of a particular 
conception of the good only in cases where doing so involves coercing citizens, or 
whether neutrality is
e measures. 
It is hardly surprising that anti-perfectionism and a particular concern with 
coercion are linked in the work of many writers; the s ate is distinguished from 
other actors in liberal71 political theory by its monopoly72 on the legitimate use of 
force,73 and there is a certain symmetry in holding that the state’s being 
distinguished in this way entails it being distinguished by the reasons for which it 
may act (or the reasons for which it may not act, in this case) as well. One might 
put it this way: for many anti-perfectionists, the sta
71 And any version of democratic theory. 
72 Near monopoly would be more accurate, given that most democratic theorists, liberals included, recognise the right of 
citizens to defend themselves by means of force under some circumstances. 
73 Raz is a notable exception to this view, and Waldron has suggested that Raz’s view that the state is distinguished rather by 
the generality of its claim to authority is linked to his view that taxation, for example, is not necessarily a coercive exercise of 
state power.  See Jeremy Waldron,, “Autonomy and perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of freedom,” Southern California Law 




 say in cases where the state appears to exercise its power without coercion. 
tate may not use such methods either to promote the good or 
as an example of the state exercising its power coercively 
over th
                                                
 it must lose the right to promote the good. 
But if it is concern with the state’s right to coerce which is the primary 
impulse in ruling out perfectionist legislation, such neutralists must work out wh
to
 
Clearly, any state frequently resorts to coercion so as to ensure compliance with 
the law; any cases where it uses force or threatens to use force to compel citizens 
either to do or to refrain from doing something count as coercion. And neutralists 
are agreed that the s
to forbid the bad.74   
 But are all exercises of state power exercises in coercion? Citizens who 
accept the legitimacy of a law can certainly not be said to have been coerced into 
compliance with it. And although they may be aware that violations will result in 
punishment, in those cases where the legitimacy of the legislation is 
wholeheartedly accepted fear of punishment is not among their reasons for 
compliance.75 Furthermore, if we accept Raz’s stipulation that, for a threat to be a 
coercive one, it must be a serious threat, citizens who comply with a law because 
they wish to avoid the minor inconveniences that certain punishments would bring 
upon them – small fines, say – can also not be said to have been coerced into 
compliance by the state.76 Thus the promulgation of legislation which is complied 
with because citizens accept its legitimacy, or because they fear punishment 
which is not sufficiently serious for the threat of it to count as a case of coercion, 
cannot be described 
ose citizens.   
We can conclude from this that the case for the legitimacy of non-coercive 
legislation of this kind – legislation that is non-coercive because it is accepted as 
legitimate by citizens – is the same as the case for the compatibility of the 
promotion of uncontroversial conceptions of the good by means of the law with the 
principle of state neutrality, as discussed in the section above entitled “Rival 
74 Some perfectionists, Raz included, hold a position quite close to this as well. 
75 Here I ignore the possibility – far fetched, it seems to me – that all instances of apparently wholehearted commitment to the 
law are cases of self-deception, where fear is in fact a genuine motivating factor, albeit one which the actor cannot or will not 
acknowledge.  This is not to deny that there are such cases. 
76 See Raz’s comment at page 149 of The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), that, in order for a case to be 
an example of coercion, avoiding the (credibly) threatened consequence of non-compliance must be, for the coercee, ‘a reason 
of great weight for not doing’ whatever it is that is being proscribed by the coercer.  
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conceptions of the good”. For legislation which appeals to non-controversial 
conceptions of the good would not coerce citizens into compliance, regardless of 
what punishments were threatened for violations. And so those neutralists, such 
as Larmore, who are attracted to the view that state neutrality requires merely that 
the state refrain from promoting controversial conceptions of the good have 
reason to accept that non-coercive promotion of the good does not violate the 
princip
rcive perfectionist legislation? And, if so, what 
ught neutralists to say about it? 
 who 
pursue
ere is indeed a category of 
ontroversial non-coercive perfectionist legislation.   
le of state neutrality. 
The categories of non-coercive perfectionist legislation and non-
controversial perfectionist legislation clearly overlap. But might there also be a 
category of controversial non-coe
o
 
Not all exercises of state power are obviously coercive. A state may exercise its 
power through the medium of offers as well as threats. It may reward certain kinds 
of behaviour so as to promote the good. And it can, of course, reward those
 a controversial conception of the good, so as to promote this good.   
One way of doing this would be to offer tax breaks to those who engage in 
or support favoured activities. Another would be simply to subsidise these 
activities.  The state may also accord privileged legal status to forms of life which 
are considered valuable, as most contemporary constitutional democracies do 
when they agree to enforce certain kinds of contracts – monogamous marriage 
contracts, for example – and refuse to enforce others – agreements to sell body 
parts, and the like – and in so doing, aim at encouraging citizens that might not 
otherwise have done so to commit themselves to these putatively valuable forms 
of life and/or avoid those which are not valuable. Furthermore, the state might also 
use advertising or other public relations techniques so as to encourage valuable 
forms of life or discourage worthless ones. Such policies do not appear to coerce 
citizens into pursuing the good, and they certainly do not forbid citizens from 
pursuing the worthless, and so, it would appear, th
c
 
Waldron has suggested, however, that even if these allegedly non-coercive 
methods of promoting the good do not literally force one to get married or to take 
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up painting, the distinction between coercive state action and non-coercive state 
action is illusory.  As he puts it, ‘[the state‘s] supremacy ultimately springs from its 
comma
eir innocuous appearances, in fact examples of the coercive use 
ial, then, they are also coercive, just as with more obvious forms of 
, on the threat of coercion so as to promote the good of 
                                                
nd of considerable means of violence.’77   
If Waldron is right, then any difference of opinion on what the principle of 
state neutrality requires of the state in cases where its power is exercised non-
coercively is of little interest. But must we believe that methods such as 
subsidising, promoting, or according privileged legal status to, valuable forms of 
life are, despite th
of state power?   
 Waldron’s argument boils down to this: all of these state activities depend on 
the state’s collection of taxes. Given that payment of taxes is compulsory, and that 
failure to do so is punishable, frequently severely, those who do not wish to 
subsidise the allegedly valuable options for the benefit of which the taxes are 
collected are plainly coerced into supporting them. To the extent that they are 
controvers
coercion. 
 Even in those cases where all the state does is establish special status for 
certain forms of life, as it does when it recognises monogamous marriage, 
Waldron argues, the laws establishing this status are what he calls ‘fragments of a 
legal system which is itself coercive,’ for the reason that, although they do not 
compel citizens to restrict themselves to any particular type of sexual relationship, 
let alone compel them to marry, they do affect greatly matters such as who has a 
right to what property, manner of financial support, and tax benefits, and other 
such issues, and these rights are upheld by coercive sanction,78 and in this way 
do indeed rely, ultimately
monogamous marriage. 
 A good deal of Waldron’s argument turns on the idea that what is actually 
problematic about coercive perfectionism is that it undermines the autonomy of 
citizens; for this reason even if his claim that all apparently non-coercive methods 
of promoting the good are ultimately coercive can be rebutted, he may still argue 
77 Jeremy Waldron, “Autonomy and perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of freedom,” Southern California Law Review 62 (1989), pp. 
1098-1152 at p. 1139. 
78 Jeremy Waldron, “Autonomy and perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of freedom,” Southern California Law Review 62 (1989), pp. 
1098-1152 at pp. 1150-2. 
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that their manipulative nature is sufficient for them to undermine citizens’ 
t of 
nds for thinking they aren’t, whatever Raz 
oncedes (and Waldron asserts). 
od by the use of tax breaks, as well as by collecting 
volunta
 
                                                
autonomy, and therefore for the principle of state neutrality to rule them out. 
 Furthermore, Raz, a leading defender of state support for valuable forms of 
life, but who, despite identifying himself as a perfectionist, nevertheless expresses 
adherence to Mill’s harm principle,79 concedes that, to the extent that the state 
relies on compulsory taxation to raise the funds necessary for subsidising valuable 
forms of life or according them privileged legal status, such strategies for 
promoting the good are coercive.80 Raz, like Waldron, thinks that the important 
issue is not whether such strategies are coercive or not, but rather whether they 
damage autonomy, and the key difference between his position and tha
Waldron is that Raz thinks that such subsidies can in fact promote autonomy. 
 This is a matter to which I will shortly return, but for the moment I wish to 
remain focused on the question of whether all exercises of state power are 
necessarily coercive, given the guns lurking behind those subsidies for artists.  
This is because there are grou
c
 
Even if we concede that compulsory taxation does coerce those who do not share 
the conceptions of the good tax money is used to support, we do not have to 
accept that all uses of the state’s fiscal powers are coercive. This is because the 
state may promote the go
ry tax payments.   
In cases of the first kind the state might, for example, make donations of 
certain kinds tax deductible and others not. Companies may then be faced with 
incentives to donate large sums of money to, say, artistic foundations, and in this 
way would be encouraged themselves to subsidise valuable forms of life. In cases 
of the second kind, the state might, as it in fact does in Germany, collect voluntary 
tax payments (effectively donations) on behalf of a small number of established 
religious bodies, presumably on the grounds that the practices these bodies
79 John Stuart Mill, on page 13 of On liberty (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), says, in an oft-quoted passage, that  
 
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against 
his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.  He 
cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make 
him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right.  
80 The morality of freedom find exact quote. 
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promo
o have at least one, and 
possib
iples 
ese two states adhere to squares best with the principle of state neutrality. 
n of autonomy, given its 
ut would non-coercive promotion of the good be any more 
                                                
te constitute valuable forms of life. 
Perhaps a case similar to that made by Waldron for the view that state 
support for monogamous marriage is ultimately coercive could be made against 
examples of the first kind; perhaps, in other words, one might establish that laws 
permitting such tax breaks can, ultimately, also be seen as fragments of a 
coercive legal system. One might do this by pointing to the web of legal relations 
in which such tax breaks are entwined, some of which would, ultimately, take the 
form of coercive prohibitions on certain uses of property etc. But it is quite 
implausible to classify the collection of voluntary church taxes as coercive in this 
way, at least if the performance of these collection duties is the only way the state 
privileges these particular religious bodies. So we d
ly two, examples of non-coercive perfectionism. 
The question, of course, is what this conclusion implies for the debate 
between those neutralists who accept the legitimacy of non-coercive perfectionism 
and those who do not. One, obvious, implication, is that there is indeed a 
difference between the two parties; there is indeed something to fight about. But 
one may be forgiven for thinking that, unless a plausible rebuttal for Waldron’s 
argument that even subsidies and privileged legal status for valuable ways of life 
constitute coercion can be found, there is not a great deal to fight about. We’re left 
with the difference between a state that collects voluntary taxes on the behalf of 
valuable institutions and one which doesn’t. We may still ask, of course, which of 
these two views which serve as the basis for the fundamental political princ
th
 
This depends, as with the other ambiguities in the neutrality principle discussed in 
this chapter, on what one’s grounds for adopting the neutrality principle in the first 
place are. And this is where we return to the questio
prominence as a basis for commitment to neutrality.81   
   Clearly, taking autonomy seriously means objecting to coercion. As Raz puts 
it, ‘[t]he contribution of autonomy to a person’s life explains why coercion is the 
evil it is.’82 B
81 I discuss reasons for adopting the principle of state neutrality systematically and in detail in chapter two. 
82 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 377. 
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accept
rd making the decision for them. In doing 
so, it fa





                                                
able?   
Some writers, such as Waldron, suggest that any promotion of the good 
shows disrespect for citizens. He argues that by increasing the costs attached to 
pursuing the worthless, or decreasing the costs attached to pursuing the valuable 
(or both), the state prevents citizens from making decisions about the direction 
their lives ought to take on the merits of the options before them. Making 
decisions on the merits is a necessary condition of rationality, and rationality is, on 
most readings, a necessary condition of autonomy. So when the state promotes 
the good, argues Waldron, it makes the decision on behalf of citizens, or, to put it 
more moderately, it goes some way towa
ils to respect their autonomy.83   
We might, as Waldron does, characterise such policies as manipulative, 
and, as such, just as damaging to autonomy as coercion. If, further, one adheres 
to the neutrality principle on the basis of the importance of autonomy, one will 
obviously incline towards the view that neutrality rules out a
as opposed to merely the coercive ways of doing so.   
Other writers, however, including Raz84 and Sher,85 have called into 
question the view that subsidisation, or the according of privileged legal status to 
valuable forms of life, or even what Sher calls ‘the manipulation of the nonrational 
determinants of preference’86 are necessarily opposed to respecting citizens’ 
autonomy. Assessing the plausibility of the arguments of Raz and Sher would, 
however, take us into territory reserved for chapter two, namely, th
r the principle of state neutrality ought to be adhered to at all.   
For the moment it suffices to say that accepting that manipulation and/or 
coercion do not necessarily disregard the autonomy of the one manipulated or 
coerced is unlikely to leave one in the neutralist camp – at least not on the basis 
that neutrality is necessary for autonomy. If, on the other hand, one thinks that the 
principle of state neutrality can be derived from a commitment to personal 
autonomy, one is probably going to accept that non-coercive – manipulative, i
83 As we noted above, Waldron believes in addition that such policies are coercive.  But it is important to note that his argument 
for their damaging effect on autonomy applies equally whether such policies are in fact coercive or not. 
84 See the section entitled “Autonomy and the harm principle” in Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1986) at pp. 412-9. 
85 George Sher, Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at pp. 64-5. 
86 George Sher, Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 36. 
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other words – promotion of the good is enough of a threat for it to be proscribed. 
our of any particular 
). Opposition to the one would in all 
likeliho
ng about civil strife, or making citizens’ lives worse than neutral governments 
do.   
hey go depends on 
(quasi-
                                                
 
Of course a commitment to autonomy is not the only reason why one might 
adhere to the neutrality principle. One might, for example, be a moral sceptic, and 
argue that seeing as there can be no reasons in fav
conception of the good, the state is obliged to be neutral.   
 Although very few philosophers have taken this line of argument seriously,87 it 
still has sufficient life outside of philosophical circles. So we may note here that, 
assuming it is possible to take a consistent position of this kind, moral scepticism 
would not incline one to think that non-coercive perfectionism was any more 
justifiable than coercive perfectionism (assuming it was the only basis of one’s 
commitment to the neutrality principle
od mean opposition to the other. 
One might, somewhat more plausibly, think that state neutrality follows for 
what Sher calls “prophylactic” reasons;88 reasons such as the fear(s) that, in 
general, perfectionist governments run a higher risk of oppressing citizens, 
bringi
Assuming for the moment that some such arguments succeed, we can say 
that where such neutralists would fall on the issue of whether the principle of state 
neutrality permits non-coercive promotion of the good depends on the role they 
believe non-coercive perfectionist laws play in bringing about the unfortunate 
consequences perfectionism in general is said to give rise to. Some such 
neutralists might agree that the principle of state neutrality permits non-coercive 
perfectionism and others might not, but whichever way t
)empirical claims about the effects of perfectionism.89 
So, for example, one who thinks that perfectionism heightens the danger of 
tyranny, or the danger of those in power acquiring excessive influence or wealth, 
would need to assess whether a government which permitted only non-coercive 
promotion of the good would run a greater risk of fostering these evils than a 
87 Bruce Ackerman, for example, discusses the argument for state neutrality from moral scepticism with a certain degree of 
enthusiasm on page 369 of his Social justice in the liberal state (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), but, given his 
coyness about the provenance of his neutralist convictions, it is difficult to know whether he genuinely endorses this argument. 
88 See George Sher, Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 106-39. 
89 Quasi-empirical because predictions.  
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neutral government. If the answer is yes, and fear of oppression is indeed the sole 
(or primary) impulse behind this commitment to the principle of state neutrality, 
then clearly all forms of perfectionist legislation must be proscribed. And so it 
goes, on similar lines, for arguments for neutrality from fear of instability or from 
the fear that perfectionist laws make the lives of citizens worse than neutral laws 
would do. We will look at the plausibility of such arguments in detail in chapter 
two, and this will enable us better to decide whether non-coercive promotion of the 
ood really is compatible with the principle of state neutrality or not.  
2.4 Favouring a conception of the good  
what it means to say that the 
favours a particular conception of the good.   
 
ood gets any special favours, 
t they are said to have done, or 
 




I wish now, however, to turn to what is perhaps the most important ambiguity in 
the formulation of the principle of state neutrality: 
state 
Let us assume that the political arena can be understood as a conflict-ridden 
realm where the conceptions of the good endorsed by individuals battle for 
influence. Neutralists argue, unlike perfectionists, that the state must, in the face 
of these conflicts, ensure that no conception of the g
just as an unbiased sports referee favours no team. 
 Referees, of course, are frequently accused of bias.  And states regularly face 
the same accusation. So what exactly is it tha
failed to do, when their neutrality is questioned? 
 
First, it is obvious that a referee who aims to help one side is not neutral.  We 
might draw from this rough starting point the provisional conclusion that neutrality 
is a quality of the aims of those individuals or bodies entrusted with the kind of 
adjudicatory role referees and states are entrusted with (at least in liberal theory). 
We might conclude that to be neutral – in other words, to avoid favouring any side 
– is to act without any intention of helping or hindering either side. 
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In sport, however, even games officiated by the most scrupulously neutral 
referees usually end up with a winning side and a losing side. Likewise, certain 
practices, ideals, or forms of life, may “win” or “lose” under the auspices of a state 
which purports to be neutral, and where this neutrality is taken to mean that it 
aims neither to hinder nor to help any of them. The influence of, for example, 
particular religions or art forms may wax and wane. If neutrality is a matter of aim, 
we are not entitled to conclude from these “victories” and “defeats” that the state 
lacks neutrality. For just as the neutral referee is not obliged to ensure that every 
game ends in a draw, neither is the state obliged to ensure that all conceptions of 
the good fare equally well.   
What the neutral referee is obliged to do – and this is what his neutrality, on 
the neutrality of aim view, consists in – is, by dint of the unbiased application of 
the laws of the game, ensure that only the deserving side wins, not the team that 
best secures for itself unjust advantages, as it might by cheating in various ways 
(which include receiving favours from the referee). Likewise, the neutral state is 
obliged to ensure, by the impartial application of the law, that only conceptions of 
the good which are entitled to do so90 gain influence, and not those ideals which 
are spread, say, by violence, or indeed by soliciting help from the state to facilitate 
their success. 
Neutrality, in its core sense, as Waldron reminds us,91 implies keeping out 
of a quarrel between two (or more) other parties. But this is not, strictly speaking, 
what either a neutral referee or a neutral state does, given that they do intervene.  
This means that there must be something about the rules neutral adjudicators 
apply which allows us to say that neutrality consists in their impartial application, 
despite the fact that they have differential effects on different forms of life (or on 
different sporting virtues and vices). This feature is elusive, but it is frequently 
identified as the fact that the rules enforce the right (as opposed to targeting any 
particular conception of the good life), or, sometimes, that their aims are 
independent of any such partisan intentions.  
                                                
90 The question whether desert is involved where some conceptions of the good life prosper under a neutral dispensation and 
others do not is a difficult one, and falls beyond the scope of this dissertation, hence my use of the more neutral term “entitled 
to”, which encompasses luck as well as desert.  Rawls denies that this is the case – see his Political liberalism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 195-200 – whereas Haksar, a perfectionist, writes as if this is indeed an assumption of 
Rawls’s position: see his remarks on what he calls the “choice criterion of value” in his Equality, liberty, and perfectionism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 206-25.   
91 Jeremy Waldron “Legislation and moral neutrality,” in Robert Goodin and Andrew Reeve (eds) Liberal Neutrality (London: 
Routledge, 1989), pp. 61-83 at pp. 63-4. 
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The latter is Nozick’s position, which he outlines in a passage where he 
ridicules the suggestion that a state cannot be neutral if it prohibits rape, given 
that such a prohibition disproportionately penalises men.92 He concedes that such 
a prohibition does penalise men in this way, but argues that it cannot be construed 
as a non-neutral piece of legislation because targeting men (or even frustrating 
that class of men who are attracted by the prospect of raping) is not, in any known 
case, the aim of prohibiting rape. In saying that there are independent reasons for 
prohibiting rape he means there are (good) reasons for doing so which have 
nothing to do with the desire to privilege any particular conception of the good. 
The sporting analogy with the prohibition of rape might run as follows: 
Forbidding punching on the sports field – assuming the sport in question is not 
boxing – has nothing to do with the desire to penalise whichever team happens to 
have superior pugilistic skills. There are good, “independent,” reasons for 
forbidding such actions, and so the referee who punishes the violent player who 
throws a punch is not thereby demonstrating his bias against violent players, or 
anyone else. 
A similar argument is made by defenders of the neutrality of aim conception 
with respect to cases which do not involve prohibitions, but where policies with 
neutral aims lead to the decline of a particular form of life. Will Kymlicka presents 
the example of a state which promotes the English language at the expense of 
others for the reason that, in the state in question, English is the most common 
language, and that communication is therefore improved by everybody having a 
command of the language.93 Other languages might well begin to die out under 
such circumstances, and this may be experienced, at least by the last generation 
that speaks the language, as a cultural loss, but, on the neutrality of aim view, as 
long as the legislation does not aim at damaging the other languages, it cannot be 
construed as a violation of state neutrality.   
Similarly, one might expect that cultures whose survival requires a certain 
amount of pressure on their members to conform – “closed” cultures, we might 
call them – are likely to suffer a mounting loss of membership and influence in 
societies where standard democratic freedoms are enforced. Members can no 
                                                
92 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, state, and utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 272-3. 
93 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary political philosophy (2ed) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 344. 
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longer be pressurised to remain within the community, and, as a result, 
community practices fall into decline. This can be seen in the history of various 
religious and linguistic groups which have not made the transition to modernity 
with success. Here the sporting analogy would run as follows: A neutral 
application of the laws of most football codes will likely result in victory for the 
young, the strong, the fast, and the intelligent. This does not mean that the referee 
is biased against the old, the weak, the slow, and the stupid.   
Now whereas no one (or almost no one) would be sorry to see the practice 
of rape decline, we might regret the demise of closed cultures under a neutral 
dispensation, a little as we might be sorry to see the humiliation of an ageing 
sports star by a new generation of players. As Rawls puts, ‘We may indeed 
lament the limited space, as it were, of social worlds, and of ours in particular; and 
we may regret some of the inevitable effects of our culture and social structure.’94  
But we cannot, if we understand state neutrality as neutrality of aim, regard these 
differential effects as a sufficient condition for the attribution of bias to the state, 
and we cannot, therefore, require that the state intervene to restore the status quo 
ante (at least not on the grounds that neutrality requires this) any more than we 
think that a referee demonstrates impartiality by bending the rules to help the old 
star hold his own against the younger. 
 
But is neutrality of aim how we should understand what it means to favour a 
particular conception of the good? On the one hand, any idea of neutrality which 
requires the state to be neutral between those who believe that raping others is 
part of the good life and those (everyone, rapists included, one would think) who 
hold that being raped makes their lives worse is clearly absurd; it is unclear what 
the attractions of neutrality are if they include a moral vision which refuses to 
discriminate between any ways of life. On the other hand, one might also think, as 
a speaker of a non-English language in the state of Kymlicka’s example, that any 
alleged neutrality in a state which takes steps which it knows will in all likelihood 
lead to the extinction of one’s culture is something of a sham.95 One might 
wonder, under these circumstances, why the intentions or aims of state actors are 
                                                
94 Political liberalism  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 197. 
95 One might also, of course, think that such a state is neutral, but that neutrality is less important than the survival of one’s 
culture. 
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more relevant to the state’s neutrality than the fact that certain sectors of the 
population whose way of life is not illegitimate in any way are disadvantaged in 
ways fully foreseeable at the time of legislation by the laws these state actors 
make. 
 That one is inclined to wonder this kind of thing does not automatically mean 
that one is justified in wondering it, of course.  But there certainly is reason to be 
dissatisfied with using the neutrality of the intentions or aims of state actors as the 
measure of the neutrality of a state. This is because of the mysterious nature of 
such intentions.  Ascertaining the real intentions of individuals is difficult enough; 
they are frequently confused or unknown, and some would even suggest that they 
are in principle unknowable, although this seems exaggerated. But when we move 
to the intentions of institutions or corporate bodies, the problem multiplies beyond 
comprehension. It is genuinely unclear that we can talk, with any degree of sense, 
of collective intentions. 
Furthermore, even if motivations were reasonably discernable, they are 
hardly ever pure. The English-speaking lawmaker may genuinely aim to improve 
communication throughout the land, while simultaneously wishing to damage the 
prestige of the languages he does not speak. How do we judge whether the 
legislation he helps, on the basis of these motivations, to promulgate is neutral – 
especially if he acts in concert with other lawmakers who are motivated in yet 
other ways (assuming one can ascertain what moves them all in the first place) – 
if the purity of his intentions is our yardstick? 
 
2.4.2 Neutrality as neutrality of justification  
 
As a result of these difficulties contemporary neutralists generally do not formulate 
the principle of state neutrality such that state neutrality means neutrality of aim on 
the part of state actors. Some, such as Robert Goodin and Andrew Reeve, argue 
that, as a result of these difficulties, neutrality must be defined in terms of results, 
as they put it.96 We come to look at this option in the section entitled “Neutrality as 
neutrality of effect” below. But for the moment let us ask whether neutrality as 
                                                
96 Robert Goodin and Andrew Reeve, ‘Do neutral institutions add up to a neutral state?’ in Robert Goodin and Andrew Reeve, 
(eds) Liberal neutrality (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 193-210 at p. 202.   
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neutrality of aim can be reformulated so as to shed the problem of the 
unknowability of the motivations of individuals and institutions, while retaining its 
intuitive appeal. 
 The most popular formulation of the principle of state neutrality, with respect 
to how the concept of favouring a conception of the good is to be construed, is 
what we will call the neutrality of justification interpretation. Larmore, for example, 
writes that 
 [P]olitical neutrality consists in a constraint on what factors can be invoked to justify 
a political decision. Such a decision can count as neutral only if it can be justified 
without appealing to the presumed intrinsic superiority of any particular conception of 
the good life. So long as a government conforms its decisions to this constraint, 
therefore, it will be acting neutrally. There is no independently describable condition of 
society to be called “neutral” that the ideal of political neutrality requires a government 
97
realm, so to speak – than its aims, 
if it can
tral, and therefore illegitimate, regardless 
of wha
                                                
to promote or maintain.  
Similar formulations can be found in the writings of Ackerman,98 Rawls,99 Sher100, 
and Waldron.101 The great advantage in replacing the aims of the state with the 
justifications put forward by a state for its actions is that these justifications are 
more readily discerned – they are in the public 
 even coherently be said to have any.   
The neutrality of justification interpretation understands neutrality to be a 
rule about what kinds of reasons the state may legitimately offer – over and above 
the normal requirements of reasonable plausibility – in justifying the legislation or 
policy it puts forward. This rule specifies that if a piece of legislation or policy 
cannot be justified except by appeal to its role in promoting a (controversial) 
conception of the good life, it is non-neu
tever other merits it might have.   
So, to return to Kymlicka’s example, if the state were unable to justify its 
promotion of the English language at the expense of other languages on the basis 
that this would improve communication (or on some other neutral basis) then such 
97 Charles Larmore, Patterns of moral complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 44. 
98 Bruce Ackerman, Social justice in the liberal state (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 8-10. 
99 John Rawls, “The priority of the right and ideas of the good,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 17, 4 (1988)  pp. 251-76 at p. 262. 
100 George Sher, Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 4. 
101 Jeremy Waldron, “Legislation and moral neutrality” in Robert Goodin and Andrew Reeve (eds) Liberal neutrality (London: 
Routledge, 1989), pp. 61-83 at pp. 66-8. 
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legislation would not be neutral. In other words, if it turned out that promotion of 
English would not improve communication, or that the improvement of 
communication was not necessary, or did not outweigh reasons for promoting 
other languages equally, then the proposed legislation would be in trouble; an 
alternative neutral justification would have to be found. If this were not possible – if 
it were only possible to justify the legislation by appeal to the alleged superiority of 
ions of justice, or questions of equality, 
ay arise, but not questions of neutrality. 
trality of aim.  
s refusal to compensate for defects losing sides 
                                                
the English language102 – then it could not be promulgated by a neutral state. 
 But, just as is the case with the neutrality of aim interpretation, the mere fact 
that the fortunes of forms of life, languages, cultures, religions and so on are 
differentially affected by neutrally justified legislation does not in itself call the 
neutrality of the state into question. Quest
m
 
The appeal of neutrality as neutrality of justification is, on the one hand, that it 
accords with the core sense of neutrality as keeping out of a conflict by presenting 
us with the image of the state as referee, impartially adjudicating the rules of the 
contest between conflicting visions of the good life, letting the chips fall where they 
may, while, on the other hand, avoiding the obvious difficulties of neu
It is unsurprising that the majority of writers on the topic adhere to it. 
 But, as we noted in introducing the question of the formulation of the principle 
of state neutrality, this consensus is not universal. Here the sporting metaphor is 
useful again, this time in that the point where it breaks down indicates why one 
might be unhappy with neutrality of justification as the correct interpretation of the 
principle of state neutrality. Sport, as a practice, unashamedly sets out to privilege 
certain (sporting) virtues, and the rules of most sports are set up precisely to allow 
these virtues to emerge triumphant over their corresponding vices. There is a 
point to the various sports, in other words. So, while a neutral referee favours no 
team, his interventions discriminate intentionally against certain qualities of teams 
– their age, their weakness, their slowness, their stupidity – for the reason that the 
laws of the game discriminate against these qualities. In fact one of the features of 
his neutrality is precisely hi
display. Pity is not neutrality! 
102 Provided superiority means more than “better able to facilitate communication in this particular country”. 
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 But this is surely not how (most) liberals want to understand the laws of 
society.  Sport is a circumscribed arena, and, largely, not a matter of life and 
death.103 In general, liberals – especially neutralist liberals – do not understand 
society as a forum for the triumph of virtue over vice. It is the fact that the 
individuals within a society do not agree on what the most important virtues and 
vices are that leads many liberals to advocate state neutrality in the first place. In 
this case a neutral referee looks more like one who adjudicates between different 
visions of virtue and vice, not one who impartially applies rules which are 
designed to allow the virtues to blossom unimpeded by the distractions of vice.104  
So whereas the team that loses on the sports field does not, merely in virtue of the 
fact that it has lost, have a complaint against the neutrality of the referee,105 it may 
be that those whose conception of the good “loses” – whether we mean by this 
simply that it loses ground within society or, alternatively, that it is proscribed 
                                                
outright – do have such a complaint.   
 Raz has indicated precisely why such a complaint might be justified; because, 
he argues,106 the neutrality of justification interpretation excuses a nation which 
sells arms to one party during a military conflict and not the other, provided it 
(genuinely, one assumes) publicly announces profit to be the justification for the 
sales – profit, presumably, being a neutral, or independent, as Nozick would have 
it,107 reason for action. It is hard to see why the party to which arms are not sold 
ought to regard the nation which sells them as neutral – interdicting such 
shipments would seem perfectly justified – and yet it is also quite unclear why the 
profit motive should be understood, in general, as a partial or biased reason for 
action. The point is that it is biased in this case. And it is biased in this case, 
presumably, because of the effect it has on the conflict between the two warring 
parties. So a state that was genuinely neutral between all visions of the good 
might have to ensure after all that, say, languages other than English prosper, 
whatever the virtues of English as an agent of communication, and perhaps even 
103 There are contrary voices, of course. 
104 Ironically, the neutrality of justification interpretation could provide perfectionists, or even communitarians, with a theory of 
state impartiality (if not state neutrality): An impartial state, on this view, would be one which, without respect for persons, 
applied those laws which promote the favoured conception of the good (just as an impartial referee applies on the sports field, 
without particular respect for either team, the laws which are designed to promote those qualities which we value in sport).   
105 It does not have a complaint against the neutrality of the rules either, despite them being discriminatory, in that the team’s 
participation in the contest assumes its willingness to be judged according to these standards. 
106 See his The morality of freedom, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) p. 116, where he discusses Nozick’s version of anti-
perfectionism. 
107 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, state, and utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) pp. 272-3. 
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ensure a broader “neutral” balance of power between various conceptions of the 
ood life within society. 
2.4.3 Neutrality as neutrality of effect  
108
al of the good of their choosing as a 
goal which is lexically prior to any other.109 
110
 obligations to prevent the 
balance from tipping of its own accord, so to speak.   




These considerations suggest an alternative to the neutrality of justification view; 
the so-called neutrality of effect interpretation. It can be formulated in a number of 
ways.  Wall and George Klosko put it as follows: the state should not do anything 
that has the effect – whether intended or not – of promoting any particular 
conception of the good or of providing greater assistance to those who pursue 
it.   Raz presents a variant formulation which he claims is a paraphrase of the 
view taken by Rawls in A theory of justice, and which holds that if a state is to be 
neutral, it must treat ensuring for all persons an equal ability to pursue in their 
lives and promote in their societies any ide
 How would state neutrality of this kind work? The first point to note is that 
Raz’s formulation suggests that Larmore errs in commenting that there is no 
independently describable condition of society to be called neutral.  There is; it 
is the state in which every citizen has an equal ability to pursue in their lives and 
promote in their societies any ideal of the good of their choosing. This is not a 
constraint on state decision-making, but an ideal state of affairs which the state is 
encouraged to bring about. Wall and Klosko’s formulation, on the other hand, 
does read like a constraint on decision-making, albeit of a different kind to that of 
the principle of state neutrality understood as neutrality of justification. Unlike 
Raz’s formulation, Wall and Klosko’s does not hold up any particular balance of 
power amongst conceptions of the good life as ideal, but merely forbids the state 
from altering the current distribution. The state may not do anything which tips the 
balance in any direction, but, apparently, it has no
108 Steven Wall and George Klosko ‘Introduction” to Steven Wall and George Klosko (eds) Perfectionism and neutrality 
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), p. 8.  There is no indication in the text that Wall and Klosko actually endorse this 
formula as the correct interpretation of the principle of state neutrality.  
109 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 114-5.  I leave open the question whether this is 
indeed Rawls’s position in A theory of justice.  It is certainly not the position he takes in Political liberalism.  
110 Charles Larmore, Patterns of moral complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 44. 
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One might read Wall and Klosko’s version as an additional constraint on 
state action; additional to the constraint set out in the neutrality of justification 
formulation. On this reading, then, the state must not only refrain from justifying 
laws by appeal to (controversial) conceptions of the good, it must refrain from 
enacting neutrally justified laws which have the effect of promoting particular 
(controversial) conceptions of the good. (One might also imagine a version which 
allowed the promotion of the good under certain circumstances, provided that 
those d
ht wonder whether state support for churches in 
Europe
as wel
                                                
isadvantaged were compensated.) 
Alternatively, one might also read Wall and Klosko’s version as a separate 
constraint from the neutrality of justification formulation; it might rule out only laws 
which promote the good, whether intentionally or not, and have nothing to say on 
the matter of justification. Whether this is an interesting distinction or not depends 
on whether one thinks there could be laws which are justified on the basis of an 
appeal to a (controversial) conception of the good life, but which do not have any 
effects on the balance of power between conceptions of the good life. Although 
this sounds unlikely, one mig
 fall into this category. 
Raz’s formulation, however, appears to require the state to intervene where 
naturally occurring changes in the balance of power happen – perhaps even 
justified changes, such as those that are analogous to the way in which a superior 
sports team takes control on the field.111  As if Wall and Klosko’s formulation were 
not demanding enough!  A state which is committed to ‘ensuring for all persons an 
equal ability to pursue in their lives and promote in their societies any ideal of the 
good of their choosing’ needs to pay close attention to the social mechanisms 
whereby citizens are prevented from pursuing and promoting ideals of the good, 
l as those mechanisms whereby those choices are made in the first place.   
Cultural, artistic, and religious choices – indeed choices of any kind – are 
heavily influenced by the extent to which they are in tune with the choices of 
others within a society. Choosing to pursue a minority religion is not, under any 
circumstances, as easy a choice as pursuing a majority one, even if it is not an 
impossible choice. (It may, of course, even be a choice that brings special 
111 Assuming, of course, that the analogy can genuinely hold; that is, assuming that some conceptions of the good life can 
genuinely deserve to be successful in comparison to others.  Some standard would have to be acknowledged for this to hold; 
even a standard as thin as “would be successful in competition with other conceptions of the good life in conditions under which 
none are privileged by the state”. 
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rewards). One might be forgiven for thinking that many of these mechanisms are 
beyond the state’s control, and this is indeed the point of view of a number of 
commentators.112 Arguing that an ideal is unachievable is not necessary a 
damning indictment of that ideal – if that were so we could reject all theories of 
justice without bothering to consider their details – although the degree of difficulty 
involved in achieving it is a relevant consideration, as an ideal to which no 
approx




                                                
imation could be achieved is indeed one which ought to be rejected.113 
Perhaps it is possible for a state to achieve the kind of neutrality envisaged 
in Raz’s formulation by maintaining the required balance in limited social areas, 
and it is quite probable that Wall and Klosko’s less demanding formulation could 
be followed, given a sufficiently restricted field of play. But the more worrying 
consideration with regard to both these 
kind ought to be an ideal at all.   
The idea that no one should find implementing their freely chosen 
conception of the good life more difficult than anyone else finds implementing 
theirs is clearly related to the ideals of equality and justice, but it is not in itself 
either an ideal of equality or an ideal of justice, and its relation to the core sense of 
neutrality is also unclear. It is not simply an articulation of the ideals of equality or 
justice for the reason that citizens might freely choose conceptions of the good 
which are themselves inegalitarian or committed to injustice; as do the rapist and 
the Nazi, to name just two examples. And clearly neither equality nor justice 
requires that rapists and Nazis find implementing their ideals as easy as anybody 
else does (although, as Raz suggests, rapists and Nazis might n
utrality of effect interpretation, be owed compensation114).   
Furthermore, requiring the state to intervene in people’s lives in the millions 
of ways necessary for maintaining equality between the countless (and 
overlapping) conceptions of the good life citizens adhere to presupposes a 
puzzling commitment to the equal value of, or the right to survive of, all these 
112 See, for example, Jeremy Waldron, who remarks on page 68 of his article ‘Legislation and moral neutrality” in the collection 
Liberal neutrality, edited by Robert Goodin and Andrew Reeve (London: Routledge, 1989), that what he calls neutrality of 
consequences interpretation ‘is a very difficult requirement to live up to, because it is so hard to predict what the effect of a law 
is going to be on lifestyles and mores.’  Similarly, Steven Wall and George Klosko suggest on page 8 of their introduction to the 
volume they edit entitled Perfectionism and neutrality (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), that ‘[i]t is impossible for a state 
to ensure that each person subject to its authority has an equal chance to pursue and realise his or her conception of the good.’ 
113 One of the reasons why impossible ideals ought to be rejected is because they can only be implemented partially, or 
selectively, that is in ways that are likely to violate the rule of law.  One might put it more strongly and say that the more 
removed from the realm of possibility the ideal is, the more likely its attempted implementation will amount to injustice.   
114 At pages 115-6 of The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
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conceptions. It seems clear why a citizen might require the state to recognise his 
or her right to equal treatment or right to life; it is less clear why a conception of 
the good must be accorded the same (or similar) recognition. And, as we have 
also noted, it isn’t clear why such a commitment on the part of the state, even 
assum
retation collides with the common understanding of the term are 
f less concern. 
inciple (regardless of whether or not these arguments are 
                                                
ing it could be justified, should be designated neutrality.   
It is for reasons such as these that Rawls distances himself from the ideal 
of neutrality altogether in Political liberalism, where he writes that ‘the term 
neutrality is unfortunate; some of its connotations are highly misleading, others 
suggest altogether impracticable principles.’115  He prefers to work with the notion 
of permissible conceptions of the good, by which he means those conceptions of 
the good which can survive in a dispensation in which the state makes no law on 
the basis of the alleged superiority of any one of them. This position, of course, 
reimports the (perhaps less worrying) difficulties associated with the neutrality of 
justification interpretation, but given that Rawls does not purport, in this passage, 




This discussion illustrates the difficulties, noted by Raz and Waldron, which arise 
when philosophers try to establish the “real” meaning of a term widely used in 
political (or any other form of) discourse.  Raz, in particular, is eager to stress that 
the philosophical task is to articulate and defend a particular version of the 
term,116 and this task has been taken on here to the extent that some of the 
difficulties involved in the various positions described here have been illustrated.  
But our principal aims at this point are merely to come to an understanding, first, 
of the options available to the defender of the principle of state neutrality, and, 
second, of which arguments for neutrality are likely to underpin which formulations 
of the neutrality pr
completely sound). 
 With this in mind, we can note that those who are drawn to the principle of 
state neutrality primarily on the basis that moral diversity, or individuality, is a 
115 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 191. 
116 See his remarks on pages 14 and 15 of The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
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good, as Mill is frequently interpreted as having been, are likely to hold that the 
state must take care that its actions help to bring about the right outcome; namely, 
some favoured distribution of conceptions of the good life. This need not, of 
course, be a balance of power in which all conceptions of the good are equally 
influential, but it nevertheless implies a concern with the effects of legislation, 
rather 
of the drawbacks of socialist economic 
decisio
                                                
than the justifications thereof. 
On the other hand, holding that the problem with perfectionism is that it 
violates equality by subjecting citizens to constraints they could not accept without 
abandoning their sense of their equal worth, as Dworkin does, leaves one open to 
formulate the neutrality principle either as neutrality of justification or neutrality of 
effect; for the claims that citizens’ sense of their equal worth is violated by their 
having to obey laws which cannot be justified without appeal to a conception of 
the good they don’t share and that citizens’ sense of their equal worth is violated 
by their having to contend with (neutrally justified) laws which discriminate against 
them on the basis of their commitments to particular conceptions of the good are 
both plausible. In fact Dworkin appears at different times to favour different 
formulations of the principle of state neutrality; in his discussion of conservatism in 
A matter of principle he appears to articulate a version of the neutrality of effect 
interpretation,117 while appearing to rely on the neutrality of justification 
interpretation during his discussion 
n-making in the same book.118 
Dworkin has also been read as rejecting perfectionism on the basis of a 
commitment to personal autonomy,119 and one might, on this (widespread) basis, 
understand neutrality to mean neutrality of justification. One might think this 
because, for example, one thinks that citizens’ choices about how to live their lives 
– choices which are properly theirs to make – are being made for them by a state 
which legislates on the basis of a particular conception of the good (whether or not 
citizens are actually in agreement with that conception) and that this presumption 
on the part of the state threatens citizens’ autonomy. But a commitment to the 
value of personal autonomy is equally compatible with the neutrality of effect 
117 See his A matter of principle (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 202. 
118 Ronald Dworkin, A matter of principle (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 195.  I owe this point 
to Jeremy Waldron’s discussion in his ‘Legislation and moral neutrality’ in Robert Goodin and Andrew Reeve (eds), Liberal 
Neutrality (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 61-83 at page 68. 
119 This is how Sher reads at least one of his arguments, for example.  See his Beyond neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), pp. 100-4. 
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interpretation; one might think that the decision about, for example, which 
language to use in the state which promotes English is a decision that citizens are 
entitled to make for themselves, without the state nudging them in any particular 
directio
suming these neutralists believe it is practicable 
enoug
 requirement is formulated the way Raz does it, really does have 
its han
 perfectionist state), and which 
                                                
n, whatever its reasons for doing so. 
The position of those who reject perfectionism for what Sher dubs 
“prophylactic” reasons120 – roughly speaking, for reasons such as the view that 
state neutrality insures against the state becoming oppressive, the view that 
perfectionist legislation increases the likelihood of social instability, or the view 
that the state is especially unlikely to have, or to be able to apply, knowledge of 
the good – with respect to how to construe the term “favour” could depend on how 
seriously they view the dangers they perceive state neutrality to ward off. If they 
view these dangers as extremely pressing, the neutrality of effect interpretation, 
being stricter, will appeal, as
h to serve as an ideal.   
Clearly, if one believes that state neutrality is necessary to prevent the 
state from, say, administering laws cruelly or arbitrarily, using legislation to enrich 
members of government, or other such oppressive behaviour, one is likely to 
believe that requiring the state to ensure that every citizen has an equal chance of 
pursuing or promoting any conception of the good they choose is a stronger 
antidote to the evils of oppression (or instability or error) than merely requiring the 
state to refrain from legislating if the proposed law cannot be neutrally justified. A 
state which is obliged to be neutral in the neutrality of effect sense of the term, 
especially if this
ds tied.   
Of course neutralists might also have reasons for leaving the state freer 
than this, despite their concerns about oppression and the like, and they might 
perceive the neutrality of justification formulation as providing a better balance 
between the constraints deemed necessary to prevent the state from becoming 
oppressive (or unstable or error-prone) and the room to manoeuvre which a state 
which is neutral in the neutrality of justification sense has (in comparison to the 
state which formulates the neutrality requirement it must adhere to in neutrality of 
effect terms, not, obviously, in comparison to the
120 See chapter 5 of Beyond neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
 50 
they take as necessary for achieving other goals. 
e dismissed on the basis of 
e brief commentary I have offered in this chapter.   
2.5 Conclusion 
more may be found, given a sufficiently diligent search.121 But while it is important, 
 
In summary, we should understand the question of what the term “favour” in the 
phrase “favouring a conception of the good” means to admit of two possible 
answers – the neutrality of justification formulation, which ought to be understood 
as a more plausible version of the neutrality of aim formulation, and the neutrality 
of effect formulation. As we have seen, both plausible formulations are not 
unassailable; the weaknesses of neutrality as neutrality of justification concern its 
apparent indifference to genuinely discriminatory (and even obviously non-neutral) 
behaviour, while the weaknesses of neutrality as neutrality of effect concern its 
impracticability and the fact that it is unclear why conceptions of the good life 
deserve the kind of respect or support which this formulation appears to give 




In this chapter I have surveyed four different axes – the question of the meaning 
of the term “rival” in the phrase “rival conceptions of the good,” the question 
whether the neutrality principle applies to all legislation or merely to constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice, the question whether the neutrality 
principle applies to all ways of promoting the good or merely to coercive methods, 
and also to the question of the meaning of the term “favour” in the phrase 
“favouring a conception of the good” – along which different interpretations of the 
principle of state neutrality may be found. Making the optimistic assumption that 
there are only two possible ways of interpreting each of the four already leaves us 
with sixteen varieties of the principle of state neutrality. And I hardly need add that 
                                                
121 Gerald Gaus provides a disturbingly long list of the diverse interpretations of neutrality.  On page 138 of the volume 




y entitled ‘Liberal neutrality: A compelling and radical principle,’ the following: 
Neutrality understood as a constraint on the sorts of reasons that may be advanced to justify state action is 
regularly distinguished from “consequential neutrality” – that the effects of state policy must somehow be 
neutral.  Yet interpretations of neutrality are far more diverse than most analyses recognise.  Neutrality is 
sometimes understood as a doctrine about the intent or aim of legislation or legislators, the proper functions of 
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in proceeding to the heart of the matter (and of the dissertation), namely, the 
arguments against the proposition that the state may not promote the good, to 
have a rough understanding of the cases for and against the most important ways 
in which the principle of state neutrality has been presented, the strengths and 
weaknesses of these cases, as I have noted in a number of places above, are 
closely tied to the strengths and weakness of the various arguments for adhering 
to any version of the neutrality principle. We therefore need to see chapter one as 
a necessary springboard for approaching the arguments for the principle of state 
neutrality investigated in chapter two, and not one whose subject matter is now 
left behind. I aim, in what follows, to make the connections between the 
formulation and the defence of neutrality clear. 
 
     ***************  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
the state, the prohibition of the state “taking a stand” on some issues, the prohibition of the state enforcing 
moral character, or the requirement that the state take a stance of impartiality.  Alternatively, neutrality can be 
understood as a requirement of a theory of justice rather than state action.  There are also differences about 
whether neutral states (or theories of justice or legislators) are supposed to be neutral between conceptions of 
the good, particular sets of ends, comprehensive doctrines and conceptions of the good, particular or 
substantive conceptions of the good, ways of life, final ends, or controversial conceptions of the good.  And it is 
unclear whether every principle of neutrality is inherently one of liberal neutrality, or whether liberal neutrality is 
a specific sort of neutral principle. 
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3 DEFENDING THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE NEUTRALITY 
 
When we turn to the question of why one might believe that the state ought to be 
neutral between comprehensive conceptions of the good life, we run into an 
apparent paradox. As noted in chapter one, state neutrality has come to seem 
necessary to many as a result of the increasingly fragmented nature of liberal 
democratic societies. Looked at historically, this necessity appears as an 
extension of the principle of religious toleration which was hammered out in early 
modern Europe.122 Looked at systematically, the necessity of neutrality appears to 
follow from a concern for the stability of divided societies, as well as from widely 
held commitments to values such as individual autonomy.   
 But whatever drives some contemporary thinkers towards the principle of 
state neutrality, it is of course not the case that all modern citizens wish for a 
neutral state. Many, if not all, take the conceptions of the good to which they 
adhere to be superior to their alternatives,123 and, unsurprisingly, these 
conceptions of the good are often thought to have political implications.   
This is where the neutrality principle might appear paradoxical. Because if a 
neutral state appears to rely on one of these conceptions in defending its 
neutrality, it may be suspected, at least by those whose conceptions do not serve 
as the basis for legislation, of precisely the kind of partisanship it is intended to 
circumvent. In such cases neutralism124 might be thought of as a fighting creed, 
just as Catholicism, Islam, or various less clearly articulated visions of the good 
life which citizens hold are perceived – as a player; but in this case one who also 
claims the right to referee. 
This appearance of paradox arises from a feature of democratic political 
theory which is less characteristic of theorising in other contexts: if one is at all 
committed to government by consent, as liberal neutralists, in virtue of being 
liberals, are, one wishes one’s political theorising to be accepted by the general 
public. The mere existence of dissenters raises questions about the validity of 
one’s position. While it is no doubt the case that metaphysicians would be grateful 
                                                
122 A process described in the “Introduction” to Rawls’s Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
123 Failing to do so may leave one unable to justify one’s own adherence to these values to oneself. 
124 Or liberalism, were we to see it, as many do, as inextricably linked to the principle of state neutrality. 
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for widespread acceptance of their views, they do not expect this, nor is their 
endeavour called into question by their tendency to address themselves primarily 
to specialists. The fact that not everybody accepts, say, the Kantian conception of 
the person, can be explained, without any appearance of paradox, by arguing that 
non-Kantians provide mistaken answers to metaphysical questions. 
 Error theories do not work quite so simply for democratic political theorists.  If I 
claim to hold a position which is neutral, the fact that my position is not accepted 
by a sector of the public calls my neutrality into question. This, therefore, is the 
problem any advocate of the principle of state neutrality must deal with before 
going on to suggest why, whatever anyone currently thinks, there are good 
reasons for accepting the principle. 
 Concern about the appearance of partisanship has weighed sufficiently 
heavily on a number of philosophers for them to attempt to defend the neutrality 
principle in ways which at least do not presuppose any controversial 
comprehensive conception of the good life.  We will see, in this chapter, what the 
prospects for such a justification are. 
 In the first part of the chapter I examine the logic of the attempts of a number 
of neutralists to formulate a defence of the principle of state neutrality which is 
itself neutral – in other words a defence which will take seriously the alleged need 
to achieve public consensus on matters of political theory, as opposed merely to 
consensus on the content of legislation. In doing so I will ask whether the 
“ecumenical” approach125 to the project of finding such a neutral justification for 
the principle of state neutrality, most obvious in the work of Ackerman, or the 
“deductive” approach126 to the task, as demonstrated in Larmore’s book Patterns 
of moral complexity as well as the writings of Rawls (who makes free use of both 
methods), holds out the most promise, and what the prospects for finding a 
neutral justification – a justification, in other words, that takes no position on the 
truth or falsehood of any comprehensive conception of the good life adhered to by 
citizens – of any kind for the neutrality principle are. I conclude, first, that 
consistency does not require that the neutrality principle be defended neutrally, 
and second, that the principle cannot in any case be so defended. 
                                                
125 I owe this term to Wall and Klosko.  See Steven Wall and George Klosko (eds), Perfectionism and neutrality (Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), p. 11. 
126 I also owe this term to Wall and Klosko.  See Steven Wall and George Klosko (eds), Perfectionism and neutrality (Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), p. 11. 
 55
 In the second part of the chapter I look further at what I call partisan defences 
of the neutrality principle; defences which express indifference to the question 
whether they are compatible with all (or a significant number of) the 
comprehensive conceptions of the good life currently adhered to within liberal 
democratic societies. These defences include all arguments which set out to offer 
convincing reasons for the principle of state neutrality regardless of whether their 
premises are actually held by a large proportion of citizens or not. In doing this I 
examine a number of common arguments for the neutrality principle, and 
conclude that none of them are conclusive. 
 
3.1 A neutral justification for the principle of state neutrality? 
 
We start, then, by asking what the logic of the demand for a neutral justification of 
the principle of state neutrality is. I will, to avoid unnecessary repetition, refer to 
this demand from here on as the principle of philosophical neutrality. 
 I understand the principle of philosophical neutrality to be the requirement that 
the principle of state neutrality be defended by arguments which take no position 
on the truth or falsity of any comprehensive conception of the good life. Its appeal 
arises from the apparent inconsistency of arguing for neutrality between 
conceptions of the good on a basis which assumes the truth (or at least the 
superiority) of precisely such a conception (or conceptions). 
 Whether or not this inconsistency is genuine (I will argue that it is not), its 
mere appearance leaves the principle of state neutrality vulnerable in contexts 
where obtaining consent for, or attracting commitment to, the principle is crucial, 
given that arguments for neutrality must avoid the appearance of partisanship in 
such contexts. Ackerman, Larmore, and Rawls all recognise, in different ways 
(which I will outline), this as a problem.   
 This discomfort is sometimes expressed in moral terms, sometimes in 
pragmatic terms. Rawls, for example, suggests both that the liberal requirement of 
public justifiability would be violated by a conception of justice which was not 
defended in terms that could be accepted by all citizens, and expresses the 
concern that defending his vision of justice – after this referred to as “justice as 
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fairness” – in, say, Kantian terms, as he himself does in A theory of justice, runs 
the risk of alienating reasonable non-Kantians, and thereby threatening the 
stability of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness. Larmore calls the defence 
of the principle of state neutrality by appeals to ideals of the person that are 
themselves controversial ‘one of the damaging paradoxes of…liberal theory,’ and 
goes on to say that ‘[b]ecause liberalism is fundamentally a response to the 
variety and controversiality of ideals of the good life, it needs a justification of 
political neutrality that is itself appropriately neutral.’127 
 One might make the point against philosophical neutralism however, that, 
given that total moral neutrality would mean not standing for any norms 
whatsoever (assuming this were possible), a case must, and can, be made for 
seeing principles operating at different levels of abstraction, with neutrality in the 
face of disagreement appropriate at some levels (typically less abstract levels, 
such as the making of laws) and not at others (typically more abstract levels, such 
as defending jurisprudential theories or theories of political morality).  We do not, 
after all, continue demanding ever more abstract levels of neutrality; there is no 
writer I know of who insists that the defence of the principle of philosophical 
neutrality must be neutral!   
 However, accepting that there is no hope of achieving total moral neutrality is 
compatible with arguing that it ought to be pursued at a higher level of abstraction 
than that of lawmaking: political theorising, for example, hence the principle of 
philosophical neutrality. Defenders of the principle must establish that there is as 
good a reason (or reasons) for responding to disagreement about which values it 
is appropriate to advance by means of the philosophy of law with the principle of 
philosophical neutrality as there is (or are) for responding to disagreement about 
which values it is appropriate to advance by means of the law with the principle of 
state neutrality. But first of all we will examine prospects for satisfying the principle 
of philosophical neutrality. If we find that this cannot be done, there is no need to 
raise this issue. 
 
                                                
127 Charles Larmore Patterns of moral complexity , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. xiii. 
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3.1.1 Ackerman’s ecumenical strategy 
 
Ackerman, in his Social justice in the liberal state,128 offers one of the earliest 
attempts to articulate and defend the neutrality principle in a neutral manner. In 
doing so he makes a surprising move: he claims that he does not need to defend 
or reject any particular argument for the principle. This strategy I term, following 
Wall and Klosko, an “ecumenical” strategy.129 
 He can make this move because, he argues, there is a wide range of valid 
“argumentative paths,” any of which can lead one to conclude that the state must 
not favour particular comprehensive conceptions of the good life. Amongst the 
starting points of such paths he lists ‘realism about the corrosiveness of power; 
recognition of doubt as a necessary step to moral knowledge; respect for the 
autonomy of persons; and scepticism concerning the reality of transcendent 
meaning.’130 
 The reason Ackerman gives for wishing to remain neutral between these 
different arguments is the desire to avoid any claim of privileged access to the 
ultimate truth, a claim which, as he sees it, would result in a partisan defence of 
neutrality. Such a defence runs the risk of ‘[making] liberalism a hostage of a 
particular metaphysical system,’131 thereby contradicting ‘the essence of 
liberalism,’ which is ‘to deny people the right to declare that their particular 
metaphysic and epistemology contains the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth.’132 
He elaborates his strategy by noting that his 
book aims, in principle, to be intelligible to all potential citizens of a liberal state.  
Given the very different people in this audience, however, any particular argument can 
be expected to persuade some only at the cost of turning others off. Thus, if I simply 
tried to tell you why I personally am a committed liberal, this would predictably divert 
some of you from arguments that you would find more compelling. Given this dilemma, 
                                                
128 New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980. 
129 Steven Wall and George Klosko (eds), Perfectionism and neutrality (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), p. 11. 
130 Bruce Ackerman, Social justice in the liberal state (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 369.   
131 Bruce Ackerman, Social justice in the liberal state (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 356-7. 
132 Bruce Ackerman, Social justice in the liberal state (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 357.  Liberalism does not in 
fact (or ought not to!) deny anyone the right to declare that their particular metaphysics is the ultimate truth, but rather the right 
to oblige others to act as if this were so. 
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it seems best to dispense with personal declarations of faith so as to better give you a 
sense of the different paths that can lead a thoughtful person to Neutrality.133 
The appearance of partisanship is to be avoided by ensuring that no attempt is 
made to persuade anyone to accept the principle of state neutrality on the basis of 
premises which they do not share.   
tradition, which, it is assumed (one expects), is the tradition of those addressed. 
                                                
 This is not to say that Ackerman says nothing in favour of the neutrality 
principle. He presents it to the reader as capturing the essence of the liberal vision 
of political authority, which, as he sees it, takes any ‘power structure [to be] 
illegitimate if it can be justified only through a conversation in which some 
person…must assert that he is…the privileged moral authority.’134 Liberal 
authority is justified rather by the free conviction of its necessity, produced through 
a dialogue of equals, on the part of its putative subjects. But this is not to argue for 
the principle of state neutrality; it is merely to assert its centrality to the liberal 
 What exactly does this destination, to which all roads lead, look like? As with 
Rawls (and indeed with Kant135), it can be modelled by means of a thought-
experiment, which explains how the exercise of power by one citizen (or a group 
of citizens) over another (or others) can be (or can fail to be) justified. But whereas 
for Rawls legitimate law (at least as pertains to the basic structure of society) must 
pass through an elaborate series of hoops involving the conditions of choice in the 
original position as well as three further stages, Ackerman’s demands are rather 
simpler. If a law136 cannot be justified without appeal to the unchallengeable moral 
insight (which we might call the clergyman’s fallacy, in deference to the historical 
origins of liberalism), or the inherently superior status of the one who exercises 
133 Bruce Ackerman, Social justice in the liberal state (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 360. 
134 Bruce Ackerman, Social justice in the liberal state (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 11. 
135 In the essay ‚Über den Gemeinspruch: „Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis,“, translated as 
‘On the common saying: “This may be true in theory, but it doesn’t apply in practice,”’ by HB Nisbet in the collection edited by 
Hans Reiss entitled Kant’s political writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 61-92, Kant remarks at page 
79 that 
 
[we] need by no means assume that this contract (contractus originarius or pactum sociale), based on a 
coalition of the wills of all private individuals in a nation to form a common, public will for the purposes of rightful 
legislation, actually exists as a fact, for it cannot possibly be so…It is in fact merely an idea of reason, which 
nonetheless has undoubted practical reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way 
that they could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation, and to regard each subject, in so far as 
he can claim citizenship, as if he had consented within the general will.  This is the test of the rightfulness of 
every public law.  For if the law is such that a whole people could not possibly agree to it (for example, if it 
stated that a certain class of subjects must be privileged as a hereditary ruling class) it is unjust.   
136 Ackerman talks rather of “the exercise of power,” but I take law to be a subset – perhaps the most important subset – of 
those cases in which citizens exercise putatively legitimate power over one another. 
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power in its name (what we might call the nobleman’s fallacy), then it is 
illegitimate. Only those laws which are justifiable without appeal to any 
comprehensive conceptions of the good life – neutral laws, if we understand 
 are not distinguished by relative power or 
titutes a hypothetical agreement between the parties 
ehind the veil of ignorance. 
fusal to take sides on the question of which 
                                                
neutrality to consist in neutrality of justification – will pass the test. 
 We can also detect an echo of the social contract tradition in Ackerman’s 
approach, despite his explicit rejection of it.137  It lies in the importance the notions 
of equality and consent have in both Ackerman’s minimal “moral proof 
procedure”138 and in the standard contractarian scenarios, including the set of 
conditions articulated by Rawls’s original position and the stages which follow it.  
Both Ackerman and (amongst others) Rawls, think that legitimate principles can 
only issue from a procedure which situates its participants initially as equals.  
Ackerman’s conversationalists are barred from appealing to inherent superiority of 
any kind in attempting to defend the particular powers they exercise, and 
Rawlsian parties in the original position
influence (or indeed in any other way). 
 Furthermore, both Ackerman’s rational conversation procedure and Rawls’s 
original position model the notion of consent, central to liberal political theory. If, 
as a result of a conversation conducted between equals, I am convinced by the 
reasons you offer for your particular powers, as opposed to being intimidated by 
your status or your threats, I can be said to have consented to them. Likewise, 
Rawls’s original position cons
b
 
What are we to make of Ackerman’s re
the best arguments for neutrality are? 
 The obvious suspicion is that, as soon as an ecumenical neutralist such as 
Ackerman encounters a sufficiently stubborn perfectionist – one who denies that 
there are any “argumentative paths” which establish the principle of state 
neutrality – he is going to have to dirty his hands and show why there is at least 
one. Ackerman might respond to this challenge, however, with the concession that 
it may prove necessary to follow a particular line of argument, but that doing so 
137 Bruce Ackerman Social justice in the liberal state (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 6. 
138 Thomas Scanlon suggests this idea in his ‘Contractualism and utilitarianism’ in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (eds), 
Utilitarianism and beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 103-28. 
 60 
need not involve any commitment to the premises held by the perfectionist. It 
merely involves showing them how they have not yet noticed that their premises, 
whatever they are, commit them to the neutrality principle. The ecumenical 
neutralist might, for example, be able to show that if you think that virtue cannot 
be coerced into people, or that the autonomous life is the good life, then you will, if 
you follow the argument sufficiently rigorously, conclude that the state may not 
favour any particular comprehensive conception of the good life. Showing this, 
however, does not commit the ecumenical neutralist to the claim that virtue cannot 
be coerced into people or that the autonomous life is the good life. It commits 
them to logical consistency, but this can hardly be regarded as damagingly 
                                                
partisan. 
 We might ask, however, whether this confidence in the prospects of taking 
any given set of premises held by citizens, and finding an argumentative path from 
there to state neutrality, is warranted.139 Perhaps there are many widely-held 
premises of political morality which do not entail the neutrality principle. In saying 
this I am not merely raising the (doubtful) possibility that modern constitutional 
democracies conceal (large numbers of) people whose fundamental political 
commitments are utterly hostile to state neutrality. It is quite likely, rather, that 
many citizens of democracies believe that the state ought to be neutral with 
respect to most controversial questions of the good. This may not preclude, 
however, the possibility that many find themselves endorsing legislation in 
defence of the good on occasions when they think that values of great importance 
are at stake, that the defence of these values requires the exercise of state power, 
and that this defence is being impeded by those badly lacking in moral insight.  
Granting those lacking in moral insight a veto over legislation, especially in cases 
where they form a minority, might be thought to be unwarranted, possibly even 
disastrous. Hence, some citizens might not implausibly conclude that, on those 
occasions where, say, the state clearly does possess superior moral insight, and 
139 On page 12 of Social justice in the liberal state (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), Ackerman expresses this 
confidence: 
 
Not that it is completely impossible to reason yourself to a rejection of Neutrality.  Plato began systematic 
political philosophy with such a dream; mediaeval churchmen thought there were good reasons to confide 
ultimate secular authority to the pope.  Only they recognised – as modern totalitarians do not – the depth of the 
reconceptualisation required before a breach of Neutrality can be given a coherent justification.  It is not enough 
to reject one or another of the basic arguments that lead to a reasoned commitment to Neutrality; one must 
reject all of them.  And to do this does not require a superficial change of political opinions but a transformation 
of one’s entire view of the world – both as to the nature of human values and the extent to which the powerful 
can be trusted to lead their brethren to the promised land. 
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where the stakes are sufficiently high, it must exercise the power it has on behalf 
ectly understood, rule out absolutely any state 
he claim that the principle 
 
                                                
of the good. 
 What is the basis of the ecumenicist’s confidence that citizens whose 
commitment to the principle of state neutrality is limited in the way described, or 
perhaps lacking altogether, thereby reveal a failure to appreciate the implications 
of their own moral commitments? It would seem to be a conviction that the 
premises of political morality commonly held by citizens of contemporary liberal 
democracies all do, when corr
action on behalf of the good.140 
 But it is doubtful that this is so. I demonstrate in the second half of this chapter 
that arguments which indisputably rule out perfectionist legislation are very difficult 
to find, even amongst major neutralist writers. Clearly, if I turn out to be right about 
this, no amount of pointing to the argumentative paths will help Ackerman – at 
least not if he’s concerned with convincing his readers. But, for the moment, we 
merely need to ask how he might respond to this possibility. We need merely to 
ask, in other words, what he would have to do to rebut t
of state neutrality cannot be vindicated. 
 Ackerman’s strategy must be to ask which premises of political morality the 
perfectionist accepts, and then attempt to show how state neutrality follows.  The 
perfectionist may respond in two ways. She may say that, while she accepts 
premises a, b, and c, no unequivocal case for the neutrality principle can be made 
on the basis of these premises. Or she will accept that a case for the neutrality 
principle can be made on the basis of premises d, e, and f, but reject these 
premises. Ackerman’s  ecumenical strategy permits him to deal straightforwardly 
with her first response; he must redouble his efforts to persuade her that a case 
for the neutrality principle can indeed be made on the basis of premises a, b, and 
c.  But it is imperative, if he wishes to remain ecumenical, that he succeed in 
these efforts.  For if he fails he is forced, if he does not want to give up on the 
enterprise of making a case for the neutrality principle altogether, to attempt to
persuade the perfectionist that she ought to accept one of premises d, e, and f.141 
140 It is also compatible with the view that it does not matter how citizens are brought to support the principle of state neutrality, 
but merely that they can be.  Since this is an illiberal position, I will not accuse Ackerman and others of defending it. 
141  Assuming he agrees that it serves as the basis of a valid argument for the neutrality principle, which in all likelihood he will, 
given his confidence that all roads lead to the neutrality principle. 
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 And arguing for a particular premise – arguing, for example, that the 
autonomous life is the good life, or some other such premise which might serve as 
the basis of an argument for the principle of state neutrality – is precisely what the 
ecumenical neutralist wishes to avoid. Ackerman is confident that he will not be 
cornered into doing this because he assumes widespread public acceptance of 
premises from which valid arguments for the neutrality principle can indeed be 
 of which particular argument best 
stablishes the principle of state neutrality. 
he thinks that, 
strictly
                                                
constructed. In this assumption he is, as I will show, optimistic.142 
 In summary, Ackerman’s confidence that he can remain neutral on the 
question of which arguments best establish the principle of state neutrality rests 
on the hope that sufficient widely accepted argumentative paths lead to that 
principle anyway. But the fact143 that many widely held views on political morality, 
views which are taken by many philosophers, including Ackerman, to be capable 
of serving as premises in valid argumentative paths to the principle of state 
neutrality, do not obviously establish that principle is a problem for him, because it 
obliges him either to criticise some of these argumentative paths or to defend 
other, valid, argumentative paths (or both) if he wishes to establish neutrality – at 
least if he wishes it to be established by argument.  And as soon as he does this 
he is no longer neutral on the question
e
 
Waldron has adduced further reasons for rejecting ecumenical approaches of the 
kind Ackerman articulates.144 He thinks that we should reject the view that the 
neutrality principle should be given a neutral justification because 
 speaking, there is no such thing as the neutrality principle.   
As he sees it “neutrality” is too heterogeneous a concept to serve as the 
focus of any one principle, and the importance of neutrality as such is in any case 
not what underlies commitment to the principles which are identified in the 
literature as variants of the principle of state neutrality. Neutrality’s attraction lies in 
its apparent capacity to assuage certain more fundamental concerns: the value of 
personal autonomy, the importance of experimentation for discovering which 
142 See the section entitled “Non-neutral justifications of the principle of state neutrality” below. 
143 Rendered plausible in section entitled “Non-neutral justification of the principle of state neutrality” 
 below. 
144 In Robert Goodin and Andrew Reeve (eds), Liberal neutrality (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 61-83, at p. 69.  
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lifestyles are in fact the most valuable, the absence of an incontrovertible case for 
any particular conception of the good, and so on. It is not widely thought to be 
attract
eutrality principle are equally served 
by the
tional to prefer one set of moral reasons 
over a
ive per se, regardless of what the case for it might be. 
Waldron’s initial premise is that one cannot articulate a principle without 
justifying it, or, to put it more colloquially, his attack on Ackerman may be 
paraphrased as “if you’re going to tell us what it is you’re defending, you’re going 
to have to tell us what your case for it is.” One does not need to accept the truth of 
this premise in all circumstances to see the force of Waldron’s point with regard to 
the neutrality principle. This is because, as we saw in chapter one, the principle 
can be interpreted in a great variety of ways, and because, furthermore, the 
variant formulations are, at least in some cases, closely tied to particular 
arguments for the principle. We saw, to mention merely one of the axes along 
which variations of the principle of state neutrality are possible, that one might 
understand the neutrality principle as requiring neutrality of aim, effect, or 
justification, and it is fair to say that which of these one takes up as a legislative 
body will have a significant impact on what laws are passed (the difference 
between neutrality of effect and the other two being the greatest). And yet it is also 
clear that not all of these formulations of the n
 common arguments for the principle   
Believing, for example, that ethical pluralism is important is likely to incline 
one to advocate neutrality as neutrality of effect (if it inclines one towards 
neutrality at all), as requiring legislators to formulate laws only on the basis of 
neutral aims is unlikely to guarantee any particular (allegedly) appropriate spread 
of ethical options in a society. Similarly, as Waldron points out, scepticism 
concerning the reality of transcendent meaning (to use Ackerman’s phrase) is 
likely to incline one to advocate the neutrality of aim or neutrality of justification 
interpretation. This is because the objection to perfectionism on the part of the 
moral sceptic is presumably that it is irra
nother as a basis for legislation.   
And so because the arguments for state neutrality which appear in the 
literature are very varied indeed, as are the formulations of the neutrality principle, 
and because in many cases these principles have quite different policy 
implications, Waldron is able to draw the conclusion that there are particular 
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neutrality principles, some of which are closely related to each other and others 
which 
 the arguments, 
aves it unclear what principle is actually being recommended.    
3.1.2 Rawls’s ecumenical strategy 
145
itizens who may differ greatly in 
                                                
are not, and all of which are justified by particular arguments.     
One might summarise his position as follows: If one remains agnostic on 
which the best arguments for neutrality are, one, in effect, remains agnostic on 
what neutrality is. The neutralist must do some arguing: either she picks which 
version of the neutrality principle she finds the most plausible, and then defends it 
against arguments for the others, or she assesses the strengths of the various 
arguments and then defends the version of the neutrality principle which is implied 
by the best of the arguments.  Simply surveying the field, as Ackerman does, and 




Rawls, in his later work, is moved by considerations interestingly similar to those 
motivating Ackerman, while nevertheless raising the hope that he can avoid the 
pitfalls which mean we must reject Ackerman’s strategy. This is apparent in 
Political liberalism,  where Rawls attempts to show that presenting justice as 
fairness as what he terms a political conception of justice can render it acceptable, 
under the right conditions, to a wide range of c
terms of their other, non-political, commitments. 
 Unlike Ackerman, however, Rawls does not see himself primarily as 
addressing potential converts to the principle of state neutrality, who might be 
provoked to reject the principle if it is presented to them as the conclusion of an 
argument from premises which they do not accept. Rawls’s concern, rather, is 
with the possibility of an overlapping consensus on the acceptability of justice as 
fairness, which we can take to entail state neutrality, amongst citizens who adhere 
to diverse comprehensive conceptions of the good life. Rawls asks, in other 
words, whether a future, or hypothetical, “Rawlsian” state can defend its refusal to 
act on the basis of any particular conception of the good in a manner that is 
neutral between precisely these conceptions. And he asks this because he fears, 
145 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
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for similar reasons to those of Ackerman, that a state which violates the principle 
of philosophical neutrality in its defence of the principle of state neutrality runs the 
risk of losing the loyalty of citizens who might otherwise have endorsed the latter 
principle. His hope is that a politically liberal state can rely on enough citizens to 
converge on a consensus endorsing neutrality on the basis of their own 
 and 
ose a conception they could not live with if things turned 
out ba
                                                
conceptions of the good – the so-called overlapping consensus. 
 The suggestion that citizens might not be able to converge on justice as 
fairness as the conception of justice which is to regulate the basic institutions of 
their society threatens the heart of Rawls’s case for it. This is because he had 
argued, in A theory of justice, that the superiority of justice as fairness over 
utilitarian and perfectionist conceptions rests, partially but crucially, on the fact that 
it offers superior stability, by virtue of the fact that it alone of the options 
discussed146 could function as the conception for a well-ordered society,147
would for this reason be favoured by the parties behind the veil of ignorance. 
 Utilitarian and perfectionist conceptions of justice, if publicised as the 
conceptions which regulate the basic institutions of a society (as must happen if 
the society is to be well-ordered), would, argued Rawls, in all likelihood, fail to 
attract the support of all citizens, given that both utilitarian and perfectionist 
conceptions might mean lifelong disadvantages for some citizens for the sake of 
improving the average level of utility or perfection. But parties in the original 
position must, says Rawls, take into account the strains of commitment any 
conception is likely to impose on them once they enter a society; the parties dare 
not, in other words, cho
dly for them.148   
Of course if the parties in the original position were permitted to pick a 
conception on the understanding that it need not be publicly acknowledged as the 
real measure of the institutions of the society, they might be inclined to choose 
utilitarian or perfectionist conceptions, given that they would know that citizens 
146 The other conceptions of justice on the table, so to speak, in A theory of justice, include utilitarianism, perfectionism, and 
various mixed options. 
147 Rawls takes, in Political liberalism, a well-ordered society to be a society united in its political conception of justice, and in 
which this political conception of justice is the focus of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.  This 
is in contrast to his view in A theory of justice, where he takes a well-ordered society to be a society united in its basic moral 
beliefs.  An ideal such as this, he came to believe, is no longer tenable in contemporary liberal democracies, given their moral, 
philosophical, and religious diversity. 
148 The “strains of commitment” are discussed in §29 of A theory of justice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp. 153-60. 
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might be able to accept their unlucky lot in life, should it come to that, if the fact 
that their lot was a function of the real conception of justice which regulated the 
institutions of the society were concealed from them.149 The publicity condition on 
choice behind the veil of ignorance is of course designed to offset this 
possibility.150 It therefore counts against utilitarian and perfectionist conceptions of 
justice, for the parties in the original position, that their acceptance as conceptions 
which are to regulate the basic institutions of a society might, given the way we 
know humans to be, turn out to render those societies unstable. The serious 
disadvantages certain citizens might have to suffer under a utilitarian or 
perfectionist dispensation would be likely to turn them against such dispensations, 
or perfectionist society which starts out well-ordered is 
                                                
damaging the stability of the society. 
 Justice as fairness, according to Rawls, does not suffer from this defect. The 
case Rawls makes for the superior stability of justice as fairness is a complex one, 
and I do no more than summarise it here.151  Roughly speaking, the two principles 
of justice as fairness are said by Rawls to give greater support to citizens’ sense 
of self-respect than do utilitarian and perfectionist views, in that the first principle 
acknowledges their equality in the matter of a number of important freedoms, and 
in that the second principle rules out material inequalities which do not benefit the 
worst-off. As a result, argues Rawls, it will be clear to the parties in the original 
position that, regardless of how things turn out for them in society, they will not be 
expected permanently to sacrifice their well-being or interests for the good of 
others. We can conclude from this, he says, that a well-ordered society of justice 
as fairness is more likely to win the loyalty of its citizens than a well-ordered 
utilitarian or perfectionist society, as citizens under justice as fairness have much 
less reason (if any) to think that they can improve their condition by establishing a 
new conception of justice as the principle which regulates the basic institutions of 
their society. A well-ordered society of justice as fairness is, in this sense, stable, 
and will, for this reason, recommend itself to the parties in the original position, 
whereas a utilitarian 
unlikely so to remain. 
 In Part III of A theory of justice, Rawls elaborates on the theme of stability, 
149 It is hard to see, however, why parties which lack a conception of the good would wish to do this. 
150 See §29 of A theory of justice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 153-60. 
151 See §29 of A theory of justice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 153-60 for Rawls’s full 
discussion 
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explaining not only that citizens of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness 
come to acquire a sense of justice, that is, a disposition to act for the sake of 
justice, but that the exercise of this sense is compatible with, and can promote 
and realise the good of these citizens. In making this argument Rawls takes the 
good for each of us to be what it is rational for us to want, assuming that we have 
full information and have reflected critically on our ends, made them consistent, 
and decided on effective means for realising them. What concerns him here is the 
possibility that it is not rational in a well-ordered society to exercise and develop 
the sense of justice, as defined by justice as fairness, and to incorporate this 
virtue into one’s conception of the good; in other words that, in pursuing their 
conceptions of the good, citizens of a well-ordered society do not have reason to 
acknowledge the claims of the two principles of justice. Clearly, if this is so, then 
justice as fairness is utopian, and cannot provide the stability which allegedly 
 no 
oncerns regarding the stability of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness. 
                                                
renders it superior to utilitarian or perfectionist conceptions of justice.152 
 Rawls’s response, in A theory of justice, to this worry is the so-called 
congruence argument. Here he offers what he terms the Kantian interpretation of 
justice as fairness, in which he claims, first, that we are capable of autonomy by 
virtue of ‘our nature as free and equal rational beings,’153 and, second, that the 
original position can be construed as “modelling” this conception of the human 
person, from which we can conclude that the principles chosen by the parties in 
the original position can be interpreted as principles that we give to ourselves out 
of our nature. If this is so, then to act for the sake of the two principles of justice is 
to act autonomously in the Kantian sense. Rawls then argues that, given that it is 
rational for citizens of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness to realise their 
natures as free and equal rational beings, it is also part of the good of each 
citizen. The human good and the two principles of justice as fairness are therefore 
congruent, and it is therefore indeed rational in a well-ordered society of justice as 
fairness to exercise and develop one’s sense of justice and incorporate it into 
one’s conception of the good.  Rawls concludes, as a result, that we need have
c
 
152 See, in particular, chapter 9 of A theory of justice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 450-514, for 
Rawls’s full discussion of this issue. 
153 John Rawls, A theory of justice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 222. 
 68 
We are to imagine, then, a society in which everyone accepts the two principles of 
justice as fairness as those principles which are to regulate the basic institutions, 
in which it is public knowledge that the two principles are to serve this purpose, in 
whose institutions justice as fairness is consistently realised, and in which citizens 
are generally inclined to do what justice as fairness requires of them; a well-
 when all citizens are reasonable, the use of 
 way in which the two principles of justice as fairness would be 
                                                
ordered society of justice as fairness, in other words. 
 In such a society, as in any free society, citizens may pursue various 
conceptions of the good life.154 In fact, because of what Rawls refers to as the 
burdens of judgement,155 there is good reason to expect a great variety of such 
conceptions. The free workings of the human intellect in a society which does not 
enforce any particular orthodoxy on the question of the good life will inevitably 
result in people reaching widely different conclusions about how to live their lives, 
and given that the case for any comprehensive conception of the good will never 
be completely clear-cut, even
judgement cannot be avoided. 
 In A theory of justice, Rawls expected, as we have seen, that citizens of a 
well-ordered society of justice as fairness could, despite their adhering to different 
comprehensive conceptions of the good life, nevertheless converge on a 
commitment to the two principles of justice. By the time he came to write Political 
liberalism, however, he had come to think that this convergence might be 
threatened by the
publicly justified. 
 Rawls’s worry here is that a public Kantian justification of justice as fairness 
would affect the stability of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness. Given the 
diversity of reasonable comprehensive conceptions in the society, the consensus 
154 Provided that their doing so does not cause the principles of justice as fairness to be violated. 
155 Rawls offers a list of the sources of reasonable disagreement, which he terms “the burdens of judgement”, on pages 56-7 of 
Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), noting that items (a) to (d), as he puts it, apply mainly to the 
theoretical uses of our reason and (e) and (f) apply to the reasonable and the rational in their moral and practical use. 
a. The evidence – empirical and scientific – bearing on the case is conflicting and complex, and thus hard to assess 
and evaluate. 
b. Even where we agree fully about the kinds of considerations that are relevant, we may disagree about their weight, 
and so arrive at different judgements. 
c. To some extent all our concepts, and not only moral and political concepts, are vague and subject to hard cases; and 
this indeterminacy means that we must rely on judgements and interpretation (and on judgements about 
interpretations) within some range (not sharply specifiable) where reasonable persons may differ. 
d. To some extent (how great we cannot tell) the way we assess evidence and weigh moral and political values is 
shaped by our total experience, our whole course of life up to now; and our total experiences must always differ. 
e. Often there are different kinds of normative considerations of different force on both sides of an issue and it is difficult 
to make an overall assessment. 
f. Any system of social institutions is limited in the values it can admit so that some selection must be made from the full 
range of moral and political values that might be realised. 
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on the principles of justice as fairness would not extend to the public justification 
offered for the principles and, as a result, commitment to the principles 
themselves might be weakened in the (presumably many) non-Kantians in that 
society. If this commitment, and with it the advantages in terms of stability which 
justice as fairness is said to offer, is to be maintained, a public justification which 
is not dependent on any one of the controversial comprehensive conceptions of 
the good life likely to be adhered to in a well-ordered society of justice as fairness 
needs to be found. And this is why justice as fairness needs to be justified 
neutrally – it needs to be offered, much as Ackerman does, as the conclusion of 
irness does render it such that a broad 
nge of citizens will give it their assent. 
conceptions of the 
good, or argumentative starting points, adhered to by citizens? 
                                                
any number of arguments. 
 It is in response to this imperative that Rawls wishes to demonstrate that 
justice as fairness can be presented as a political conception of justice. A political 
conception of justice does not aim to encompass all the contexts in which we 
might speak of justice or injustice, let alone the good life. It is not offered, in other 
words, as a basis for social co-operation on the grounds that it is derived from any 
comprehensive (and putatively true) moral, philosophical, or religious vision of the 
good life despite its – hopefully – being compatible with many such visions. And it 
is this particular feature of a political conception – the compatibility of its 
justification, as well as its content, with a variety of comprehensive conceptions of 
the good life – which, Rawls argues, makes an overlapping consensus156 between 
adherents of various comprehensive doctrines, and the social stability consequent 
on this consensus, possible. We need, therefore, to examine the extent to which 
the political presentation of justice as fa
ra
 
What reasons do we have for thinking that presenting justice as fairness as a 
political conception would enable the Rawlsian state to take an ecumenical 
approach to justifying the principle of state neutrality? Do we have grounds for 
thinking, in other words, that such a state could argue for justice as fairness while 
remaining agnostic on the question of the truth or falsity of the 
156 Rawls introduces the idea of an overlapping consensus in the “Introduction,” pp.xv-xxxii of Political liberalism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993) and discusses it at length in “Lecture 4,” pp. 133-72 of the same book. 
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 Ackerman expected, as we saw,157 that any premise158 would prove to be 
capable of serving as the starting point for a valid argument to the neutrality 
principle (given sufficient rationality on the part of those challenged to work out the 
implications of their starting points). In a similar manner Rawls expects that (at 
least) significant numbers of citizens will not need to be challenged to give up the 
comprehensive doctrines by which they live in order to submit to the demands of 
political liberalism. This is because, as Rawls envisages it, many citizens are likely 
to be reasonable, in the particular way in which he uses the term. This involves, 
firstly, their acknowledgement of the burdens of judgement. They do not, in other 
words, attribute deviation from their favoured conception of the good solely to the 
stupidity or malice of those with whom they disagree on these matters, and they 
conclude, consequently, that they cannot expect the state to legislate on the basis 
of, or enforce, their (or any other) doctrine of the good.   
 Assessing this expectation on the part of Rawls is not an easy matter, given 
that his position on the possibility of an overlapping consensus has prediction-like 
and argument-like aspects. Furthermore, the prediction-like aspect is rendered 
obscure by the fact that we should not read Rawls as suggesting that an 
overlapping consensus on justice as fairness will actually be achieved at some 
point in the future. But we can at least say about the argument-like aspect of the 
expectation that we do not have grounds for thinking that justice as fairness, even 
when presented as a political conception, is compatible with any and every 
comprehensive doctrine which is an option in contemporary liberal democracies.   
 This would not surprise Rawls, of course.159 But this does raise questions 
about whether his defence of political liberalism can be regarded as an example of 
an ecumenical strategy. The Rawlsian state (the state which enforces political 
liberalism, in other words) will, presumably, have to offer public arguments for 
justice as fairness (or some other conception of justice which is compatible with 
political liberalism) which are aimed not only at citizens who are reasonable, in the 
                                                
157 See the section above entitled “Ackerman’s ecumenical strategy”. 
158 To be fair, Ackerman does concede the remote possibility that there may be starting points out there which could not lead 
one to the principle of state neutrality.  See, for example, the following remarks at page 12 of Social justice in the liberal state 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). 
 
Not that it is absolutely impossible to reason yourself to a rejection of Neutrality.  Plato began systematic 
political philosophy with such a dream; mediaeval churchmen thought there were good reasons to confide 
ultimate secular authority to the pope.  Only they recognised – as modern totalitarians do not – the depth of the 
reconceptualisation required before a breach of Neutrality can be given a coherent justification.  
159 See his discussion entitled “Is justice as fairness fair to conceptions of the good?” at pp. 195-200 of Political liberalism (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
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Rawlsian sense, but also at citizens who have not concluded that the conceptions 
of the good which guide their actions in the normal course of events are 
compatible with a political conception of justice.   
 Now obviously a Rawlsian state can remain ecumenical when justifying 
political liberalism to those who are part of the overlapping consensus. It can say 
to them, much in the way that Ackerman does, that it is has no interest in why they 
come to the conclusion that political values trump non-political values in the 
political sphere, or, to put the same point another way, how they get from their 
starting points to the conclusion that the state may not enforce any 
comprehensive conception of the good. As Rawls puts it in A theory of justice, 
‘[j]ustice as fairness...[does not] try to evaluate the relative merits of different 
conceptions of the good...There is no necessity to compare the worth of the 
conceptions…once it is supposed they are compatible with the principles of 
justice.’160  And it may indeed be the case that the majority of citizens adhere to 
such conceptions, freeing the state from the burden of arguing for the liberal 
dispensation. But the breadth of Rawls’s ecumenicism is tested in its encounter 
with those outside the consensus. 
If we judge by Lecture 4 of Political liberalism (the lecture on the idea of an 
overlapping consensus),161 the state may present two principal neutral arguments 
for political liberalism. The first simply involves the claim that what Rawls calls fair 
social co-operation on a footing of mutual respect is of great value, and the 
additional point that this form of co-operation would be threatened by legislation 
which could only be justified on the basis of a comprehensive conception of the 
good life.  The way he puts it is to say that  
the virtues of political co-operation that make a constitutional regime possible 
are…very great virtues.  I mean, for example, the virtues of tolerance and being ready 
to meet others halfway, and the virtue of reasonableness and the sense of fairness. 
When these virtues are widespread in society and sustain its political conception of 
justice, they constitute a very great good, part of society’s political capital. Thus the 
values that conflict with the political conception of justice and its sustaining virtues may 
be normally outweighed because they come into conflict with the very conditions that 
                                                
160 John Rawls, A theory of justice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 94. 
161 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 157. 
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make fair social co-operation possible on a footing of mutual respect.162 
The ‘values that conflict with the political conception’ are “non-political” values – 
values that derive from the comprehensive conceptions of the good citizens live 
by, and they may conflict with the political conception if they encourage their 
adherents to press for a political order which expresses them, despite their less 
than universal acceptance. And when Rawls writes that these values ‘come into 
conflict with the very conditions that make fair social co-operation possible on a 
footing of mutual respect’ he takes it that mutually respectful co-operation 
between the moral, philosophical, and religious factions which are inevitable in a 
free society breaks down if the political order expresses views which are properly 
to be regarded as private, or non-political. Put more crudely, social peace (albeit 
of a strictly liberal kind) will be endangered by partisan laws, and this is why a 
politically liberal dispensation is to be preferred. 
pt at an ecumenical 
strategy laid out. He appeals to reasonableness as follows: 
o er of equal citizens, 
                                                
In making this point, Rawls challenges critics of political liberalism to ask 
themselves whether they really want to give up the great good that is a society in 
which people co-operate fairly with each other on a footing of mutual respect. Add 
to this challenge the second argument from Lecture 4: what we might call the 
appeal to reasonableness, and we have Rawls’s attem
Since many doctrines are seen to be reasonable, those who insist, when 
fundamental questions are at stake on what they take as true but others do not, seem 
to others simply to insist on their own beliefs when they have the political power to do 
so. Of course, those who do insist on their beliefs also insist that their beliefs alone are 
true: they impose their beliefs because, they say, their beliefs are true and not 
because they are their beliefs. But this is a claim that all could equally make; it is also 
a claim that cannot be made good by anyone to citizens generally. So, when we make 
such claims others, who are themselves reasonable, must count us unreasonable. And 
indeed we are, as we want to use state power, the collective p w
to prevent the rest from affirming their not unreasonable views.163 
So the second half of the non-partisan case for justice as fairness consists in 
162 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 157. 
163 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 158. 
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Rawls, or the Rawlsian state, challenging critics of political liberalism with the 
accusation that it is unreasonable to press for perfectionist legislation, given the 
inevita
 about how life ought to be lived.  
l, as we did in the case of 
Ackerm
r the truth of at least one, and thereby calling the 
ecume
bility of dissent from the values which are to serve as the basis of such 
legislation. 
This is a more substantial strategy than that of Ackerman, in that Rawlsian 
ecumenicism does argue for justice as fairness, and thereby for state neutrality.  
Furthermore, it seems that in presenting justice as fairness as a political 
conception of justice which guarantees the great good of (a liberal) social peace, 
and in suggesting to those who lie outside the overlapping consensus that they 
are thereby unreasonable, the Rawlsian defends neutrality without having to dirty 
his hands and take sides on questions of the truth or falsity of the comprehensive 
conceptions of the good life citizens adhere to. The appeal to the importance of 
the political virtues does not obviously depend on the truth of any comprehensive 
conception of the good life. Nor does it appear to deny the truth of any 
comprehensive doctrine. And in pointing out that it is unreasonable to insist that 
one’s conception of the good be enforced by law, Rawls appeals to the 
uncontroversial fact that not all people of adequate intellectual standing and good 
faith have come to the same conclusions
Pointing this out to someone is not to imply that their view is false. No stand on 
this question need be taken, it would seem. 
 But, as I have hinted at above, matters are not this simple. Why this is so 
becomes clear when we imagine in more detai
an, the encounter between the neutralist and the perfectionist, as we might 
refer to those outside the overlapping consensus.   
In discussing Ackerman, we noted that he might face two kinds of 
difficulties in dealing with stubborn perfectionists. The first possibility was that the 
perfectionist might indeed be committed to the premises which Ackerman takes to 
be potential starting points for an “argumentative path” to the principle of state 
neutrality, but nevertheless deny that neutrality is the logical end point of the path 
which begins with the premises they assert. The second possibility was that the 
perfectionist might reject the premises which Ackerman appeals to altogether, 
forcing him to argue fo
nical nature of his strategy into question. We will see how Rawls must deal 
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with similar interlocutors. 
With regard to the argument from the great value of fair social co-operation 
on a footing of mutual respect, the Rawlsian state may encounter perfectionists 
who do in fact value co-operation of this kind highly, but nevertheless think that, 
occasionally, this good stands in the way of the achievement of greater goods.  
Such a perfectionist will be mostly reasonable, in the Rawlsian sense, but will 
think that on some crucial issues the state must enforce the good over the 
reasonable objections of dissenting citizens. And we will see that encounters with 




ny comprehensive conception of the good life. And in doing 
this, 
a little more partisan than we might have hoped. He says in Political liberalism that 
ism, and therefore state neutrality, can be defended in an ecumenical 
manner.   
Such perfectionists accept the facts of reasonable pluralism and the 
burdens of judgement: there is no need for the Rawlsian to get them to accept 
premises they don’t already accept. But what they don’t accept is that the facts of 
reasonable pluralism and the burdens of judgement imply that political values 
must always override non-political values. They do not, in other words, think that 
state neutrality is the logical response to the diversity of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. Clearly, the state must, in such cases, try to show s
tionists why the principle of state neutrality does follow from the burdens of 
judgement. And in doing so it violates Ackerman’s standards of ecumenicity.   
But the Rawlsian does have another arrow in his quiver: he will argue that 
Ackerman’s stringent degree of ecumenicity is neither achievable nor desirable, 
but that a lesser degree of ecumenicity is both. This lesser degree amounts to the 
political nature of the argument the state puts forward for its neutrality: it may have 
to take issue with the argumentative path followed by the moderate perfectionist 
who does not reach state neutrality from the burdens of judgement, but it does so 
without drawing on a
the state accuses the perfectionist of being unreasonable, but not of adhering 
to a false doctrine.   
Can the Rawlsian state clear this lower bar? Answering this question 
requires taking a closer look at what Rawls understands by the term “reasonable”.  
And when we do, it becomes clear that reasonableness, in the Rawlsian sense, is 
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‘[r]easonable persons…desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as 
free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept.’164  This 
sounds a good deal as if Rawls takes being reasonable to mean understanding 
society as a fair system of co-operation between free and equal citizens: precisely 
the view of society that political liberalism expresses. A little later on he goes on to 
say t
of public reason. The content of this ideal includes what free and equal 




                                                
hat  
being reasonable is not an epistemological idea (though it has epistemological 
elements).  Rather, it is part of a political ideal of democratic citizenship that includes 
the idea 
citizens can require of each other with respect to their reasonable comprehensive 
views.165 
Another way of putting this would be to say that being reasonable does not merely 
consist in having certain mental capacities or having access to certain knowledge: 
being unreasonable is not simply a failure of mental competence. The 
perfectionist may recognise the facts of reasonable pluralism and the burdens of 
judgement, but, for Rawls, this is insufficient. It is the perfectionist’s response to 
the facts that is inadequate, and, furthermore, it is inadequate for reasons that 
have nothing to do with the uncontroversial facts themselves. Being 
unreasonable, for Rawls, means failing to live up to a larger political ideal which 
includes, naturally, the ideal of reasonableness, but also, as he indicates above, a 
number of other notions from the lexicon of politica
re accepted at all by perfectionists, are certainly not accorded the same 
weight they are in the vision of political liberalism.     
The upshot of taking the reasonable to be part of a political ideal of this kind 
is that it allows Rawls to define the perfectionist, moderate or otherwise, as 
unreasonable, for it is precisely this understanding of the “political ideal of 
democratic citizenship” at the heart of political liberalism that the perfectionist calls 
into question. The Rawlsian notion of the reasonable is not, therefore, neutral 
ground to which the politically liberal state may appeal in attempting to persuade 
perfectionists to refrain from demanding that their favoured comprehensive
es be expressed in legislation. It is rather a particular kind of response to 
164 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) pp. 49-50. 
165 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 62. 
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the burdens of judgement, one which expresses the values of political liberalism. 
But having established that the appeal to reasonableness is not an appeal 
to ground which is neutral between the political liberal and the perfectionist does 
not establish, of course, that the notion of reasonableness is not a political notion, 
in the Rawlsian sense. It may well be that Rawls’s conception of the reasonable is 
one which, as part of the doctrine of political liberalism, applies only in the political 
sphere
d, as opposed to  merely the conclusions they draw from 
prem
Ra
r actions nevertheless imply that we believe the concern for salvation 
leness of those who 
disagr
                                                
, and is elaborated in terms drawn entirely from ideas in public political 
culture of contemporary liberal democracies,  
That this is not the case becomes clear when we look at how the Rawlsian 
state must confront non-moderate perfectionists – perfectionists whose premises 
must be challenge
ises they share with political liberals. In discussing this kind of encounter, 
wls asks us to  
imagine rationalist believers who contend that these beliefs are open to and can be 
fully established by reason…In this case the believers simply deny what we have 
called “the fact of reasonable pluralism”. So we say of the rationalist believers that they 
are mistaken in denying that fact; but we need not say that their religious beliefs are 
not true, since to deny that religious beliefs can be publicly and fully established by 
reason is not to say that they are not true. Of course, we do not believe the doctrine 
believers here assert, and this is shown in what we do. Even if we do not, say, hold 
some form of the doctrine of free religious faith that supports equal liberty of 
conscience, ou
does not require anything incompatible with that liberty. Still, we do not put forward 
more of our comprehensive view than we think needed or useful for the political aim of 
consensus.166 
In cases such as the “rationalist believer” the Rawlsian has even less purchase in 
appealing to the burdens of judgement – if the reasonab
ee with her position is denied, then, obviously, the next move to the 
reasonableness of political liberalism as a response to the facts of reasonable 
pluralism and the burdens of judgement cannot be made.    
Now what is striking here is the admission that at least part of “our” 
166 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 152-3. 
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comprehensive view has to be put forward in talking to the stubborn perfectionist.  
While the politically liberal state does not directly say that the comprehensive 
conception of the good life adhered to by the believer is false, this is implied by its 
actions, says Rawls. This is an extraordinary concession for Rawls to make, as it 
amounts to a recognition that political liberalism cannot be defended in a purely 
political manner against perfectionists who do not acknowledge the burdens of 
judgem









                                                
ent. And this means that, at least with regard to non-moderate 
perfectionists, that the Rawlsian state does not justify state neutrality in a manner 
ecumenical enough to satisfy the relaxed requirements Rawls himself sets out, let 
alone Ackerman’s more stringent standards.   
And when we consider why the Rawlsian state cannot do this, we see that 
it is because the way in which one responds to the burdens of judgement is in fact 
dependent on one’s comprehen
 perfectionists who do recognise the fact of reasonable pluralism must be 
nfronted by the Rawlsian state in a non-political, and hence non-ecumenical, 
nner. This becomes clear when Rawls’s discusses the case of abortion. On 
s topic he says the following: 
Suppose…that we consider the question in terms of three important political values: 
the due respect for human life, the ordered reproduction of political society over time, 
including the famil
itizens…Now I believe any reasonable balance of these three values will give a 
woman a duly qualified right to decide whether or not to end her pregnancy during the 
first trimester…Any comprehensive doctrine that leads to a balance of political values 
excluding that duly qualified right in the first trimester is to that extent
167
 This passage should be understood as emphasising that the view that the 
state ought to treat abortion at any stage of pregnancy as murder is an 
unreasonable one, on the grounds that believing abortion to be the equivalent of 
murder is a non-political belief which might reasonably be disputed.   
Clearly that belief is a view that may be reasonably disputed. And it is also 
clear that enforcing this view – making abortion illegal in most or all cases – is 
167 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), fn. 32, pp. 243-4. 
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likely to hinder social co-operation on a footing of mutual respect. But one might 
accept both of these points and nevertheless think that abortion ought to be illegal 
in most or all cases because one thinks also that being reasonable and 
maintaining the social peace, however important, do not trump the need to 
prevent murder. This is in no way an incoherent position: it is a response to the 
burdens of judgement which is rooted in an at least partially non-liberal conception 
of the good. And the Rawlsian state’s response, whether it be the insistence on 
the premise that there is a fact of reasonable pluralism which must be 
acknowledged, as it would be in the case of the “rationalist believer” or non-
moderate perfectionist, or the insistence that the burdens of judgement imply the 
rinciple of state neutrality, as it would be in the case of the moderate 
th taken by any conception of the good which 
cknowledges the fact of reasonable pluralism, but accords the good of fair social 
co-ope
p
perfectionist, implies the falsity of the conception of the good to which the 
rationalist believer or the (mostly) liberal opponent of abortion rights is committed, 
because no one could adhere to that perfectionist conception of the good and take 
the attitude to the burdens of judgement which political liberalism requires. 
 
In summary, then, Rawls’s appeal to reasonableness is not an ecumenical 
gesture.  This is because the Rawlsian conception of reasonableness is a partisan 
one – it is in fact a moral conception, and one, furthermore, which is part of an 
anti-perfectionist vision of the citizen’s place in society – and not an 
uncontroversial starting point on which political liberals and their opponents can 
agree. The appeal to reasonableness involves denying the premises of any 
conception of the good which disputes the fact of reasonable pluralism and 
rejecting the argumentative pa
a
ration on a footing of mutual respect less weight in relation to other goods 
than the Rawlsian liberal accords it. How one responds to the fact of reasonable 
pluralism turns out to be intimately connected to which comprehensive conception 
of the good life one adheres to. 
 
Consequently, the apparently ecumenical defence of state neutrality which 
Rawls’s proposes in Political liberalism turns out in fact to have partisan elements.  
The politically liberal state cannot defend its refusal to legislate on the basis of any 
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particular conception of the good without arguing for at least the view that the 
good of fair social co-operation on a footing of mutual respect ought to take 
precedence over any goods which might come into conflict with it or the view that 
reasonableness consists in responding to the burdens of judgement by rejecting 
perfectionism. The fact that one’s take on these two issues is a function of the 
onception of the good life one is committed to means that citizens cannot simply 
e 
paths they are already committed to. Their comprehensive conceptions of the 
ood life, premises, or argumentative paths will, in many cases, have to be 
3.
e goes on to say that ‘[d]oubtless there are other paths as well.’   
I do not intend, in what follows, to adopt Ackerman’s schema in its entirety – the 
second highway seems to me to collapse into the first and the fourth seems to me 
wholly unconvincing – but will concentrate rather on the first and third highways, 
given the greater likelihood of their indeed leading us to the principle of state 
neutrality.170   
                                                
c
be left to work their way to the principle of state neutrality using argumentativ
g
challenged by the Rawlsian state. 
 
2 Non-neutral justifications of the principle of state neutrality 
 
If it is neither possible nor desirable to justify the principle of state neutrality 
neutrally, what about frankly partisan justifications? Is there, in other words, a 
convincing case to be made for the principle of state neutrality on a basis which is 
not shared by all citizens of contemporary liberal democracies? Many such 
strategies have been suggested – Ackerman writes, for example, of ‘four…main 
highways to the liberal state: realism about the corrosiveness of power; 
recognition of doubt as a necessary step to moral knowledge; respect for the 
autonomy of persons; and scepticism concerning the reality of transcendent 
meaning.’168 H  169
168 Bruce Ackerman, Social justice in the liberal state (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 369 
169 Bruce Ackerman, Social justice in the liberal state (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 369 
170 My discussion is in fact more indebted to the schema George Sher presents in Beyond neutrality than it is to that of 
Ackerman. 
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3.2.1 The first highway: Realism about the corrosiveness of power 
 
I deal first with a number of popular arguments for state neutrality which are 
premised on what Ackerman terms “realism about the corrosiveness of power” 
and conclude that they do not, in the end, establish sufficiently that the principle of 
state neutrality is the necessary response to this problem. 
 Roughly speaking, this realism might be paraphrased as the view that 
perfectionist governments cannot be trusted to promote the good. When one says 
that one fears that a perfectionist state cannot be trusted to promote the good, 
what exactly is it that such a state is thought to be in danger of doing? What evils, 
in other words, is state neutrality thought to be the best method of thwarting?   
 
The first kind of misbehaviour occurs when the state misidentifies what the good 
in fact is, in which case it ends up promoting that which is worthless and (at least 
possibly) damaging to citizens’ lives. This concern is to be distinguished from 
moral scepticism – it is not the claim that there is no good which anybody, state or 
otherwise, might identify. In fact it is a kind of concern only available to moral 
realists, but it may be motivated by the belief that governments are particularly 
prone to judge moral matters incorrectly, given the multitude of temptations and 
interests they face. Raz alludes to this concern when he notes, as motivations for 
anti-perfectionism,  
the dangers inherent in the concentration of power in few hands, the dangers of 
corruption, of bureaucratic distortions and insensitivities, of fallibility of judgement, and 
uncertainty of purpose, and the insufficiency and the distortion of information reaching 
the central organs of government.171 
What are we to make of this concern? The first point to make is that there is little 
reason to believe that the state’s refraining from promoting its (possibly 
erroneous) vision of the good would guarantee that citizens would be free of any 
influences which promote or discourage the good. There are many ways that 
one’s life could go wrong without the state’s interference, and one might worry just 
                                                
171 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 427. 
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as much that the state’s abstention from promoting the good would leave citizens 
vulnerable to other, possibly more malign, forces. So those who argue for 
neutralism on the basis that the state may misjudge the good need to show that 
 falsehoods within that vision, or falsehoods which come to 
replac
ion of the good that will leave them vulnerable, at a later date, to false 
ely, if not more so, to thwart the dangers of the state which 
                                                
the state is especially prone to this kind of misjudgement. 
 Why might one think that the state is especially prone to promoting misguided 
conceptions of the good?  Mill suggests three reasons.172 The first one is that the 
state cannot know the needs and tastes of each individual sufficient for it to be 
any kind of authority on what his or her good is.  Secondly, the standards for 
judging the successful promotion of the good on the part of the state are, or would 
be, so vague as to leave policymakers with little incentive to consider legislation 
carefully. And, thirdly, a state which successfully promotes even a valid vision of 
the good amongst the citizenry runs the risk of leaving them, at some future time, 
unable to discern the
e that vision.   
One might, for any one of these three reasons, think that the state best 
remain neutral, and that pursuit of the good is best left in the hands of individual 
citizens themselves, given their greater knowledge of their own predilections, the 
much higher stakes they have in their leading valuable lives in comparison to the 
state, and the likelihood that they will develop the kind of dependence on the 
state’s vis
values.   
 Sher has argued173 that Mill’s concerns are not misguided, and indeed make 
a convincing case for caution with regard to perfectionist legislation. But we need 
not conclude from this that the state must be bound by a rigorous principle of state 
neutrality. Holding instead that the state ought to be bound by a principle – which 
Sher dubs principle M – forbidding it from promoting any conception of the good 
unless that conception has been found to satisfy our usual standards of 
justification is just as lik
misjudges the good.   
 Is there any reason to suppose that a state which observed Sher’s principle M 
would be more likely to disregard its lack of knowledge of the needs and tastes of 
172 John Stuart Mill, On liberty (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), p. 93. 
173 George Sher, Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 131-8. 
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each individual, and thereby to hinder citizens in their efforts to lead valuable lives, 
than a state which understood itself to be bound by the principle of state 
neutrality?174 Or to suppose that a state’s being bound by the principle of state 
neutrality is necessary to diminish the danger of false ideals being promoted by 
officials with little at stake? Or that a commitment to state neutrality would reduce 
the risk of future moral misjudgements on the part of the state more than a 
commitment to assessing conceptions of the good by means of our usual 
ore kindly, take its own 
re about the principle of state neutrality 
                                                
standards of justification before promoting them? 
 One misleading line of argument for neutrality needs to be dealt with first, and 
that is the claim that a principle such as M could not solve the problem of possible 
misjudgements on the part of the state, since it is the state itself which must apply 
the principle M. Given that it is the state’s vulnerability to error that raises the 
concern in the first place, so the argument goes, any response which suggests, in 
essence, that the state police its own errors (or, to put it m
fallibility into account), must be to that extent fallacious.   
 This argument shows too much. It shows too much because the claim that the 
state cannot be trusted to live up to the principles it is ostensibly committed to 
leaves it quite unclear as to why the principle of state neutrality should be any less 
vulnerable to such a move. If states which are supposedly committed to a careful 
weighing of reasons for and against before promoting a particular conception of 
the good cannot be trusted actually to act consistent with this principle, why 
should we assume that states which are committed to the principle of state 
neutrality can be so trusted? What is the
which makes it less likely to be abused? 
 There may have been reason for optimism in regard to neutrality’s properties 
as a fail-safe principle in Mill’s day, but there is surely little reason now, given that 
we have all seen how easy it has been for states to commit every kind of abuse in 
the name of principles of right (such as justice) in the twentieth-century. But 
perhaps one does not need to deploy as sweeping an argument as the suggestion 
that states which promote the good will be tempted in every way to promote what 
is not in fact good, and that these temptations are faced to much lesser degree by 
governments bound to the principle of state neutrality. Perhaps we might rather 
174 George Sher, Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 131-8. 
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find specific arguments for the special vulnerability of perfectionist governments to 
the failure to understand the intricate needs of citizens, or showing how 
perfectionist governments will be especially uncommitted to working out the 
consequences of their policies for the goods they are supposedly promoting, or 
showing how future generations are rendered especially rigid or complacent by 
ns vulnerable to false ideals than a 
govern
independent argument for the principle of state neutrality is therefore 
ecessary.   
                                                
perfectionist governments. 
 It is hard to see where such arguments are going to be found. There is no 
reason to think that, as Raz puts it, ‘one is more likely to be wrong about the 
character of the good life than about the sort of moral considerations which all 
agree should influence political action such as the right to life, to free expression, 
or free religious worship,’175 in which case we might say that a neutralist 
government is just as likely to leave its citize
ment committed to Sher’s principle M. 
This issue reveals the fundamental problem with postulating a neutrality 
principle as a way of preventing the state from erring. While there certainly is 
cause to worry that the state may err for the reasons Mill mentions, and any 
reputable state would do well to take its own fallibility in this regard into account in 
making law, there are many conceivable ways of guarding against the possibility 
that a state may promote false ideals of which the principle of state neutrality is 
only one. An 
n
 
The second kind of pragmatic reason for forbidding the state from promoting the 
good is motivated by the fear of instability. Larmore’s “modus vivendi” liberalism, 
and the later work of Rawls can be read as following from the view that avoiding a 
society in which factions urgently desire control of the state so as to avoid having 
unwelcome conceptions of the good imposed on them requires excluding 
perfectionist considerations from lawmaking. Not surprisingly, many have feared 
that such a society would suffer from a dangerous degree of political instability.176  
 The obvious difficulty any such argument faces is the fact that contemporary 
liberal democracies are neither strictly neutralist nor unstable. Substantive goods 
175 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 160. 
176 Of course the overwhelming power of one faction within such a society would stabilise it.  But this is hardly the kind of 
solution liberals look to. 
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are openly supported by the states of North America and the European Union, to 
mention two primary loci of liberal democracy. Many European states, for 
example, have established churches, and all of them, as well as Canada and the 
United States of America, support the arts and monogamous marriage by means 
of taxation. And these are only the more obvious examples – a great deal of the 
fine web of law which governs people’s everyday lives is premised on the 
prefera
ined by a host of factors other than objections to perfectionist 
overnment. 
of these kinds, but this fact 
 insufficient to establish a principle of state neutrality. 
 
bility of certain lifestyles over others.   
The stability of contemporary liberal democracies is even more obvious 
than their lack of neutrality. Western Europe has seen remarkably little political 
turmoil since the end of World War II, and the United States and Canada have 
enjoyed an even longer periods of tranquillity. Furthermore, it is quite unclear that 
the causes of those periods of serious unrest in the recent history of the West can 
be traced to perfectionist legislation. It is true, of course, that the Nazis were 
perfectionists, but it was the odious nature of the substantive values they were 
committed to that pushed the world into war in the late 1930s and not the mere 




We must conclude, then, that there is little reason to think that the dangers which 
state neutrality is allegedly required to ward off, to the extent that they are 
genuine, are always better dealt with by a state which is bound only to legislate in 
a manner neutral between any conceptions of the good than they are by a state 
that is free to promote the good, provided it is also bound by the need to 
recognise various rights and procedures that form a standard part of the legal 
vocabulary of contemporary liberal democracies. It may be that, on occasion, 
state neutrality is an appropriate response to concerns 
is
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3.2.2 The third highway (1): Promoting autonomy as a ground for the 
principle of state neutrality  
 
influential arguments for state neutrality 
y is a frequently appealed to – possibly 
e 
 
say that one can reason one’s way to 
the pri
                                                
I deal in this section with a number of 
which rely on the importance of personal autonomy and also conclude that they 
do not, in the end, establish sufficiently that the principle of state neutrality is the 
necessary response to this problem. 
 The importance of personal autonom
th most frequently appealed to – reason for the requirement that the state be 
neutral. The basic idea here is that everyone has a fundamental interest in leading 
an autonomous life, and that perfectionist legislation damages the ability of 
citizens to do so. It will be my contention that no such general principle applies.   
 It will be my contention, in other words, that although particular perfectionist
laws may indeed damage citizens’ ability to lead autonomous lives, such laws 
may just as easily, if not more so, enable citizens to lead autonomous lives, and 
therefore the argument from the importance of autonomy to a principle of state 
neutrality fails. 
Ackerman’s way of putting this is to 
nciple of state neutrality by adopting ‘a conception of the good that gives a 
central place to autonomous deliberation and den[ies] that it is possible to force a 
person to be good.’177 One form that this argument takes moves from the claim 
that autonomous lives are of great value to the principle of state neutrality via the 
intermediate premise that more good (in the form of more autonomous living, in 
other words) results from the state’s refusal to promote any particular conception 
of the good than would from any alternative. Another way of putting this would be 
to say that autonomous lives (or autonomous choices) are good in the way that, 
say, beauty, or excellence, are, and therefore that, because the government must 
promote the good, the government must promote as much autonomy as it can, 
and this it does best by remaining neutral between conceptions of the good when 
legislating: the government’s promoting the most good requires it refraining from 
177 Bruce Ackerman, Social justice in the liberal state (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 11.  One need not, of 




the attempt to do so.   
The first troubling aspect of this argument, however, is that, while the claim 
that au
otion 
f against other 
goods
might equally 
of ways in which the state may 
promo
                                                
tonomy is valuable, and even the claim that autonomy is very valuable, is 
(rather obviously) plausible, the claim that only autonomy is valuable is (rather 
obviously) implausible. And this gives rise to two difficult questions for those who 
wish to argue from the value of autonomy to the principle of state neutrality. 
 The first question is whether autonomy is always reduced by state prom
of other goods. And if the answer to this question is positive, we might still ask 
why the state must always take the side of autonomy in any conflict between it 
and other goods. And even if autonomy is the most valuable good, we might 
nevertheless ask further why the state’s promoting a select set of goods other 
than autonomy could never end up promoting more good overall.   
As long as the possibility of the state trading autonomy of
 exists, the argument from the value of autonomy to the principle of state 
neutrality will not work. But there may be ways of ruling out such trade-offs, and 
one tempting way of doing so would be to argue that goods other than autonomy 
depend for their value on being autonomously chosen. This position need not be 
interpreted as the dubious claim that the mere fact of being chosen autonomously 
confers value; it could be the claim that valuable goods acquire their value through 
an act of choice which recognises their potential independent value. 
 If one holds to this claim, which is not implausible,178 then one 
plausibly argue that any state promotion of the good which overrides citizens’ 
autonomy cannot in fact succeed in promoting the good, as it removes the 
conditions under which genuine goods can arise.  It is not obvious, however, that 
activities only become valuable in virtue of having been autonomously chosen. 
And the argument from the value of autonomy to the principle of state neutrality 
assumes that when a citizen takes up a form of life, or a potentially valuable 
activity, as a result of the state’s having promoted it in some way, this choice on 
the part of a citizen is necessarily heteronomous.   
But this is dubious.  Let us look at a number 
te the good in order to establish whether these methods necessarily detract 
178 It is, as Sher points out, analogous to Kant’s view that actions acquire independent moral value only if performed for the right 
reasons, namely recognition of their potential independent value.  See George Sher, Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and 
politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 59. 
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from the autonomy of those who choose the good as a result of these efforts on 
the part of the state. 
 
Could those who take up a potentially valuable form of life (or reject a worthless 
r, to suggest that if one’s initial choice to pursue a 
form o
he neutralist to concede that it may well 
                                                
form of life) as a result of, say, a state advertising campaign, be said have chosen 
autonomously? One might think that they cannot, given that, first, autonomous 
choice is made on the basis of sound reasons, and, second, advertising 
campaigns (generally) do not aim to persuade by means of argument. One might 
plausibly conclude that opting to pursue a valuable form of life is an autonomous 
choice only if the value of that form of life is the reason for it being chosen; doing 
so as a result of a persuasive advertising campaign is not usually understood as a 
response to good reasons.179 
It is misleading, howeve
f life is not made on the basis of sound reasons, then one’s subsequent 
pursuit of that form of life must be contaminated by this origin. This is because it is 
very frequently the case that valuable forms of life, pursued by citizens in what 
appear to be indisputably autonomous ways, were initially chosen on a less than 
rational basis. One might even suspect that all valuable practices, such as various 
arts, crafts, sports, or even religions, are initially taken up by their practitioners on 
the basis of, for example, admiration for prominent figures, the desire to impress 
their peers, an unmastered thirst for power or status, or any number of other forms 
of non-rational encouragement on the part of peers or authority figures. And yet it 
is false that such beginnings preclude an autonomous commitment to these 
practices in later life. It may be that non-rational choices are the necessary hooks 
which make it at all possible for adults to participate, whether autonomously or 
not, in such practices in later life. If this is the case, then a state policy which 
seeks to maintain an adequate range of valuable options for citizens to pursue, as 
Raz believes it should,180 must not be construed as threatening to autonomy. On 
the contrary, a state which fails to do so might be needlessly depriving citizens of 
many worthwhile avenues of endeavour. 
The obvious rebuttal would be for t
179 Of course an advertising campaign could merely present a sound argument to those who have not yet encountered it.  I do 
not refer here to that kind of argument. 
180 See Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 372.  
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happe
ht ban on 
any pr
tonomy is that it is 
surely
n that people respond autonomously to valuable options that they were 
initially introduced to by non-rational means, while arguing that these happy 
commitments are outnumbered by cases in which the initial method of persuasion 
does indeed render future pursuit of the option in question heteronomous, and 
that this means that the state should avoid promoting the good so as to avoid 
these more numerous unhappy outcomes. Put more simply, the neutralist might 
make a consequentialist argument that more good (assuming that autonomy is a 
good) results from a policy of state neutrality than from a policy of perfectionism, 
given the relatively low likelihood of autonomous choices being produced from the 
kind of heteronomous beginnings state promotion of the good induces. 
But this seems much too pessimistic.  Arguing that the an outrig
omotion of the good is necessary in order to forestall the loss of autonomy 
that such promotion inevitably entails requires arguing that the state is largely 
incapable of distinguishing between those cases where “manipulative” promotion 
of the good – say, through advertising campaigns which promote the arts, 
discourage dangerous drug use, encourage attendance at museums, participation 
in sports and various kinds of community service, and so on – supports long-term 
autonomous commitments to these forms of life and those cases in which it does 
not. There seems little reason to believe that once any state embarks on the 
promotion of forms of life uncontroversially accepted as valuable, such as those 
mentioned above, it will inevitably be tempted to promote them, and perhaps 
other, more controversial, forms in ways that damage citizens autonomy. This is 
not idle speculation, as most western states do aim to promote the good in 
precisely this way, and I know of no evidence to suggest that this has brought 
about a decline in the amount of autonomy in these societies.  
A further problem for the argument from the value of au
 impossible for a government to avoid affecting citizens’ tastes or 
conceptions of the good. As we saw when discussing the neutrality of effect 
interpretation of the principle of state neutrality in chapter one, it is simply 
impossible for a state so to calibrate its policies that the balance of power between 
all forms of life or conceptions of the good within a society remains exactly as it 
would be absent state action. If this is so, a discussion of the state’s influence 
over citizens’ preferences must turn into a discussion of whether it may do so 
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intentionally or not, not whether it can be prevented from doing so or not. 
 But a state which refuses intentionally to influence the preferences of citizens 
state can create more 
nomy against coercive 
 be laws against the use of narcotics.  Some 
citizen
                                                
in the direction of what it deems to be the good will not thereby increase autonomy 
in the society, as its unintentional influences will remain untouched; rather, the 
number of citizens who lead lives that are good in terms accepted by the state will 
drop, an outcome that should please nobody other than those who hold the state 
to be promoting false ideals of the good. Raz makes a similar point – emphasising 
the way in which individuals cannot always create valuable options without state 
support – when he says that ‘anti-perfectionism in practice would lead not merely 
to a political stand-off from support for valuable conceptions of the good. It would 
undermine the chances of survival of many cherished aspects of our culture.’181  I 
come to discuss this point in greater detail when I outline Raz’s defence of 
perfectionism in chapter three. 
 Whatever we have said about the claim that the 
autonomy by refraining from using non-coercive, non-rational, methods than by 
using them does not, of course, necessarily apply to the same claim about 
coercive methods. This, after all, is the crux of the neutralist’s case: it is in the 
state’s use of coercion to promote the good or discourage the bad that the 
neutralist sees the greatest threat to citizens’ autonomy. 
 But is the argument from the value of auto
perfectionism any stronger than the same argument against non-coercive 
perfectionism? What, after all, is the objection to coercion other than its preventing 
its victims from responding to the reasons that apply to them?182 And, if this is so, 
in what way does it differ from the argument that non-coercive perfectionism 
reduces the overall amount of autonomy? Is it not possible that initial coercion 
could produce citizens who respond autonomously to the potential good of 
genuinely valuable forms of life?   
The obvious example would
s may refrain from narcotics out of fear of punishment, and not because 
they recognise the dangers of narcotics. As such they cannot be said to be living 
(with regard to this choice, at least) autonomously. But it can hardly be denied that 
181 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 162.  Here Raz is thinking in particular about 
practices such as opera, but his point in fact covers a wide variety of cases. 
182 We will see in chapter three, when I discuss Raz’s view of coercion, that the way I have put it here is a simplification.   
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they may well lead lives a good deal more autonomous as a result of their being 
forced to refrain from narcotics; more autonomous, in all likelihood, than their 
peers who autonomously choose to devote themselves to regular drug 
consumption. 
I conclude, then, that arguing from the value of autonomy to the principle of 
state n
3.2.3 The third highway (2): Respecting autonomy as a ground for the 
One need not, however, defend autonomy as a good to be maximised.  It may be 
ance of autonomy to the principle of state neutrality is 
. As a result I look principally in what 
follows
A theory of justice, the purpose of the 
origina
eutrality will not establish that principle, as it is not the case that promotion 
of the good on the part of the state always decreases citizens’ autonomy. As I 
argued above, it is possible, under not uncommon circumstances, for 
perfectionism to increase citizens’ autonomy, especially if citizens’ autonomy is 
considered over the long run. Furthermore any consequentialist argument which 
aims to show that a neutral state increases the overall good in a society must 
account for the place of goods other than autonomy. And this cannot be done in 
such a way – at least not if the argument is a consequentialist one – as to show 
why autonomy should always take precedence over other goods.   
 
principle of state neutrality  
 
that getting from the import
best done by understanding respect for autonomy as a constraint which rules out 
non-neutral lawmaking. 
This is a popular route for neutralists – so popular, in fact, that I cannot 
hope to examine all possible variations on it
 at the work of Rawls, who, as I have indicated in the introduction, is both 
unquestionably the most important contemporary liberal neutralist and a 
formidable opponent of consequentialist styles of political argument. I examine 
whether a convincing non-consequentialist case for the principle of state neutrality 
can be gleaned from his writings. 
Rawls, as we have already seen, sets up a decision procedure known as 
the original position in his landmark work 
l position being to model the principles of justice that free and equal citizens 
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would agree on, given the right kind of circumstances. Naturally questions will 
arise as to why exactly Rawls sets up the original position the way he does, and 
these are precisely the questions we will need to deal with in working out why 
Rawls believes that free citizens, whom we can understand as autonomous 
citizens for our purposes, would choose principles of justice which are not to be 
based on any particular conception of the good. In other words working out why, 
for Rawls, respect for autonomy means state neutrality, means, at least with 
regard to A theory of justice, working out why the original position is set up the 
way it is. And this I do in what follows. 
 
But first a small detour. The immediately puzzling aspect of any argument which 




                                                
rules out promotion of the good under certain circumstances is the fact that it 
requires one to ignore what would normally be considered good reasons for 
action; and in the case of arguments from respect for autonomy to the principle of 
state neutrality the state is required to ignore such reasons entirely.   
How might such a requirement arise? Constraints which for
ting the good do make sense under some circumstances: it is 
uncontroversially illegitimate, for example, to extract organs from an 
unconsenting, living, person, no matter how much good would thereby be 
promoted. Such constraints, Sher points out, can be justified by the Rawlsian 
argument that ‘one person’s losses cannot be offset by the gains of others’183.   
But, as he goes on to explain, torturing for the greater good is not on 
with promoting the good in general, as the latter, in theory at least, is an 
effort to promote the good in the lives of all citizens, not in some (such as those 
whose suffering is preventing by the torture) at the expense of others (such as the 
one whose torture prevents the suffering of others). Expanding on this, we might 
say that state promotion of the good cannot be understood as the thwarting of 
citizens’ interests as torturing someone can be understood as thwarting his or her 
interests. This is because, as well as having an interest in leading autonomous 
lives, citizens also have an interest in leading good lives, in which case the state’s 
failure to promote the good might well be understood as thwarting citizens’ 
interests. 
183 George Sher, Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 74. 
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Let us turn now to Rawls.  In what follows I will look at arguments 
presen
hat is Rawls’s case for the design of the original position which is 
 certain kinds of personal 
, however, as tempting 
Furthermore, it would also be unclear why any beliefs at all would be 
permit
                                                
ted in both A theory of justice and Political liberalism which are understood 
by Rawls to make the case (although seldom explicitly) for a neutral state, 
beginning, naturally enough, with those presented in A theory of justice. 
 
W
simultaneously a case for the principle of state neutrality?   To be precise, the 
question we have to ask is why Rawls denies the parties in the original position 
knowledge about the conceptions of the good, given that it is ignorance of this 
which leads them to assent to principles neutral between such conceptions. In A 
theory of justice, Rawls describes the veil of ignorance as ensuring ‘that no one is 
advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural 
chance or the contingency of social circumstance.’184 
 Given that principles of justice which favoured
qualities or talents would be precisely principles which advantaged or 
disadvantaged citizens on the basis of “natural chance” or “the contingency of 
social circumstance”, we might think that principles which favoured certain 
conceptions of the good are ruled out for the same reason. It might be that Rawls 
thinks of the conceptions of the good people adhere to as being unchosen in the 
way that talents are, and therefore undeserving of favour. 
 I would caution against interpreting Rawls in this way
though the analogy may be, he surely cannot think of conceptions of the good in 
the same way as he thinks of talents. And this is because of the significance he 
takes our ‘capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the 
good’ to have.185 It would be quite unclear why this capacity would be of any 
importance if it were simply the product of contingency: in fact it would be quite 
unclear how anybody could revise their conception of the good if that were the 
case. 
ted to influence the choices of the parties in the original position, as Rawls 
gives us no reason to think (nor could he, one must assume) that beliefs about the 
184 John Rawls, A theory of justice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999), p. 11. 
185 John Rawls, “Kantian constructivism in moral theory,” Journal of Philosophy 77, 9 (1980), pp. 515-72 at p. 525. 
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good are products of contingency, whereas their other beliefs are not. And clearly, 
some beliefs are required behind the veil of ignorance, otherwise the parties could 
have no grounds whatsoever for choosing the principles they do. We can 
conclude therefore that Rawls’s reasons for excluding conceptions of the good 
from the knowledge available to parties in the original position lie elsewhere. 
 
On page 560 of A theory of justice186, Rawls says that 
                                                
 [w]e should not attempt to give form to our life by first looking to the good 
independently defined. It is not our aims that primarily reveal our nature but rather the 
principles that we would acknowledge to govern the background conditions under 
which these aims are to be formed and the manner in which they are to be pursued. 
For the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it; even a dominant end must be 
chosen from among numerous possibilities. There is no way to get beyond deliberative 
rationality.187 
This suggests that what is important about conceptions of the good – what, in 
other words, makes them unfit to influence the choices made behind the veil of 
ignorance – is not that they are the products of contingent factors beyond 
anyone’s control, but rather that they are external to the self. 
 But the problem with understanding Rawls to exclude conceptions of the good 
on this basis is that his claim that the nature of the self is revealed by the 
principles it would choose behind the veil of ignorance, and not by its ends is that 
we do not thereby have an argument for denying the parties in the original position 
knowledge of the conceptions of the good they will adhere to. Naturally, seeing 
the self in this way leads to Rawls’s designing the original position the way he 
does, and, unsurprisingly, this design produces principles of justice which forbid 
the state from acting on the basis of any particular conception of the good. But the 
progression from Rawls’s vision of the self as prior to its ends to the design of the 
original position to the principle of state neutrality does not satisfy us if we want to 
know why we ought to see the self in this way, and if we do not know why we 
ought to see it this way we will not have been shown why the state should respect 
the principle of state neutrality.     
186 (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
187 John Rawls, A theory of justice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 560. 
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 In any case, in attempting to understand why the claim that the self’s being 
prior to all its ends implies that conceptions of the good cannot be taken into 
account when principles of justice are being established, we run up against the 
problem of why one might think that the contingency of one’s conceptions of the 
good should rule them out from consideration behind the veil of ignorance.188    
The problem is that one’s conceptions of the good are not the only beliefs 
whose failure to “reveal our nature”, as Rawls understands it, is indicated by the 
fact that our selves remain what they are despite changes in our conceptions of 
the good. This is in fact true of any beliefs we might have, including those beliefs 
that Rawls would deem straightforwardly to be “knowledge”, and therefore 
knowable behind the veil of ignorance. But ruling out all these beliefs from the 
deliberations the parties in the original position take part in would deprive them of 
any basis for choosing principles of justice.   
And so if Rawls were to argue from the contingency of conceptions of the 
good, or their changeability, to the principle of state neutrality, he would in both 
cases show more than he would want to: by ruling out conceptions of the good 
from the deliberations behind the veil of ignorance he would not only deprive the 
parties in the original position of what they need to establish principles of justice 
which are premised on the good; he would deprive them of what they need to 
establish any principles of justice at all. 
 
But perhaps these are not in fact Rawls’s reasons. Writing about the arguments 
for neutrality that might be found in A theory of justice, Raz says that  
 [t]o vindicate Rawls’s position one requires convincing reasons…for excluding 
moral and religious beliefs from the information available behind the veil of 
ignorance…A theory of justice contains hardly any explicit argument for the exclusion 
of moral and religious beliefs from the original position. Such argument as there is 
turns on the need to secure unanimity, the need to have, in the original position, one 
viewpoint which can be the “standpoint of one person selected at random” which 
189
                                                
excludes bargaining and guarantees unanimity.    
188 See George Sher, Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 82, for a 
similar argument. 
189 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 124-5. 
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So perhaps we can get to the principle of state neutrality (via A theory of justice) 
this way: We must place knowledge of the good behind the veil of ignorance for 
the parties in the original position, because failing to do so would make it 
impossible for them to reach any agreement, with the result that ‘we would not be 
able to work out any definite theory of justice at all’190   But this surely cannot, in 
itself, be sufficient for us to accept a principle of state neutrality, as it is quite 
possible to imagine configurations of the original position other than the setup 
Rawls actually uses which provide us with an agreement, without denying the 
onclusions no less determinate than those reached by the Rawlsian 
ld not suffice to establish a neutral constitution: as he 
puts 
ossibility, since the 
process for determining which perfectionist principle should be implemented in the 
parties in the original position knowledge of their conceptions of the good. 
 They could be, for example, provided with knowledge of a minimal number of 
well-supported values, much in the way that they are provided with a certain 
amount of empirical knowledge. Or we might note, as Sher has, that ‘nothing [said 
by Rawls in A theory of justice] shows why we should not altogether dispense with 
the contractarian premises about the good life.’191 and that doing this would 
produce c
parties.   
 Furthermore, Raz has argued that even being denied knowledge of one’s 
conception of the good wou
it, the original position 
may yield an agreement to establish a constitutional framework most likely to lead 
to the pursuit of well-founded ideals, given the information available at any given time. 
Ignorance of one’s particular moral beliefs will not exclude this p
parties in the original position know that they have moral ideals. They accept, in other 
words, “a natural duty” to pursue the best-founded moral ideal.192   
Contrary to Rawls, therefore, a principle of state neutrality cannot be deduced 
from the choices parties in the original position make: they might well refrain from 
adopting a ‘particular perfectionist principle as a constituent of their doctrine of 
justice,’193 given their general knowledge of human fallibility, but there is no 
reason why they could not ‘accept a doctrine of justice including an agreed 
                                                
190 John Rawls, A theory of justice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 140. 
191 George Sher, Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 83, 
192 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 125. 
193 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 126. 
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state’194 – if we (and they) are to consider matters of the good as potential subject 
matter for rational deliberation, that is. And Rawls is of course eager to evade 
charges that he is a moral sceptic.195 We might just as well ask ourselves, when 
thinking about justice, what sort of process the parties in the original position 
would want to implement for deciding which conceptions of the good ought to 
serve as the basis of legislation. This conclusion is, of course, welcome to 
erfectionists. 
aking law on the basis of any particular conception of the good, 
wls, ought we to make these demands 
of a co
                                                
p
 
Of course A theory of justice is not all there is to Rawls’s work. And it may be that, 
despite the difficulties of establishing where exactly the case for the principle of 
state neutrality is to be found in this first book, things become clearer once we turn 
to Political liberalism, where Rawls presents his theory of justice in a new manner, 
taking it to be the conclusion of a process, valid for contemporary liberal 
democracies alone, in which its principles are “worked up”, as he puts it, from 
widely-held assumptions about political morality which are, so to speak, part of the 
public culture of such democracies. It might be that this strategy makes clearer 
why a commitment to respect for the autonomy of individuals requires the state 
the refrain from m
as Rawls sees it. 
 In Political liberalism Rawls emphasises, once more, his view that a 
conception of justice must be ‘as far as possible, independent of the opposing and 
conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that citizens affirm’196 – neutral 
between conceptions of the good, in other words. And in Political liberalism he no 
longer argues for this neutrality on the basis of the original position. It is therefore 
worth asking why, according to the later Ra
nception of justice? Why neutrality? 
Raz’s answer is that Rawls advocates state neutrality because he takes it 
that ‘social unity and stability based on consensus – that is, achieved without 
excessive resort to force – are valuable goals of sufficient importance to make 
them and them alone the foundations of a theory of justice for our societies.’197 As 
194 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 126. 
195 John Rawls, A theory of justice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p 328. 
196 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 175. 
197 Joseph Raz, “Facing diversity: The case of epistemic abstinence,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 19, 1 (1990), p. 14. 
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Raz in
 it illegitimate), we must 
ask wh
troversial conception of the good life. And this, so 
Raz’s 
                                                
terprets Rawls, perfectionist societies must either be unstable, or they must 
coerce their citizens into stability.   
We have already seen that the claim that unless the laws of contemporary 
liberal democracies are free of perfectionist legislation, instability will ensue, lacks 
foundation.198 But let us grant Rawls this premise for the moment, so as to reveal 
further problems which arise from the way in which Political liberalism sets up the 
case for state neutrality. If, as Rawls suggests, any conception of justice which is 
not derived from the shared values of the public political culture is illegitimate 
(leaving aside for the moment the question of what makes
y justice as fairness is derived from a controversial conception of the good; 
the supreme value of uncoerced stability, as Raz puts it.   
This apparent dependence on the value of uncoerced stability upsets the 
later Rawls’s case for state neutrality in way similar to the way in which the 
argument for the neutrality principle from the value of autonomy is upset.199 If we 
are to derive the neutrality principle from the original position, the setup of which is 
itself premised on a certain vision of the autonomous and equal individual, but we 
are told that this vision of the person derives its validity from its place in the public 
culture of contemporary liberal democracies, then we need first of all to know why 
holding such a place in the culture confers validity on the vision of the 
autonomous person. The answer Rawls must give us, if Raz is correct, is that 
failing to base our vision of the person on the public political culture would mean 
basing it, instead, on a con
interpretation goes, is ruled out as a basis for legislation on the grounds that 
it is a recipe for instability.   
But here, once again, we have to ask whether the rejection of uncoerced 
stability is as pervasive a part of the public political culture of modern liberal 
democracies as all that. It is true that there is no general enthusiasm for instability, 
but, as Sher remarks, it is still unclear ‘why we should never regard some 
sacrifices in stability, or some amounts of coercion, as reasonable prices to pay 
for suitably large amounts of other goods.’200 And here we see that the trade-off 
problem, which we had hoped arguments from the respect for autonomy (as 
198 We can safely conclude, as well (although I do not discuss this in any detail), that the reason contemporary liberal 
democracies are stable is not (at least not to any worrying extent) because of large amounts of coercion.  
199 See pp. above. 
200 George Sher, Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 85. 
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opposed to the value of autonomy) could sidestep, arises again. It may be that the 
principle of state neutrality can be derived, via the public political culture, from the 
alue of uncoerced stability, but we are not told why uncoerced stability should 
One 
“pr
is proper and hence justifiable only when it is 
rom the fact of the state’s 
r accurately points out,205 that this means that a legitimate 
                                                
v
take precedence over other, or combinations of other, values. 
 
of the important innovations of Rawls later writings201 is the so-called 
inciple of liberal legitimacy”. This principle, which states that 
our exercise of political power 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to 
them as reasonable and rational202 
is derived, first, from the fact that we do not choose our relationship to the politics 
of our society, but are simply born into it, and, second, f
overwhelming power.203 Rawls takes this principle to require that, as we saw in 
chapter two, conceptions of the good be excluded as a basis for reasoning about 
constitutional essentials or basic questions of justice.204 
 So we know from the principle of liberal legitimacy, that no constitution which 
cannot be reasonable endorsed by all citizens can be legitimate. We do not as yet 
know, though, as She
constitution cannot be premised on any conception of the good. And this is 
because we do not yet know what exactly it is that citizens can or cannot 
reasonably endorse. 
 Rawls’s view is that citizens, or their comprehensive conceptions of the good 
life, are reasonable if they do not expect the state to coerce others into 
compliance with it; if they, in other words, accept the principle of state neutrality.  
But this is of course not an argument for the principle of state neutrality, for we 
first need an argument as to why Rawls’s particular vision of reasonableness 
ought to be accepted: we might, quite reasonably, one would think, regard a 
201 By this I mean those writings after and including his “Kantian constructivism in moral theory,” The Journal of Philosophy 77 
(1980), pp. 515-72.   
202 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 217. 
203 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 216, 135-6. 
204 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 216, 135-6. 
205 George Sher, Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 85. 
 99
reasonable person, or conception of the good life, as one for which there is a good 
h does not have obvious neutralist implications. We still do not 
have a convincing reason for abandoning, in the political sphere, what is obvious 
in our personal lives; that we ought to promote the good. 
 
     ***************  
case, a view whic
 100
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4 DEFENDING LIBERAL PERFECTIONISM 
 
We now have some sense of what the principle of state neutrality is, how it has 
been defended, and what the prospects for such defences are. Let us turn for the 
remaining chapter to the doctrine it opposes – perfectionism – to see how the 
positive case for perfectionism can be made.  I begin by noting two oft-cited, yet 
misleading, ways of looking at perfectionism which we ought to reject, and then 
move on to discuss the arguments of the most influential of contemporary liberal 
perfectionists, Joseph Raz, in making the case for the pursuit of the good in the 
political domain. I join Raz in arguing that political perfectionism is permissible, but 
I depart from him in that I deny that state support for valuable forms of life is 
necessary in order to preserve the autonomy of citizens. My reasons for doing so 
will be made clear in the sections entitled “The necessity of perfectionism” and 
“Raz’s collectivism.”  
 
The misleading picture of perfectionism is, unfortunately, the one encountered in 
§50 of A theory of justice, where Rawls characterises what he calls “the principle 
of perfection” as a doctrine which appears in two variants, one more plausible 
than the other. The first, less plausible, version, which he associates with 
Nietzsche, is the view that society should ‘arrange institutions and…define the 
duties and obligations of individuals so as to maximise the achievement of human 
excellence in art, science and culture.’206   
In fact Rawls might equally have said that what is implausible is the failure 
to grant anything other than the principle of perfection weight in formulating a 
political morality, as the second, “Aristotelian” version of the principle turns out to 
be the recognition that its rule is not to be absolute.  Nevertheless, as Rawls sees 
it, the greater the weight accorded to maximising human excellence relative to 
other social or political desiderata, the more justified we are in terming 
“perfectionist” the set of principles which are presented as a political morality.207 
But we ought not to see Rawls’s elucidation as definitive of perfectionism.  
                                                
206 John Rawls, A theory of justice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 285-6. 
207 ‘This more moderate doctrine is one in which a principle of perfection is accepted as but one standard among several in an 
intuitionist theory.  The principle is to be balanced against others by intuition.’  See John Rawls, A theory of justice (Revised 
edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 286.   
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For o
t the state promotes the good does not entail 
accep
oppos
                                                
ne thing, perfectionism need not endorse the account of excellence 
attributed by him to both the Nietzschean and the Aristotelian variants. While art, 
science, and culture are as plausible candidates as any for those activities a 
perfectionist state ought to promote, there are other candidates; the godly life, 
and, as we shall see when we discuss Raz, the autonomous life, for example.  
And there could be many others.   
And secondly, accepting tha
ting that it ought to maximise the good. A perfectionist might quite 
coherently hold that certain reasons count against maximising the good, while 
they do not count against promoting it. So perfectionism does not entail the view 
that the state ought to promote the good and discourage the worthless at all costs, 
nor does it entail the view that the state is obliged to maximise the good.208   
In contrast to Rawls, Sher presents a definition of perfectionism in 
ition to subjectivism: as he sees it, any substantive ethical theory which 
traces all value to some combination of actual or ideal desires, choices, or 
enjoyments is a form of subjectivism, and any view that denies that these factors 
exhaust the determinants of value is a form of perfectionism.209 But while it is 
clear that the forms of perfectionism discussed in this dissertation require a 
commitment to an ethical theory of the kind endorsed by Sher, perfectionism 
should be understood as more than an ethical theory. Opponents of the principle 
of state neutrality such as Raz, Hurka, Haksar and Arneson have in common not 
merely a substantive ethical position, but also the view that the special value 
attributed by a perfectionist ethic of the kind described by Sher to some forms of 
human activity or experience ought to play a part in some political decisions.210   
 Raz puts it this way: ‘[p]erfectionism…is the view that whether or not a 
particular moral objective should be pursued by legal means is a question to be 
judged on the merit of each case, or class of cases, and not by a general 
exclusionary rule, as the so-called “neutralists” would have it,’211 and, further, as 
‘a term used to indicate that there is no fundamental principled inhibition on 
208 Contrary to Rawls’s comments in A theory of justice (Revised Edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at pp. 285-92. 
209 George Sher, Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 9. 
210 To be fair to Sher, this is quite clearly acknowledged throughout Beyond neutrality, but is usually referred to therein as 
political perfectionism. 
211 Joseph Raz, “Facing up: A reply” Southern California Law Review 62 (1989), pp. 1153-235 at p. 1231. 
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governments acting for any valid moral reason.’212 Waldron (who is not a 
perfectionist) says that ‘[p]erfectionism is...the view that legislators and officials 
may consider what is good and valuable in life and what is ignoble and depraved 
when drafting the laws and setting the framework for social and personal 
relationships,’213 even, we might add, when doing so is controversial. It is with this 
kind of understanding of perfectionism – as a political theory – that we will 
proceed. 
 Hurka’s perfectionism explicitly harks back to Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, Marx, 
and TH Green,214 and he takes the good life to be a life which develops or 
expresses human nature by developing or expressing those qualities which are 
essentially human. In fact he has been primarily concerned with defending a 
perfectionist ethic, but has also explored the ways in which such an ethic might 
support a perfectionist political dispensation which, in a manner similar to that 
advocated by Raz, provided citizens with the wherewithal for developing and 
expressing those essentially human qualities (one of which is their capacity for 
acting freely).   
As Hurka sees it, states should not work from the false assumption that 
‘human beings left on their own will always choose what is best’.215 Rather, they 
are obliged to create the conditions which increase the likelihood that citizens will 
live good lives. Sher, similarly, has argued that conceptions of the good are ‘often 
relevant to decisions about public assistance, educational policy, the criminal and 
civil justice system, the prison system, city planning and land use, transportation 
policy, the tax code, support for cultural institutions, regulation of the 
entertainment industry, investment incentives, and the structure of institutions 
such as the military – to name just a few of the more obvious candidates.’216   
Of course this does not mean that any and every attempt to promote the 
good on the part of the state is legitimate. Wall, for example, points out that there 
may be many situations – such as those in which it is particularly likely that 
officials or institutions lack the capacity to promote the good – in which the state 
                                                
212 Joseph Raz, “Facing up: A reply” Southern California Law Review 62 (1989), pp. 1153-235 at p. 1230. 
213 Jeremy Waldron, “Autonomy and perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of freedom” Southern California Law Review 62 (1989), pp. 
1098-1152 at p. 1102. 
214 Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 3. 
215 Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 160. 
216 George Sher, Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 246. 
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does best by keeping its hands off.217 The frequency of such situations will 
determine the extent to which the practical recommendations of perfectionists will 
differ from those of neutralists.   
 
It will help, in clarifying what it is that perfectionists stand for, for us to make a 
distinction suggested (with a little modification) by a passage from Hurka.218 This 
is the distinction between “philosophical” and “state” perfectionism.219 And 
distinguishing between these two explains the somewhat surprising fact, which we 
will return to in the more detailed discussion of Raz which follows,220 that 
perfectionists, despite their theoretical commitments, may, under some 
circumstances, recommend policies which are very close to those recommended 
by anti-perfectionists. 
What we might call philosophical perfectionism is concerned with political 
morality at its most abstract level. Philosophical perfectionism takes the view that 
the amount of good produced is a factor to be weighed in judging the ultimate 
worth of a legal or social system; it operates at the same level of abstraction as, 
for example, Rawls’s theory of justice, and is concerned, in other words, with what 
legislation, in general, is supposed to achieve. And the goods that perfectionists 
think a legal system should promote – goods which, of course, will differ from 
perfectionist theory to perfectionist theory – may or may not be promoted by 
actual perfectionist legislation. 
If a philosophical perfectionist is of the opinion that the greatest good can 
indeed be promoted by perfectionist legislation, in a given society, he or she 
evinces a commitment to what we might call “state perfectionism.” To be a state 
perfectionist is to argue that this particular state ought in these particular 
circumstances to promote the good. Taking this position entails accepting 
philosophical perfectionism, of course, but the reverse does not apply. A 
philosophical perfectionist can conceive of circumstances in which the state 
                                                
217 Steven Wall, Liberalism, perfectionism and restraint (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 15. 
218 Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 162-3.  In fact Hurka proposes in this passage a 
distinction between philosophical and state neutrality, but we may safely extrapolate from that to a similar distinction with regard 
to perfectionisms. 
219 See also Steven Wall and George Klosko, Perfectionism and neutrality (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), p.16. 
220 See especially the section entitled “The contours of Rawlsian perfectionism” below. 
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should not attempt to promote the good.221   
As we saw in the discussion of arguments for the principle of state 
neutrality in chapter two, and as we will see again in the discussion of Raz, a 
common motivation for anti-perfectionism is the fear of perfectionist coercion. The 
sheer power of the state, in comparison to other bodies or institutions that might 
attempt to promote the good, is thought by many to threaten human freedom. I 
have, of course, argued in chapter two that widely deployed arguments for the 
principle of state neutrality, whether they are premised on the value of autonomy 
or on various pragmatic concerns regarding oppression or instability, are 
unconvincing. But I wish to argue in this chapter that this does not mean that 
perfectionists cannot offer principled reasons for limiting the power of the state.  
They can; they simply do not postulate philosophical neutrality. 
What exactly are these arguments? One way in which contemporary 
perfectionists have attempted to assuage doubts about whether the state should 
be entrusted with the power to promote the good is demonstrated by Joseph 
Chan, who argues (as does Sher222) for what Wall and Klosko have called the 
“weak perfectionist thesis” – the simple assertion that perfectionist considerations 
are a legitimate basis for policy.223  “Weak perfectionists”, like Chan might reject 
coercive promotion of the good on the part of the state on the basis of 
deontological considerations, while nevertheless endorsing non-coercive methods 
of advancing the good.   
Another way in which one might assuage these doubts is to search for 
reasons for limiting state power within perfectionism, as those dubbed “strong” or 
“liberal” perfectionists by Wall and Klosko do.224 Strong, or liberal perfectionism, 
as I will refer to it, argues that autonomy, limited government, or individual 
freedom, can be defended on a perfectionist basis. This position is, as has already 
been hinted at in chapter two, typical of contemporary perfectionists. And it is to 
the work of the most prominent of the contemporary liberal perfectionists, Joseph 
                                                
221 Thomas Hurka discusses, albeit critically, what such circumstances might be in his “Indirect perfectionism: Kymlicka on 
indirect perfectionism,” Journal of Political Philosophy 3 (1995), p. 36-57. 
222 See George Sher, Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 246. 
223 Joseph Chan, “Legitimacy, unanimity, and perfectionism” Philosophy and Public Affairs 29, 1 (2000), p. 15 and Joseph Raz, 
The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 133.  “Weak perfectionism” of this description also bears a close 
resemblance to the “Aristotelian” perfectionism discussed by Rawls on page 286 of A theory of justice (Revised edition) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
224 Joseph Chan, “Legitimacy, unanimity, and perfectionism” Philosophy and Public Affairs 29, 1 (2000), p. 15 and Joseph Raz, 
The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 133. 
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Raz, that I now turn. 
 
4.1 Raz’s defence of perfectionism 
 
Raz has argued that there are a number of reasons perfectionists might find for 
limiting the power of governments.225 One such reason would be perfectionism’s 
compatibility with moral pluralism. There is no reason for a perfectionist state to 
promote only one conception of the good life if there are in fact many ways of 
leading a good life. Nothing about perfectionism rules out the state’s encouraging 
a wide range of worthwhile ways of life (other than potential incompatibilities 
between these ways of life, which we need not assume will always be there).  
There is no reason, in other words, to assume that perfectionism entails the state 
imposing a unified conception of the good on a recalcitrant population. 
Of course acknowledging moral pluralism does not give one a decisive 
reason against state paternalism. A moral pluralist might, for example, take the 
view Plato does in The republic, where the state pushes citizens into the roles it 
deems optimal for them, regardless of whether they wish to take up these roles or 
not. Offsetting this possibility requires the perfectionist to understand autonomy 
itself as a good.226 This would mean that a state which wished to promote the 
good would be required, in perfectionist terms, to promote citizens’ autonomy.  
And one might conclude from this that the power of the state to compel citizens in 
certain directions must be restricted.   
We must note, however, that for the perfectionist autonomy will, on any 
plausible catalogue of goods, be merely one of a number of goods. Nor is it likely 
that a plausible perfectionism would accord personal autonomy the highest place 
in any such catalogue. Further, some perfectionists, including Raz,227 argue that 
autonomy is only valuable if exercised in the pursuit of the good, which implies 
that the state’s forbidding or discouraging worthless options cannot be ruled out.  
One might, strictly speaking, concede that the implementation of this kind of policy 
affects citizens’ autonomy, but not, as Raz sees it, their ability to lead an 
                                                
225 Joseph Raz “Liberty and trust” in Robert George (ed), Natural law, liberalism and morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), pp. 113-29. 
226 This point is well developed in Thomas Hurka’s Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 148-52 and 158-
60. 
227 See Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 378-81. 
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autonomous valuable life. Only the latter, thinks Raz, is a good worth promoting. 
Understanding autonomy as one amongst many values, and understanding 
it as v
n has frequently been attacked on the grounds that 
whate
n in this way.229 But one 
might 
                                                
aluable only in pursuit of the good, as Razian perfectionism does, leaves 
open the question whether, for example, what has traditionally been referred to as 
morals legislation, is illegitimate, as most neutralists (excluding those that think 
the state only need be neutral with regard to controversial values) take it to be. By 
morals legislation, I mean those laws, of which there are examples in every polity, 
which forbid actions on the grounds of their depravity, as opposed, generally 
speaking, to the likelihood of their harming others. The outlawing of homosexual 
behaviour, for example, was usually justified on the basis of the claim that such 
actions are depraved. Contemporary western societies, of course, usually permit 
homosexual behaviour, but laws against certain fringe manifestations of sexuality 
are still on the statute books: bestiality, various forms of exhibitionism, incest, and 
extreme forms of sado-masochism are forbidden, not because of any alleged 
harms they impose, but because of a consensus that they are immoral, or, to use 
terminology more typical of the philosophical literature, a consensus that they are 
worthless forms of life. 
Morals legislatio
ver good it promotes is paid for in terms of citizens’ autonomy.228 And then 
either this cost is deemed to be too high, or, if the neutralist does not wish to 
deploy a consequentialist argument, the mere fact of citizens’ autonomy being 
violated is deemed to be sufficient grounds for rejecting morals legislation. But 
taking the view that autonomy is one among many goods, and also that it is only 
valuable to the extent that it pursues the good, leaves the case against morals 
legislation a good deal weaker. On this view, if the forms of life morals legislation 
seeks to combat are worthless, any autonomy citizens express by indulging in 
these forms of life is not worth protecting or promoting.   
Certain perfectionists do defend morals legislatio
also find perfectionist reasons for resisting morals legislation. One could, for 
example, argue that coercive promotion of the good must be ruled out on the 
228 Although of course not only on these grounds.  Other arguments against morals legislation would parallel other arguments 
for the principle of state neutrality: one might argue, for example, that morals legislation is likely to cause social instability, 
oppressive, or likely to enforce unsound morals, or even that the value or worthlessness of, say, bestiality, cannot be known, 
although one would have to be a particularly hardy sceptic to pursue the last line of argument. 
229 Robert George is an example.  See his Making men moral (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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grounds that, or in those cases where, genuine goodness cannot be coerced.  
And one might argue that this is because compelled virtue is no virtue. Or one 
might, following Raz, argue that ‘there is no practical way of ensuring that the 
coercion will restrict the victim’s choice of repugnant options but will not interfere 
with other choices.’230 This view implies that the state’s coercive combating of 
worthless forms of life does not diminish autonomy per se, but is sufficiently likely 
to have deleterious effects on the efforts of its victims to choose valuable forms of 
life as well for it to be an illegitimate strategy for a liberal state.231 Accepting these 
considerations would also seem to imply that as long as non-coercive state 
strategies are as likely to be successful in promoting the good as coercive 
strategies, they ought to be preferred.   
 
In what follows in this chapter, I will outline how Raz’s defence of perfectionism 
4.1.1 Raz’s case for the permissibility of perfectionism  
 this section I defend Raz’s argument for the claim that governments are entitled 
to make policy on the basis of judgements as to the value of comprehensive 
                                                
has two strands, one of which I defend, and one of which I reject. The first aspect 
of Razian perfectionism involves the arguments he presents which are designed 
to establish that governments are entitled to make policy on the basis of 
judgements as to the value of comprehensive conceptions of the good life. The 
second aspect involves the arguments he presents which are designed to show 
that governments are obliged to make policy on the basis of judgements as to the 
value of comprehensive conceptions of the good life: in particular, that unless 
governments make policy on a perfectionist basis, the autonomy of citizens will be 
diminished. It is Raz’s contention that liberals must acknowledge the necessity of 
perfectionism, given the fundamental role the value of autonomy plays in liberal 
political morality. I discuss the first strand in the section below entitled “The 
permissibility of perfectionism” and the second in the section entitled “The 




230 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 419.   
231 Forbidding alcohol, for example, on the basis that a life devoted to its consumption is a worthless lifestyle, might well 
damage all kinds of worthwhile practices – including but not limited to the arts.  
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conceptions of the good life. His way of making the case for this claim involves, 
primarily, rejecting as unwarranted two traditional concerns regarding the 
illiberality of perfectionism. These two concerns are, first, the alleged danger that 
the values of one sector of the citizenry are imposed on the rest, and, second, the 
alleged danger that this imposition will take the form of coercion. In what follows I 
will defend Raz’s defusal of these concerns. 
 
A popular motivation for anti-perfectionism is the perception that allowing 
omprehensive conceptions of the good into politics entails the values of some 
th o reason 
for anything. Only it’s being valuable or valueless is a reason. If it is likely that the 
government 
Another way of putting this would be to say that perfectionist policies need not (or 
erfectionism from views which ground 
the leg
                                                
c
citizens being imposed on others with contrary values. Accordingly, neutralists 
have argued that a state does not treat citizens with equal respect as long as 
conceptions of the good are permitted to be taken into account in political 
decision-making, given that imposing the values of one section of the citizenry on 
another appears to deny citizens whose views are judged unacceptable as a basis 
for legislation the respect to which they are entitled.   
Raz’s response is to point out that, in a perfectionist dispensation  
e fact that the state considers anything to be valuable or valueless is n
will not judge such matters correctly then it has no authority to judge them 
at all.232   
should not) be defended on the basis of their provenance, but can (or should) be 
defended on the basis of their validity: his claim is that perfectionist lawmakers 
need not say “these values should be promoted by law because they are the 
values of privileged caste p” but rather “these values should be promoted by law 
because they are the right values (and it is an uninteresting matter that the truth of 
this is apparent to some and not others).”   
Raz’s strategy, then, is to distance p
itimacy of laws in the opinions of a select body, without taking an interest in 
the question of the correctness of these views: Patrick Devlin holds a position 
232 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 412. 
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something like this,233 as do Rousseau-style democrats who locate the legitimacy 
of laws in their fidelity to the general will, or those communitarians who locate the 
legitimacy of laws in their fidelity to the values of the community. But Razian 
perfectionism does not deem laws to be legitimate on the basis that they express 
the views held by the appropriate body of decision-makers. A further question 
must be asked, namely, whether the views of those entrusted with the business of 
making law are likely to be valid. 
It is not clear, of course, that Raz’s strategy would satisfy those who remain 
sceptical about the capacity of governments to judge matters of the good 
correctly. But remaining sceptical about this on the basis of a general moral 
scepticism – scepticism, in other words, about anybody’s capacity to know 
anything about morality – is a very unpromising position, however, given that it 
undermines the basis for any political morality. And even a general scepticism 
about the capacity of governments to make moral judgements leaves its advocate 
unable to advance the principle of state neutrality, as governments, after all, must 
judge whether proposed legislation is neutral or not. But, as we saw in chapter 
two, there are legitimate, albeit not decisive, worries about whether governments 
are in the best position to access knowledge of the good, such as it is to be had.  
Raz appears to see the force of this point when he says that  
...it is possible that the appeal of anti-perfectionism is at least in part indirect.  There 
is no way of acting, politically or otherwise, in pursuit of ideals except by relying on the 
judgement of some people as to which ideals are valid and imposing it on others who 
disagree. Those whose views are imposed on the community do not regard the fact 
that they hold those views as a reason for their imposition on others who reject them. 
They maintain that their conception of the good is valid and that is the reason which 
justifies its imposition. But such an action is constitutionally justified on the ground that 
rulers, the majority, etc. chose to act in that way, regardless of the truth or soundness 
of their views.’234   
                                                
Raz is willing to admit, further,   
the dangers inherent in the concentration of power in few hands, the dangers of 
233 Patrick Devlin, The enforcement of morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965).  
234 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 158. 
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corruption, of bureaucratic distortions and insensitivities, of fallibility of judgement, and 
inesc lusion would deprive neutralists of any “non-
impo
 
difference between the policy recommendations of a Razian perfectionist and a 
                                                
uncertainty of purpose, and the...insufficiency and the distortion of information 
reaching the central organs of government.235   
These are not, however, reasons for rejecting philosophical perfectionism. This is 
because holding that the fact that laws conform to the values of the lawmakers, 
but not the entire citizenry, means that such laws are imposed on dissidents, and 
must therefore be considered illegitimate, is to hold to an untenable position. The 
problem that some members of society approve of the laws and others don’t is by 
no means a problem peculiar to perfectionism.236 Imposition must mean 
something more nuanced than this, otherwise we must conclude that it is 
apable. And this conc
sitional” alternative to perfectionism.   
Raz goes on to say that  
 [t]he pursuit of full-blooded perfectionist policies, even of those which are entirely 
sound and justified, is likely, in many countries if not in all, to backfire by arousing 
popular resistance leading to civil strife237  
and that ‘[i]n such circumstances compromise is the order of the day...which will 
confine perfectionist measures to matters which command a large measure of 
social consensus...’238 These factors hamper governments in fulfilling their
legitimate role of helping citizens achieve well-being, and Raz’s acknowledgement 
that they must be taken into account may mean that there may be little ultimate 
Rawlsian anti-perfectionist. What difference there is lies in the fact that the anti-
perfectionist rules out perfectionist policies in principle, while the Razian concedes 
merely that they may not always be strategically or tactically wise.   
235 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 427. 
236 Vinit Haksar comments  on pp. 285-6 of his Equality, liberty, and perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) that  
 
Even if one takes a purely want-regarding line, there is the problem about who has the authority to impose the 
recommended policy, and about whose views should carry the day on what the want-regarding approach 
implies in practical.  Even if one takes a non-perfectionist approach like that of BF Skinner…there is still the 
problem about whose views about what ought to be done should carry the day….He can reply to such 
accusations by making a distinction between recommending a policy that should be adopted by legislators and 
dictatorially imposing a policy.  He could admit that he has no right, no authority, to impose his views by 
dictatorial means, but this does not prevent his views from being correct and from being deserving of 
implementation by the state through democratic channels. 
237 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 429. 
238 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 429. 
 112
A seco
that there is 
an imp
d coercively, and this surely means that the state 
is usin
nd motivation for anti-perfectionism which Raz seeks to defuse is the view 
that state neutrality is necessary to prevent one section of the population from 
coercing others into acting in accordance with their conception of the good life.   
But as we saw in chapter two, perfectionist policy could consist in the 
encouragement and facilitation of action of the desired kind, or discouragement of 
undesired modes of behaviour – Raz mentions the possibilities of conferring 
honours on creative and performing artists, giving grants or loans to people who 
start community centres, taxing certain kinds of leisure activity (his example is of 
hunting). Citizens do not suffer criminal penalties for failing to become creative 
artists, or failing to get married, and so perfectionist policies of this nature, he 
argues, cannot be construed as coercion.  And he argues, crucially, 
ortant difference between imposing criminal penalties on citizens for non-
compliance with perfectionist laws, and using financial incentives (or 
disincentives) to encourage certain lifestyles and discourage others.   
Many might argue, of course, that  these allegedly non-coercive 
perfectionist methods are not importantly different from coercion, or that the 
difference between imprisonment, which is clearly a case of coercion, and 
taxation, which is less clearly so, is merely one of degree rather than kind. Even if 
nobody is forced to, for example, go to the theatre, everybody is obliged, on pain 
of coercive sanction, to pay taxes. The taxes which are used to promote the 
activity of theatre-going are raise
g its coercive power to enforce its judgements regarding the relative merits 
of various options (the theatre being held to be a valuable form of life despite its 
less than universal popularity).   
It seems to me that the right way for Raz to defend himself on this matter is 
to distinguish between coercion per se and the state’s use of its coercive power.  
It is clearly prospect of financial penalties or jail sentences for failing to observe 
officially-sanctioned religious or political dogma that causes anti-perfectionists to 
worry that perfectionism involves coercion. And it is clearly a stretch to argue that 
use of tax money which one would have paid anyway for purposes to which one is 
not entirely committed constitutes coercion – at least of a worrying kind. We might 
therefore deem the latter to be “the state’s use of its coercive powers”, and 
concede that, strictly interpreted, perfectionism does (as does any political 
 113
dispensation) involve the use of tax moneys for purposes which not every 
xpayer can be expected to endorse. But this is a far cry from enforcing political, 
ctionism so as to argue that the morality or immorality of, 




deas about right and wrong which are 
                                                
ta
religious, or moral orthodoxy, and that is one of the important motivating forces 
behind the attachment to anti-perfectionism, not the uses of tax money.   
 
Raz says very little about which lifestyles should be regarded as immoral, and for 
good reason, as his purpose in writing the book is to raise the question whether 
there is anything left in the liberal critique of perfectionism once we set aside the 
possibility that perfectionism might be deployed to support mistaken standards.239  
This is better achieved by avoiding the danger that The morality of freedom be 
read as Raz’s treatise against, for example, pornography, or some such thing. It is 
indeed the case that perfectionist principles are frequently invoked to call for a ban 
on lifestyles which some consider to be immoral, and that liberals usually counter 
by invoking anti-perfe
say, homosexuality, is not the state’s business.240 Raz’s perfectionism, however, 
would afford one the stronger response of sayi
t immoral at all. 
Razian perfectionism must be distinguished from legal moralism of the kind 
vocated by Patrick Devlin, who argued that 
the law-maker is not required to make any judgement about what is good and what 
is bad. The morals which he enforces are those i
already accepted by the society for which he is legislating and which are necessary to 
preserve its integrity…Naturally he will assume that the morals of his society are good 
and true; if he does not, he should not be playing an active part in government. But he 
has not to vouch for their goodness and truth.241 
This is a conservative rather than a perfectionist view, given that Devlin regards 
(one of) the purpose(s) of morals legislation as the maintenance of society’s 
integrity, by which he means the maintenance of the particular moral community it 
happens to be, regardless of whether this can be justified in any objective sense. 
239 Jeremy Waldron, “Autonomy and perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of freedom,” Southern California Law Review 62 (1989), p. 
1130. 
240 See Michael Sandel’s introduction to his edited collection Liberalism and its critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984). 
241 Patrick Devlin, The enforcement of morals, (:,1965).  
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 Raz’s view does show conservative tendencies, in that his perfectionism 
obliges the state to defend worthwhile social practices, and in that it is not 
implausible to suppose that it makes more sense to defend established worthwhile 
social practices rather than create new and unfamiliar ones. However, his view 
e. His perfectionism, like 
ny version of perfectionism, is willing to countenance legislation in support of 
f the means at its disposal.  As Weber saw it, ‘the state cannot 
be de
ty of non-
                                                
differs from that of Devlin in that a Razian state does vouch for the goodness and 
truth of the social practices it supports. Indeed, a Razian state only has legitimate 
authority to the extent that it can vouch for the value of these practices. And, of 
course, the question whether a state could indeed possess such competence is 
much in dispute. 
 Raz believes it could, and he believes that the grounds on which state 
decisions about the good should be made are exactly the same grounds as those 
upon which state decisions about the right should be mad
a
distinctive conceptions of “wide morality” – principles, in other words, regarding 
the constitution of a ‘successful, meaningful, and worthwhile life’242 – regardless of 
whether the interests of one’s fellow citizens are directly involved or not. And this 
is where anti-perfectionism must part company with Raz. 
 
Anti-perfectionists are especially preoccupied with the state because of the 
coercive power it holds. Both Max Weber and Locke understood the state 
primarily in terms o
fined in terms of its ends…Ultimately, one can define the modern state 
sociologically only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, as to every political 
association, namely, the use of physical force.’243 Locke’s view was that ‘the care 
of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in 
outward force’244   
Raz, on the other hand, has never seen the use of force as the defining 
characteristic of legal orders, preferring to see the generality of its claim to 
authority as the state’s definitive feature, and it is against this background that we 
should understand his lack of squeamishness regarding the possibili
242 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 213.  
243 ‘Politics as a vocation’ in H Gerth & C Mills (eds) From Max Weber: Essays in sociology 77 at 77-8 1946 
244 “A letter concerning toleration” in Two treatises of government and A letter concerning toleration (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003). 
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coerci
difference between the authority 
of the 





or worthless forms of life: 
i  values autonomy highly can justify restricting the autonomy of 
one person for the sake of the greater autonomy of others or even of that person 
omy. Undesirable as these conditions are, they may not be 
ve perfectionist policy-making on the part of the state. As he sees it, there 
can be no objection to the state’s pursuing perfectionist goals if such means as, 
for example, taxing some kind of leisure activities, subsidising others, or 
conferring public honours on certain exemplary citizens, or using education to 
encourage certain kinds of activities judged to be noble, are employed. 
However, traditional liberals are not likely to be convinced, as their worries 
about perfectionism are connected to the widely-held view that the state is 
distinguished by its monopoly on the use of force. Many would argue that the 
generality of the state’s claim to authority is not, as Raz suggests, unique.  
Institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church make the same sorts of claim to 
general authority as those made by states – the 
state and the authority of the Roman Catholic Church is that the former, 
possessing those divisions of which the Pope has none, is much more likely to be 
obeyed. If this is so, then the government’s ability to do anything rests, ultimately, 
on its coercive powers, and we should therefore be sceptical about claims about 
the allegedly non-coercive nature of policies.245   
Raz specifies that state coercion is legitimate only under certain tightly-
circumscribed conditions – conditions which he takes to be the same as those 
under which Mill sanctione
ver, specifies that harm to autonomy is what legitimate state coercion is 
ed at.246 In other words, he allows that the state may coerce me so as to 
vent an unacceptable diminution in my autonomy or the autonomy of another, 
t he explicitly rules out the use of coercion as a means of stamping out immoral 
A moral theory wh ch
himself in the future. That is why it can justify coercion to prevent harm, for harm 
interferes with autonomy. But it will not tolerate coercion for other reasons. The 
availability of repugnant options, and even their free pursuit by individuals, does not 
detract from their auton
                                                
245 Jeremy Waldron, “Autonomy and perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of freedom,” Southern California Law Review 62 (1989), 
4.   
pp. 1139-40. 






for te invasions of the autonomy of 
ts him from almost all autonomous pursuits. 
Other forms of coercion may be less severe, but they all invade autonomy, and they 
all, at least in this world, do it in a fairly indiscriminate way.  That is, there is no 
epugnant 
options but will not interfere with their other choices.248 
4.1.2
I move
h of this argument, I do not in the end believe that he establishes 
that the liberal commitment to the value of autonomy not only permits, but also 
requires 
                                                
rbed by coercion.247 
e should note, though, that Raz’s reluctance to sanction coercion in the name of 
rfectionist ideals is pragmatic, rather than principled, and applies only to those 
ms of coercion which are broad and indiscrimina  
the coerced individuals: 
 [C]oercion by criminal penalties is a global and indiscriminate invasion of 
autonomy. Imprisoning a person preven
practical way of ensuring that the coercion will restrict the victim’s choice of r
If such “smart” coercion became available in the future, Raz would have no 
objections to its use, as removing the option of harmless depravity from peoples’ 
lives does not damage, in any sense that matters, the autonomy of those who 
would otherwise have participated in it. 
 
 The necessity of perfectionism: Raz’s fundamental premises 
 
 now from Raz’s defusal of widespread worries about perfectionism to his 
positive argument for the claim that governments are obliged to make policy on 
the basis of judgements as to the value of comprehensive conceptions of the good 
life. This is a more complex matter, and, although I find myself in agreement with 
Raz over muc
state perfectionism. My reasons will be made more explicit in the section 
entitled “Raz’s collectivism”. 
In outlining the argument with which he attempts to establish this, we begin 
with three premises. Firstly, Raz holds that well-being is success in the 
247 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 419. 
248 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 418-9. 
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autonomous pursuit of a valuable form of life (or of valuable forms of life). I deal 
with the implications of this premise in the section entitled “Well-being and 
autonomy”.   
Secondly, he argues that the justification of political authority lies in its 
o act for the reasons that apply to them than 
they would be in the absence of the authority. I deal with the implications of this 
remise in the section entitled “The justification of authority”. Thirdly, he holds that 
4.1.3 
tonomous pursuit of a 
It is also the case, however, according to Raz, that well-being cannot be 
derived from unchosen pursuits. Autonomous choice is essential to well-being, 
onomy would not be possible. This 
 to our well-being, and well-being cannot issue from the pursuit of 
capacity to enable citizens better t
p
the various forms of life through which we pursue our well-being are social in 
nature – they depend on collective goods for their continued existence. I deal with 
the implications of this premise in the section entitled “Raz’s collectivism”. And it is 
here, as I will indicate, that the argument stumbles. 
 
Well-being and autonomy  
 
Raz’s first premise – that well-being is success in the au
valuable form of life – derives from his rejection of moral scepticism, in that he 
holds that no well-being can issue from the pursuit of a worthless form of life, 
regardless of whether the agent takes it to be valuable or not. The mere fact of 
having been chosen is not sufficient to confer value on a form of life.   
 
and so, given that everyone has a fundamental interest in well-being, we may 
conclude that everyone has a strong interest in autonomy. 
 This interest is sufficiently strong, as Raz sees it, to impose on everyone an 
obligation to promote and maintain the conditions of autonomy – those social 
conditions without which individual aut
obligation Raz terms “the principle of autonomy”. 
 
Raz’s commitment to the view that well-being is success in the autonomous 
pursuit of valuable forms of life also entails the conclusion that autonomy is only 
valuable in pursuit of the good, as the value of autonomy must lie in its 
contribution
 118
worthless forms of life. 
 life (and Raz is hard to pin down on 
 It 
 so 
ave unclear the basis for defending the standard liberal doctrine that 
 be in a position to draw our attention to our misguided reasoning.  
  
well-being, the pursuit of which he distinguishes both from that of self-interest and 
 he argues, understand self-
 It follows that, in promoting the conditions of autonomy, which include, 
amongst others, the existence of an adequate range of choices, the state is under 
no obligation to maintain worthless forms of life, as, even if one’s autonomy is 
enhanced by the existence of such forms of
this question), one’s well-being cannot be. Raz therefore understands the 
existence of an adequate range of valuable forms of life as a condition of 
autonomy. 
 
Raz opposes moral scepticism. He holds not only that well-being is derived solely 
from valuable ways of life, but also that it is possible to know which ways of life 
are valuable and which are not, and further, that it is acceptable for the state to act 
on such knowledge.   
follows from this position that the good life must be a life which the agent 
has good reason to value – and that this is something about which it is possible to 
be mistaken. To the suggestion that nothing can be known on moral matters, Raz 
responds by saying that if this is so, then the wrongness of perfectionism cannot 
be known either.249 It is clear that no liberal, not even of the anti-perfectionist 
persuasion, could coherently be sceptical about all moral judgements, as doing
would le
everyone ought to be free to pursue their own conception of the good life. 
The Razian view is that, because our goals and desires are not arbitrary – 
because we make our choices on account of the value we think they have250 – our 
ideals must be understood as reason-dependent. And, in so understanding them, 
we must concede that their value is not determined (entirely) by ourselves, and 
that we may therefore be mistaken about them, leaving open the possibility that 
others may
Raz takes it as axiomatic that individuals have a fundamental interest in personal 
from the satisfaction of preferences. One ought to,
                                                
249 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 160.  
250 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 411-2. 
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interest as relating primarily to one’s biological needs, whereas well-being 
‘depends on the value of [one’s] goals and pursuits,’251 and can come about only 
from the successful pursuit of autonomously chosen, valuable, comprehensive 
goals.252   
The value of such goals is not conferred merely by the fact that somebody 
regard





successful and content in them.’
of goals, and therefore 
n ’s] interest and what is not. Therefore we cannot rank options by their 
s them as valuable. In fact, claims Raz, the ‘[s]atisfaction of goals based on 
false reasons does not contribute to one’s well-being.’253  However, well-being is 
nevertheless dependent on how good one’s life is from one’s own point of view,254 
in that one has personal reasons for action which flow from the comprehensive 
goals which one has chosen. The pursuit of goals one has not chosen, or goals 
one is compelled to pursue, cannot result in well-being.     
Comprehensive goals are necessary for well-being in that they provide us 
with what Raz calls “action reasons” – reasons we have to undertake certain 
endeavours, as opposed to simply enjoying their outcomes. Our well-being arises 
from participation in the endeavours which provide our lives with meaning, and our 
autonomy is realised in that we have the particular action reasons we do on 
account of the particular comprehensive goals we choose.255   
Raz argues further that the importance of action reasons for our well-being 
implies the incommens
ns arise. Without having already adopted a comprehensive goal, one lacks, 
 Raz puts it, ‘any grounds for judging a career as a graphic designer to be 
rinsically better or worse for those engaged in it than a career as a livestock 
mer or a gliding instructor, assuming that they are likely to be equally 
256 The fact that one has adopted a particular set 
care[s] about one thing rather than another determines to a considerable degree 
what is in [o e
                                                
251 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 298. 
252 Raz understands comprehensive goals to be those goals which pervade one’s life in the widest-ranging manner, forming the 
context in which one pursues lesser goals.  Examples of the contexts in which comprehensive goals would be situated are 
n society. 
 WJ Waluchow, “Critical notice of Joseph Raz’s The morality of freedom,” Canadian journal of 
marriage or the structure of a given profession, or the structures of politics in a give
253 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 301. 
254 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 299. 
255 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 300. 
256 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 343.  This is his so-called “Incommensurability 
thesis”, which argues further that incommensurability is pervasive within our culture and hence integral to the structure of 
practical reasoning.  See also
philosophy 19 (1989), p. 485. 
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contributions to our well-being. The conditions of our well-being, we might say, were 
not yet created. They are determined by our choices, and therefore they can guide our 
cho
ince it is frequently impossible to pursue various options simultaneously, and 






 state supports a sufficiently wide range of 
ices only to a limited extent. In large measure the direction is the other way: our 
choices determine our well-being. At that stage indeterminacy reigns, for many of the 
options are incommensurate, and reason cannot advise us how to choose between 
options which are incommensurate, except to tell us to avoid those we are unlikely to 
succeed in.257 
S
since these options typically only acquire value for us through actually being 
pursued, we find that we are not in a position to compare them.   
One of the political implications of incommensurability is that governments 
are in an equally unpromising situation with regard to making such comparisons.  
Raz will argue that the be
autonomy, a range of acceptable social forms from which people can choose, and 
thereafter derive well-being.258 
 
ll-being is primarily determined by success in the pursuit of valuable, socially-
fined goals, we can understand the morally good person as one whose 
sperity is so intertwined with the pursuit of worthy goals which advance the 
ll-being of others that it is impossible to separate their personal well-being from 
ir moral concerns.259   
In fact Raz anticipates that, if the 
valuable options from which citizens may choose their comprehensive goals, it will 
be  
easy for people generally…to choose for themselves goals which lead to a rough 
coincidence in their own lives of moral and personal concerns…By being teachers, 
production workers, drivers, public servants, loyal friends and family people, loyal to 
their communities, nature loving and so on, they will be pursuing their own goals, 
enhancing their own well-being, and also serving their communities and generally 
                                                
257 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p.  345. 
258 WJ Waluchow, “Critical notice of Joseph Raz’s The morality of freedom,” Canadian journal of philosophy 19 (1989), p. 484. 
259 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 320. 
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living in a morally worthy way.260 
As one might expect, however, anti-perfectionists deny that the pursuit of personal 
well-being is quite so inseparable from the promotion of social values which 
261 
t – that autonomy is necessary for well-
being.
 
ey seem at first blush, for we might want to ask 
whether the desire which we ar
s has given rise to the by now 
familiar distinction between negative conceptions of liberty – whereby freedom is 
                                                
benefit the whole community.
Two further premises in Raz’s argument for perfectionism are derived from the 
claim that well-being is the successful pursuit of autonomously chosen valuable 
forms of life. I begin below with the firs
 This will involve a discussion of what Raz takes autonomy to be, as well as 
a discussion of what he takes the social conditions of autonomy to be. I turn in the 
section below entitled “Raz’s collectivism” to the second premise which is based 
on Raz’s understanding of well-being: that autonomy is valuable only in pursuit of 
the good. 
Despite the consensus that freedom is an important value, there are aspects of it 
which remain obscure, and controversies have arisen around the question of what 
precisely it is that makes us unfree.   
For example, being physically prevented from doing something I wish to do 
seems to be the perfect example of the loss of freedom. But even cases such as 
this are less straightforward than th
e being prevented from fulfilling is one which was 
freely acquired, and/or whether its fulfilment might lead to enslavement.   
And there are many more complicated cases:  Do I lose my liberty when 
fear prevents me from acting? Does it matter whether the fear is well-grounded or 
not?  Do poverty and ignorance deprive people of liberty? The difficulty of deciding 
whether freedom is what is being lost in these case
understood purely as the absence of constraints – and positive conceptions of 
liberty, in which the “freedom to” pursue certain values is emphasised, as opposed 
to “freedom from” constraints.262   
260 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 319. 
d in Isaiah Berlin’s essay ‘Two concepts of 
8-72.  
261 See, for example, Richard Bellamy, in his “Review of Joseph Raz’s The morality of freedom” History of European Ideas 9 
(1988), p. 746. 
262 The classic discussion of these two ways of looking at freedom is to be foun
liberty’ in his Four essays on liberty, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 11
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Raz’s understanding of autonomy is closer to the idea of “positive freedom”, 






part) authors of their own lives, es of coerced choices264, 
s’
Look
ribing his purposes and causes, what he intends 
to do in his life.’  He notes further that 
suppose, then, that each individual has a rational plan of life drawn up subject to the 
ed to permit the harmonious 
s desires can be 
    
r be understood as showing us which liberties are worth pursuing and which 
 unimportant, as well as showing why freedom requires that citizens have 
hts to certain services – education, for example – without which our freedom 
m interference would be less than satisfactory.   
z understands autonomy, first and foremost, as the ideal of people being (in 
263 as opposed to living liv
and ‘the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning 
it through successive decisions throughout their live .265 The autonomous 
person’s life is 
marked not only by what it is but also by what it might have been and by the way it 
became what it is. A person is autonomous only if he had a variety of acceptable 
options available to him to choose from, and his life became as it is through his choice 
of some of these options. A person who has never had any significant choice, or was 
not aware of it, or never exercised choice in significant matters but simply drifted 
through life is not an autonomous person.266 
ing at autonomy this way is of course not startlingly original. Rawls describes 
personhood as ‘…a human life lived according to plan’267 and writes that ‘…an 
individual says who he is by desc
268
 [t]he main idea is that a person’s good is determined by what is for him the most 
rational long-term plan of life given reasonably favourable circumstances…We are to 
conditions that confront him. This plan is design
satisfaction of his interests. It schedules activities so that variou
fulfilled without interference. It is arrived at by rejecting other plans that are either less 
                                            
ph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 370. 
ph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 371. 
ph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 369. 
ph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 204. 





267 John xford University Press, 1999), p. 408.  
8 John Rawls, A theory of justice (Revised Edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 408.  26
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likely to succeed or do not provide for such an inclusive attainment of aims.269 
y is not to be identified with the ideal of giving one’s 
life a unity…The autonomous life may consists of diverse and heterogeneous pursuits. 
 to exercise our bodies, to stimulate 
Raz is concerned to emphasise, however, that autonomy does not entail the 
implausible requirement that one live one’s life from beginning to end according to 
a plan. His view is that  
the ideal of personal autonom
And a person who frequently changes his tastes can be as autonomous as one who 
never shakes off his adolescent preferences.270 
Although the pursuit of goals does require some sensitivity to the past,271 we 
do not need to be committed to projects which define the worth of our entire lives 
in order to be pursuers of goals in the sense necessary for us to be autonomous 
beings. Lesser goals will also suffice – and, indeed, an overly rigid life may be an 
indication of a lack of autonomy. 
 
Raz is careful to stress that the autonomous person is part author of his or her life.  
A life is always lived in the face of basic needs, and in the midst of other people, 
who provide for one the materials out of which one’s life is to be created.  
Autonomy is not compromised by the mere fact of having needs to satisfy – it is 
compromised by (amongst other things) the absence of choices as to how these 
needs will be satisfied. Raz at times seems to suggest that all our autonomous 
activities involve the satisfaction of needs, although they will often be less basic 
needs, such as the ‘drives to move around,
                                                
wls, A theory of justice (Revised Edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 92-3.  Nozick makes a similar 
t in Anarchy, state and utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 49-50, where he argues that what is important about the 
 of a person, is that it is the idea of  
a being able to formulate long-term plans for its life, able to consider and decide on the basis of abstract 
principles or considerations it formulates to itself and hence not merely the plaything of immediate stimuli, a 





life is for itself and others…operating in terms of an overall conception of it life and what it is to add up 
to…What is the moral importance of this…ability to form a picture of one’s whole life (or at least significant 
chunks of it) and to act in terms of some overall conception of the life one wishes to lead?…I conjecture that the 
answer is connected with that elusive and difficult notion: the meaning of life.  A person’s shaping his life in 
nly a being with the capacity to so 
  
), p. 387 ‘Our life comprises the pursuit of 
accordance with some overall plan is his way of giving meaning to his life; o
shape his life can have or strive for a meaningful life. 
 
270Joseph Raz The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p.  370-1.
271 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, state and utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974
various goals, and that means it is sensitive to our past.’ 
 124
our senses, to engage our imagination and our affection, to occupy our mind.’272   
 Satisfying our needs provides us with reasons for action. But Raz also asserts 
that in adopting particular goals (such as deciding to pursue certain interests), 
individuals acquire reasons for action that they would not otherwise have had.273  
And it is in these reasons for action, peculiar to themselves, that their autonomy 
can be seen, in that having reasons for action which they would not have had, 
were it not for the goals they have adopted, they determine how they will satisfy 
their needs, even though they cannot change the fact that they have (certain 
eds.  
 in difficult times. This is hard to dispute, but leaving the 
matter
inst ‘over-intellectualised conceptions of autonomy’275, arguing 
that an
r discovered, as they are to be chosen by an act of 
cons
basic) ne
Unfulfilled basic needs are nevertheless usually detrimental to one’s 
autonomy. As Raz puts it, ‘the autonomous agent is one who is not always 
struggling to maintain the minimum conditions of a worthwhile life.’274 Choices 
made under such conditions do not reflect the particular person one is – they 
cannot be said to reveal authorship. One might respond by suggesting that one’s 
true colours are revealed
 there misses the subtlety of Raz’s point. Hard times may reveal character – 
both in the sense of the capacity to remain steadfast, and in the sense which 
refers to the particular constellation of characteristics displayed by individuals.  
But neither sense conveys precisely the quality of authorship which Raz sees as 
essential to autonomy. And he is surely right here – one may be of strong 
character, and one may be unique, but neither of these qualities is identical to or 
necessary for autonomy. 
  
Raz also warns aga
 autonomous choice need not be fully articulable, nor defensible in terms of 
reasons that would apply to everyone, at the time it is made. He argues that in 
many cases the most important projects in the life of an autonomous person are 
just as likely to be acquired, o
cious deliberation.   
                                                
272 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 375. 
273 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 300. 
274 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 155. 
275 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 371. 
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Echoing the work of Sher,276 John Christman,277 and Harry Frankfurt,278 it 
not how such projects were initially acquired that matters for autonomy in Raz’s 
w, but their conscious and wholehearted pursuit. We should understand the 
is 
vie
autonomous person as one who, being already in possession of certain projects, 
 of reasons which they 
ontinue to use in their practical deliberations, and they identify with the choices 
T







however acquired, regards themselves as having reasons either to persist with 
these projects or to abandon them. Furthermore, autonomous people choose 
amongst the projects they’ve acquired on the basis
c
they have made.   
It is likely that some of these reasons we have for pursuing our choices will 
be impersonal – ie that they could in principle apply to anyone – but, as noted 
above, it is also likely that many of them will arise from having made the choice in 
the first place. As Raz puts it: 
he emerging picture is of interplay between impersonal, ie choice-independent 
reasons which guide the choice, which then itself changes the balance of reasons and 
determines the contours of that person’s well-being by creating new reasons which 
were not there before. This interplay of independent valu
e’s actions and one’s past provides the clue to the role of the will in practical 
reasoning.279 
e see here how choosing autonomously is a way of creating oneself, as in doing 
 we create new reasons for future choices, and we are who we are at least 
rtially through the reasons we have for our choices.   
Some critics of liberalism, such as Michael Sandel, have argued that liberal 
political theory presupposes the existence of a self that stands at a certain 
distance from its own interests, a self that can reconsider its commitments without 
calling its own exi nto question.280 But the conception of the person evident 
                                                
276 See George Sher, Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 61-5.  




280 On p t 
perience, to make it invulnerable, to 
 that I could not understand myself 
S
277  Christman, “Autonomy and personal history,” Canadian journal of philosophy 21 (1991), pp. 1-24. 
y Frankfurt, The importance of what we care about (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
ph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 389. 
age 62 of Liberalism and the limits of justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1982), Sandel says tha
 
[o]ne consequence of this distance is to put the self beyond the reach of ex
fix its identity once and for all.  No commitment could grip me so deeply
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in Raz’s view of autonomy is not one to which typical communitarian critiques of 
liberalism can easily apply.   
Far from regarding commitments to conceptions of the good as detachable 
from the self, Raz’s understanding of autonomy in fact requires such 
 their own moral world have a commitment to 
projects, relationships, and causes which affect the kind of life that is for them worth 
arded as constitutive of the 
identit
Saying ‘I want to...’ can be a way of indicating that one is committed to a project, 
that one has embraced a certain pursuit, cares about a relationship. It is...part of a 
                                                                                                                                               
commitments, as the following passage makes clear: 
 (Significantly) autonomous persons are those who can shape their life and 
determine its course. They are not merely rational agents who can choose between 
options after evaluating relevant information, but agents who can in addition adopt 
personal projects, develop relationships, and accept commitments to causes, through 
which their personal integrity and sense of dignity and self-respect are made concrete. 
Persons who are part creators of
living.281 
Further on he notes that autonomous people may have commitments, the betrayal 
or compromise of which would render their lives ‘worthless or even impossible (in 
a moral sense)’.282 Such commitments may be reg
ies of those concerned – in other words commitments they cannot imagine 
themselves being without. Moreover, as we will see shortly, Raz regards the 
ability to maintain intimate relationships and form personal attachments, as well as 
the characteristic of stability, as conditions of autonomy.  
 And once one has taken up certain relationships or projects, one’s 
subsequent reasons for action are changed: 
valid reason for action, once the initial commitment has been made. In this usage it 
does not signify the existence of a particular mental state, a desire. It signifies a 
commitment, deep or shallow, to a pursuit, which may be limited or lasting or 
comprehensive.283 
 
without it.  No transformation of life purposes and plans could be so unsettling as to disrupt the contours of my 
identity.  No project could be so essential that turning away from it would call into question the person I am.   
 
ph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 389. 
281 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 155. 
282 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 155. 
283 Jose
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For the autonomous person, as Raz sees it, choices already made create the 
framework for future (autonomous) choices. The goals they choose determine the 
ways in which their autonomy is worked out. Clearly, a view of this kind cannot be 
construed as guilty of the (allegedly) typical liberal error of regarding the self as 
ecessarily detached from his or her commitments.  
   
ipulation, and, thirdly, the availability to the agent of an 
 
                                                
n
Waldron comments that although liberals may deny, in some uninteresting 
metaphysical sense, that a commitment makes a difference to our essential 
beings, Raz has helped to show how our commitments make a great difference 
indeed to our goals, our reasons for action, and the way we see ourselves.  
Furthermore, says Waldron, he does this without neglecting either the part our 
own choices play in these commitments, or the sense we have that we could 
revise these commitments if we so chose.284
 
Now that we have some idea of what the autonomous life is, let us look at the 
conditions which are necessary before individuals enjoy the possibility of living 
such a life. Raz goes to some lengths to emphasise the social nature of these 
conditions. For the time being I will simply note this position, as I engage in a fuller 
discussion of its implications in the section below entitled “Raz’s collectivism”. 
 The three conditions of autonomy are, according to Raz,285 firstly, the mental 
abilities to form intentions of a sufficiently complex kind, secondly, freedom from 
coercion and man
adequate range of valuable options. 
 
In discussing the first condition, Raz lists a number of attributes of persons which 
we value on account of their contribution to the autonomous life – attributes 
without which individuals would have no capacity for autonomy. The list includes 
cognitive abilities such as ‘the power to absorb, remember and use 
information,’286 character traits such as ‘stability, loyalty and the ability to form 
personal attachments and to maintain intimate relationships,’287 as well as 
conditions such as basic health and physical well-being.   
284 Jeremy Waldron, “Autonomy and perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of freedom” Southern California Law Review 62 (1989), p. 
. 
1114. 
285 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 372-3
286 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 408. 
287 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 408. 
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 This first condition of autonomy is uncontroversial. Even anti-perfectionists are 
kely to argue, consistently with an opposition to perfectionism, that the state has 
ciple that the state refrain from judging the merit of 
count as an autonomous one’ ) calls the distinction into question.  
And the dis
Even less likely to be disputed by anti-perfectionists is Raz’s second condition of 






a duty to provide people with the necessary basis for them to make their own, 
autonomous, choices – and this may involve taxation to raise funds for education 
and so on. Arguing that education and health are preconditions for the ability to 
make truly autonomous choices is hardly controversial, and even arguing that a 
certain level of prosperity is necessary for autonomy does not necessarily fall foul 
of the anti-perfectionist prin
different lifestyles. 
 Raz’s list of the capacities necessary for autonomy is of course disputable. It 
includes such features as the capacity for loyalty which, anti-perfectionists may 
argue, blurs the distinction between the conditions for and the objects of choice.  
The perfectionist may well respond that recognising that certain objects of choice 
cannot be autonomously chosen (as Mulhall and Swift put it, that ‘not just any 
choice can 288
tinction might also be called into question in the opposite way. An anti-
perfectionist argument which, for example, suggested that state subsidies for the 
arts promotes the capacities necessary for the autonomous life, would be hard 
pressed to deny that the superior value of the arts is one of its premises. 
 
from coercion and manipulation, given that negative 
edom, in the Hobbesian sense,289 appears to be a necessary condition of 
tonomy, even if not obviously a sufficient one. One could not be considered 
tonomous in circumstances in which one’s desires or decisions had no impact 
 what one could do.  
 Unfortunately, however, it is unclear that the mere fact of being coerced does 
indeed mean that one’s desires or decisions have no impact on one’s actions. It is 
at least plausible to suggest that, when threatened with harm, one chooses to 
comply with the threatener’s wishes.290 And the suggestion that what defines 
                                                
288 Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and communitarians (2ed) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 275. 
here he says that ‘[L]iberty, or Freedome, 
diments of motion’. 
289 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), p. 261, w
signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; by Opposition, I mean external Impe
290 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 151. 
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coercion is that one regrets having to make the choice will not work either, as it 
to cover a range of situations, many of which we would not regard as 
y the projects or 
ur autonomy by threatening you, even if 
ches decisions, forms preferences or adopts 
costs with the options one would otherwise wish to pursue.294   
tailed than his analysis of 
au  of 
ma  
appears 
coercion.   
Raz regards any choice following directly from the need to preserve one’s 
bodily integrity as a heteronomous one – whether the result of coercion, threat or 
poverty.291 He goes on to observe that threats to destro
relationships which are central to our lives are also coercive, and therefore also 
destructive of autonomy.    
Furthermore, he notes that  
 [t]he natural fact that coercion and manipulation reduce options or distort normal 
processes of decision and the formation of preferences has become the basis of a 
social convention loading them with meaning regardless of their actual consequences. 
They have acquired a symbolic meaning expressing disregard or even contempt for 
the coerced or manipulated people.292 
On this view, I may show disrespect for yo
I don’t actually diminish it. I might do this by threatening dire consequences for 
you if you do not do something you in fact wanted to do, for good reasons, 
anyway. We’ll see later that Raz’s opposition to the use of coercion in the pursuit 
of valid moral ideals requires this particular understanding of disrespect.   
  
Raz distinguishes manipulation from coercion by postulating that the former 
‘perverts the way [a] person rea
goals,’293 whereas the latter reduces one’s options by associating unbearable 
 Raz’s analysis of manipulation is far less de
coercion. What he does clarify is that, like coercion, manipulation is a threat to 
personal autonomy. He also makes clear that manipulation can be an insult to 
tonomy, much in the way that threats are, and that the political use
nipulation should face the same restrictions as the political use of coercion. 
                                                
129
292
 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 156. 
 Jose
293 Jose
294 Jere 1989), 
p.1117. 
ph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 378. 
ph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 377-8. 
my Waldron, “Autonomy and perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of freedom,” Southern California Law Review 62 (
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However, as we’ll see when we come to discuss the shape of Razian 
perfectionism, critics may well suspect that, even if the perfectionist state’s 
promotion of morally valuable options can escape the charge of coercion, the 
charge of manipulation is less easily evaded. A defence against this charge would 




ces are adopted wholly 
indepe
t’s look, for the time being, at what he does say on the subject. Firstly, one 
may regard manipulation as an invasion of autonomy on the grounds that it 
interferes with what Raz calls the inner capacities necessary for autonomy.295 If 
certain possibilities are deliberately concealed from one so as to ensure that one 
chooses a particular option rather than others, then clearly one cannot be said to 
be making an autonomous choice.296 Choices made under such conditions cannot 
be said to be one’s own choices. 
 Unfortunately, though, the matter of deciding which desires have been 
artificially induced, and are therefore indicative of the manipulation of the agent, is 
a tricky one. Firstly, in order to ascertain whether manipulation has taken place or 
not, one needs to know what desires the agent would have had, had the alle
ulation not taken place. Obviously, it is not clear how one might know 
this.297   
And, as if this were not bad enough, someone like Raz, who holds that the 
reasons which make a preference autonomous may stem from the fact that the 
preference has been adopted, faces a yet more complex problem in attempting to 
distinguish manipulated desires from unmanipulated ones. Raz quite correctly 
acknowledges the fact that none of our preferen
ndently of other people, hence his view that autonomous desires are those 
which we currently embrace on the basis of our evaluative capacities. And the 
                                                
oseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 407-8.  In this passage, he says that  
[s]ome of these concern cognitive capacities, such as the power to absorb, remember and use information, 
reasoning abilities, and the like.  Others concern one’s emotional and imaginative make-up.  Still others 
concern health, and physical abilities and skills.  Finally, there are character traits essential or helpful for a life 
of autonomy They include stability, loyalty and the ability to form personal attachments and to maintain 
intimate relationships. 





autonomy indeed when he says 
 
A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power 
to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by 
aldron, “Autonomy and perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of freedom,” Southern California Law Review 62 (1989), p. 
over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants.  Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power 




reasons we have for embracing these goals might, of course, be reasons which 
we wo
ocial conditions, conditions which are fragile and therefore 
require
like the coercive inculcation of virtue, damaging to 
utonomy,299 and this means that the moral quality of the choices resulting from 
 manipulation as the inculcation of false beliefs is equally 
proble
                                                
uld have regardless of the interference of others, but then again they might 
not. The fact that our preferences derive initially from the interference of others in 
our lives cannot then serve, for Raz, as an indication of their heteronomy.298  
Furthermore, Raz has argued that personal autonomy is not possible 
outside of certain s
 deliberate action to maintain them. Given that Raz will argue that we have 
a duty to create the conditions of autonomy for others, it may (not infrequently) be 
the case that we are duty bound to interfere in the lives of others in the interests of 
their autonomy. This, of course, leaves Raz unable to regard deliberate 
interference as necessarily indicative of manipulation.   
Nor can he simply define manipulation as interference which creates the 
likelihood of bad choices on the part of the person interfered with – although such 
interference will certainly count as manipulation. But he needs to be able to offer 
an account of manipulation which allows for the possibility of the manipulative 
inculcation of virtue, which is, 
a
interference cannot be the standard by which we judge whether the interference is 
manipulative or not.   
Defining
matic, as there are many cases in which we simply cannot tell what the 
merits of a belief are apart from the allegedly manipulative efforts to establish 
merits for it. Waldron uses the example of the symbolic loading of an option to 
make this point.300  
If I wish, for example, to attempt to establish a certain way of being as 
“authentically x” – for example if I were to manage an election campaign with the 
intention of inculcating the belief that voting for the African National Congress is 
the authentically South African thing to do – is there some way of working out 
what the genuinely authentically South African thing to do would be apart from the 
social meanings with which this option has been and is being endowed? It’s hard 
298 Jeremy Waldron, “Autonomy and perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of freedom,” Southern California Law Review 62 (1989), 
6), p. 420. 
hern California Law Review 62 (1989) p. 
pp. 1118-9. 
299 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 198
300 Jeremy Waldron, “Autonomy and perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of freedom,” Sout
1120.  The general point is Waldron’s, the specific examples my own. 
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to see how even Raz could believe that there is. But if attempting to create the 
Autonomy is not possible without a society which ensures that the choices 
term options of little consequence.’301 We should also, according 






its coercive powers so as to secure an adequate range of valuable options implies 
out well-being? Raz’s answer here is a 
denies well-being to the 
aura of authentic South Africanness around the African National Congress is not 
manipulation, then one might ask why attempting to create the aura of machismo 
around Marlboro cigarettes is. 
 
Raz’s third condition of autonomy requires the availability to the agent of an 
adequate range of valuable options, and this is where we come to the real 
controversy.   
available to its members ‘include options with long term pervasive consequences 
as well as short 
to Raz, ‘be able both to choose long term commitments or projects and to develop 
lasting relationships and be able to develop and pursue them by means which we 
choose from time to time. It is intolerable that we should have no influence over 
the choice of our occupation or of our friends.’302 Moreover, ‘[t]o be autonomous 
and to have an autonomous life, a person must have options which enable him to 
sustain throughout his life activities which, taken together, exercise all the 
capacities 
lop any of them.’303 
While one can imagine anti-perfectionists accepting that autonomy isn’t 
ssible in the presence of coercion and manipulation, or in the absence of 
rtain basic capacities, it is clear that anti-perfectionists must part company with 
z with regard to his third condition. The claim that the state has the duty to use 
that the state must act on judgements as to the value of certain options, and this is 
not a position anti-perfectionists could endorse.   
 
Why is a life without autonomy a life with
little surprising: 
 The nature of modern societies, he argues, 




ph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 374. 
ph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 374. 




personal autonomy is a fact of life. Since we live in a society whose social forms are to 
a considerable extent based on individual choice, and since our options are limited by 
ting, and this means 
that well-being in this
the
he y are so because they belong to 
pocke
hich the rest of us 
enjoy.
nomous. Given that well-being depends on the successful pursuit of 
valuable social forms, and given that the social forms of modern liberal democratic 
republics are autonomy-presupposing, it follows, says Raz, that autonomy is 
necessary for the well-being of citizens of such societies. Conversely, members of 
different kinds of societies do not necessarily have an interest in autonomy.304 As 
he puts it: 
For those who live in an autonomy-supporting environment there is no choice but to 
be autonomous: there is no other way to prosper in such a society…The value of
what is available in our society, we can prosper in it only if we can be successfully 
autonomous.305 
But note the phrase “autonomy-supporting environment”. It so happens that 
modern industrial/post-industrial society is autonomy-suppor
 society requires autonomy, whether individual members of 
 society want it or not.306   
This of course raises the question of what should be done with the 
teronomous in modern societies – whether the
ts of non-modern culture, or simply because they choose against autonomy.  
Raz denies that non-autonomous lives cannot be valuable,307 and in particular 
denies that those on the outside of modern societies should be forcibly 
“autonomised,” so that they achieve the levels of well-being w
 He makes the obvious point that plunging the unprepared into a society that 
                                                
n page 189 of The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), Raz comments that ‘not everyone has an interest 
utonomy.  It is a cultural value ie of value to people living in certain societies only.’ 




306 Note that, in Raz’s view, valuing autonomy does not necessarily imply valuing the extension of personal choice into all 
relationships and pursuits.   In this regard, he comments that 
 
ep more and more into 
 parents and their children.  The 
impact of the increased choice on the character of the family is just beginning to be felt. 
alue of personal autonomy necessarily 
 to see an end to this process, or even its reversal. 
native forms of valuable lives.’  Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: 
[t]he relations between parents and their children are an example of a relationship which is not based upon 
choice of partners.  It shows that an environment can be supportive of autonomy and yet include forms not 
based on choice…It has to be admitted though that even here choice has tended to cre
the relations.  Parents have greater control over whether and when to have children, and to a certain extent 
over which children to have.  The widespread use of contraception, abortion, adoption, in vitro fertilisation and 
similar measures has increased choice but also affected the relations between
 It would be a mistake to think that those who believe, as I do, in the v
desire the extension of personal choice in all relationships and pursuits.  They may consistently with their belief 
in personal autonomy wish
 
Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 394. 
307 ‘Autonomy is…inconsistent with various alter
Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 395.  
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requires autonomy of them may well leave them a good deal worse off than 
before, and this can hardly be understood as a contribution to their well-being.308  
 
The claim that autonomy is of fundamental importance is, of course, associated 
with anti-perfectionism. Raz, however, is equally committed to the value of 
autono
s life is valuable 
o
sumption that governments 
could 
the objects of such choices might be thought to be the province of 
ethics,
                                                
my. It is just that he takes liberal political morality to be derived from a 
comprehensive ideal of the good life: that of the valuable autonomous life, where 
valuable and autonomous are not synonyms. As he sees it,  
…the autonomy principle309 is a perfectionist principle. Autonomou
nly if it is spent in the pursuit of valuable projects and relationships.  The autonomy 
principle permits and even requires governments to create morally valuable 
opportunities, and to eliminate repugnant ones.310  
What Raz says here about the autonomy principle is surprising, first, in that 
he terms it a “perfectionist” principle: rather than requiring the state to withdraw 
from the terrain on which values battle for dominance, it requires the active 
promotion of a valuable human attribute, namely autonomy.     
Second, Raz does not take autonomy to be valuable simpliciter. He thinks, 
rather, that the autonomous life is valuable only if it is spent in the pursuit of 
valuable projects and relationships. This means that Raz rejects the view that the 
state’s job is done to the extent that citizens are offered a choice between ways of 
life: on the Rawlsian view, the quality of the choices on offer is also a matter for 
the state. And if we make the additional, plausible, as
only have a duty to promote autonomy to the extent that it is valuable, we 
can conclude that the state can have no duty to support worthless forms of life.   
Writers who stress the importance of autonomy, as liberals generally do, 
tend to emphasise that the state must leave citizens in a position to make choices.  
Remarking on 
 or of comprehensive conceptions of the good, neither of which are thought 
by anti-perfectionists to be appropriate bases for political morality. 
308 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 424. 
309 The autonomy principle is the principle of political morality which requires the state to promote autonomy (and which derives 
from the duty individuals have to do the same). 
310 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 417. 
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 Is valuing autonomy, while denying that it confers value on immoral or 
worthless choices, a tenable position? It is certainly less paradoxical than it 




rsued by a single person. As Isaiah Berlin puts it, ‘not all good things are 
ompatible, still less all the ideals of mankind.’312 In fact, it is likely that the pursuit 
 would dispose one towards intolerance of 
other, incommensurable,313 morally worthy ways of life.   
Raz notes that ‘if autonomy is an ideal then we are committed to [moral 
                                                
elves, as all liberals do, does not imply that worthless ideals themselves 
acquire value through the fact of being chosen. While we do often make remarks 
such as “at least she chose it for herself” we do not thereby endorse the value of 
the object of a person’s choice. Rather, in making such remarks, we emphasise 
the evil of coercion or manipulation. And it is a short step from conceding that 
worthless ideals do not acquire value through having been autonomously chosen 
to the recognition that being offered a range of worthless options may well allow 
one to make an autonomous choice, but not one that is in any sense w
.311 Autonomy is valuable when there are valuable options on the table. If 
not, one’s predicament is not improved by autonomy. 
The autonomous life requires valuable choices, and this obliges Raz to 
accept moral pluralism. As Raz sees it, the moral ground for the liberal 
commitment to individual liberty is provided by the good of personal autonomy 
which individuals realise in choosing between morally valuable but incompatible 
possibilities.   
According to this position, there are many morally worthy ways of living 
one’s life, and they are not necessarily compatible with each other, nor can they 
all be pu
c
of certain morally worthy ways of life
pluralism]: valuing autonomy leads to the endorsement of moral pluralism’314 – 
otherwise it would not be clear with regard to which choices autonomy could be 
exercised. Once one accepts that a life can only be autonomous and valuable if 
one has a number of valuable alternatives to choose from, then one must also 
accept moral pluralism, as it is necessary to make valuable autonomy possible.  
on of this point in the Pink Floyd song “Nobody home”. 
r than one but is not better than the other.’ Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: 
311 Roger Waters offers a particularly clear expressi
312 Isaiah Berlin, Four essays on liberty (:,), p. 26.  
313 According to Raz, ‘Two valuable options are incommensurable if (1) neither is better than the other, and (2) there is (or could 
be) another option which is bette
Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 325. 
314 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 399 [my italics]. 
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On the other hand, if autonomy is valuable regardless of the moral value of the 
choices made, a commitment to moral pluralism does not necessarily follow. 
Raz’s position is distinctive in that his view of autonomy presupposes the 
truth of moral pluralism. His argument attempts to establish an internal relation 
between moral pluralism and the claim that a life is only valuable if it is in pursuit 
4.1.4 The justification of authority 
tives are indeed justified in this 
ay, then the governed have an obligation to follow them and to treat them as 
g all other reasons which apply to them. The normal 
erived from the so-called “service conception of authority”, 
also articulated by Raz, which takes political authority to be justified only to the 
author
                                                
of a valid ideal that has been autonomously chosen. In other words, his claim is 
that if autonomy, as he understands it, is possible, then value must be plural. In 
contrast, the more standard argument treats moral pluralism and the claim that a 
life is only valuable in pursuit of an autonomously chosen valid ideal as two 
separate claims, and concludes that a state concerned to promote the valuable 
autonomy of its citizens has no reason to favour any particular valuable form of 
life.315   
 
 
Raz regards the exercise of political authority as justified only if the governed are 
more likely to comply with the reasons (moral, prudential and other) that apply to 
them if they accept as binding the directives of the authority, than they would be if 
they tried to comply directly with these same reasons. This thesis he terms the 
“normal justification thesis”, and argues that if direc
w
pre-empting and replacin
justification thesis is d
extent that it serves the governed.  
 It is important to note the connections between the service conception of 
ity and the principle of autonomy. Because we all have a powerful interest 
in autonomy, we have reasons to act so as to create the conditions of autonomy 
for ourselves and others. And given that the role of governmental authority is to 
assist us to comply with the reasons which apply to us, government therefore has 
a duty to promote autonomy and compliance with the principle of autonomy.  
315 I owe this point to Mulhall and Swift.  See their Liberals and communitarians (2ed) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 265. 
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Political authority is therefore justified principally because and to the extent that it 
 reasons 
4.
Raz’s third premise is that the conditions on which autonomy depends are social 
ehaviour. This much is certainly true. 
ut the value of one’s goals. And this is as true for societies as it is for 
                                                
provides conditions necessary for personal autonomy.316 
 
In summary then, Raz’s second fundamental premise is that the justification of 
political authority lies in its capacity to enable citizens better to act for the
that apply to them than they would be in the absence of the authority. It follows 
from this premise that, if the state is able to assist citizens in pursuing the reasons 
which apply to them (which would include their moral obligations), then it must do 
so, for failing to do so would be to neglect its duty. 
 
1.5 Raz’s collectivism 
 
in nature – that is, they cannot be created by individuals.   
He argues further that these conditions depend on state support, to the 
extent that they would wither in the absence of such support, leaving the range of 
valuable forms of life insufficient for citizens to make genuine autonomous choices 
between them, and therefore deleteriously affecting their chances of experiencing 
well-being. I will explain, in what follows, why this part of Raz’s argument for the 
necessity of perfectionism is unconvincing.   
 
Raz’s claim that ‘[a] person’s well-being depends...on success in socially defined 
and determined pursuits’317 involves, firstly, the claim that well-being depends on 
success in one’s comprehensive goals, and secondly, that comprehensive goals 
must be based on social forms of b
 Raz’s understanding of well-being as depending on how successfully one is 
pursuing the most comprehensive goals one has set oneself means that well-
being cannot, on this view, consist in the pursuit of goals one has not chosen, or is 
compelled to pursue. As noted earlier in this chapter, one might be mistaken 
abo
9 Canadian journal of philosophy 479. 316 WJ Waluchow ‘Critical notice of Joseph Raz’s The morality of freedom’ (1989) 1






dependent for their meaning on the social practices or conventions in which they 
valuable options, that Raz concludes that, for individual 
ort.  
Perfec
autonomy. And this is where he is much less convincing. 
duals, according to Raz. He argues that his claim that one’s well-being 
pends on socially defined pursuits is ‘not a conventionalist thesis. It does not 
im that whatever is practised with social approval is for that reason valuable.’318 
It is also important to note that the comprehensive goals of individuals are 
are embedded. This is true for the whole gamut of possibilities, ranging from goals 
such as the pursuit of a medical career, to those such as supporting Manchester 
United Football Club. And one can only maintain such comprehensive goals 
through continual participation in social forms, as instruction in the various 
practices in which these goals are embedded is never explicit, but learned largely 
through a process of intuitive observation. Failure to participate in these social 
forms results in “losing touch”, whereby the successful pursuit of the associated 
goals becomes unlikely. This does not mean, of course, that it is not possible to 
deviate from social forms, nor that any attempts to deviate are valueless, but 
rather that deviations tend to gain their significance from the very fact of their 
being deviations from the norm.   
 It is on the basis of his claims that one cannot pursue valuable forms of life 
without the social forms that make them possible, and that autonomy requires the 
availability of a variety of 
citizens to enjoy autonomy, a variety of social forms must be available. As he puts 
it: 
...autonomy is only possible if various collective goods are available. The 
opportunity to form a family of one kind or another, to forge friendships, to pursue 
many of the skills, professions and occupations, to enjoy fiction, poetry, and the arts, to 
engage in many of the common leisure activities: these and others require an 
appropriate common culture to make them possible and valuable.319 
Raz argues further that the social forms necessary to maintain a range of options 
sufficient for the autonomy of the citizens would wither away without state supp
tionist policies are then seen to be necessary to preserve the conditions of 
                                                
318 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 310. 
319 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 247. 
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 Raz argues that anti-perfectionism ‘[undermines] the chances of survival of 
many cherished aspects of our culture,’320 and therefore undermines the 
possibility of autonomous lives. Here again, Raz emphasises the social basis of 
autonomy. He argues that ‘[s]upporting valuable forms of life is a social rather 
than an individual matter,’321 and we can conclude from this that, without social 
support, such valuable forms of life will wither away. The example he gives is of 
monogamy, which, he points out, ‘cannot be practised by an individual,’ and which 
‘...requires a culture which recognises it, and which supports it through the public’s 
may wither away, as the withering away of these 
e has no reason to pursue these consequences, seem particularly 
tempti
attitude and through its formal institutions,’322 without which its chances of survival 
would be diminished. 
 We need to note that in claiming that cherished aspects of our culture may 
wither away without state support, Raz is not concerned with any particular 
cherished aspect of our culture. This is not an argument that the state has 
obligation to maintain, say, opera as an art form, because it is cherished.323 The 
concern Raz articulates is that, without state support for valuable options, 
opportunities for autonomy 
valuable options may eventually reduce the choices citizens are able to make to a 
point where they can no longer be described as autonomous. And if this 
diminution of autonomy is a genuinely possible consequence of anti-perfectionist 
policies, Raz’s concern is not one that anti-perfectionists can dismiss lightly.   
Although anti-perfectionists do not usually articulate their commitment to 
neutrality as a commitment to ensuring that all conceptions of the good life are 
equally affected by state policy,324 the view that the consequences of a policy – 
particularly the consequences for autonomy – are irrelevant to the acceptability of 
the policy is not one that anti-perfectionists will rush to endorse. And neither would 
either the claims a) that we cannot identify any consequences as better than 
others, or b) that even if we can identify some consequences as better than 
others, the stat
ng. 
 But would failure on the part of the state to support worthwhile forms of life 
                                                
320 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 162. 
321 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 162. 
322 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 162. 
323 In fact a Razian state would not have the right to support any particular form of life unless failing to do so would not leave a 
range of valuable forms sufficient for the autonomy of citizens. 
324 The anti-perfectionist view is usually articulated as a commitment to neutrality of policy justifications.   
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have the consequences which Raz suggests it has? Raz has surely overstated his 
case, as it seems clear that many forms of life, the value of which he would 
endorse, do not require state support for their survival. This may not be true of 
opera, but Raz is not purporting merely to provide a defence of the value of opera, 
and we may well require a much larger set of examples of valuable forms of life 
which are likely to wither away without state support before feeling the need to 
 
port for valuable forms of life would be to acknowledge that 
abandon anti-perfectionism. 
 A lot hinges on what range of options counts as adequate for autonomy. And 
clearly, Raz’s understanding is that autonomy requires a rather wide range.325  
Even so, however, it is hard to imagine that the number of such options would 
become so small as to constitute a threat to the autonomy of citizens in the 
absence of state support. Raz is not, after all, suggesting that the state has a duty 
to provide us with the most valuable life possible, a duty which would have to be 
derived from the implausible view that all individuals have a coercively 
enforceable duty to do the same. It seems more plausible to interpret him as 
requiring the state to support options sufficient to guarantee the autonomy of 
citizens, which would mean that one could acknowledge that a certain form of life 
was superior, while denying that its disappearance would condemn citizens to 
heteronomy.   
One possible Razian response to anti-perfectionist scepticism about the 
necessity of state sup
many such forms could survive without state support, while arguing that state 
support is nevertheless necessary for them to be available to the majority of 
citizens. If the consequence of an anti-perfectionist refusal on the part of the state 
to support valuable forms of life would be a society in which a wide range of such 
forms is available only to the elite, leaving the majority of citizens with a much 
diminished menu of options, Razian perfectionism may appear as the preferable 
option. 
 But even we concede the possibility that, without state intervention, the range 
of options on offer in the society could be worryingly larger for the elite than for the 
majority of citizens, it remains unclear why we should think that the solution to this 
                                                
325 The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 375, where he says that ‘[t]o be autonomous and to have an 
e all the capacities human beings have an innate drive to exercise, as well as to decline to develop any of them.’ 
autonomous life, a person must have options which enable him to sustain throughout his life activities which, taken together, 
exercis
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problem lies in a state which makes policy by judging the value of various forms of 
fe. All that would be necessary is that the state redistribute resources sufficient 
cquire the inner capacities necessary for the conduct of an 
himself in outlining his second 
condition of autonomy.326 Such a state need simply ensure that all citizens have 
access to education sufficient to allow them to create autonomously whatever 
forms of life they deem to be valuable. As Hannah Arendt, for example, has 
argued, the increased availability of formal opportunities for political participation 
seems to correlate inversely with the extent and substance of such 
participation.327 And Waldron suggests further that ‘good social practices are likely 
to be those capable of flourishing perfectly well on their own, unassisted by the 
efforts of the law.’328 
 This is not, of course, to argue that perfectionism is impermissible. As I have 
argued in chapter two, the case for the principle of state neutrality has not been 
convincingly made. It is rather to suggest that Raz’s conviction that anti-
perfectionism must damage autonomy is not well-founded. And this is because, 
although he is correct to argue that autonomy is valuable only in pursuit of the 
good, and also that the state has a duty to uphold the conditions of autonomy for 
all citizens, it does not follow that the state must therefore promote the good, as, 
under the circumstances likely to obtain in modern liberal democracies state 
promotion of the good is superfluous to requirements: a range of valuable forms of 
life adequate to provide citizens with genuinely autonomous choices can be 
attained in many ways other than state intervention. 
 
     ***************  
 
                                                
li
for everyone to a
autonomous life – as recommended by Raz 
326 Joseph Raz, The morality of freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 408. 
327 Hannah Arendt, On revolution (London: Penguin,1963), pp. 115-40.  






Having surveyed the case for the principle of state neutrality, I conclude that it 
cannot be sustained.   
 This conclusion I reached, first, on the basis that the onus of proof lies with 
whoever argues against acting for good reasons, or, to put it another way, with 
whoever argues against promoting the good. After outlining various, and often 
conflicting, ways of formulating the principle of state neutrality, I turned to examine 
a number of the most persuasive and most frequently advanced arguments in 
contemporary philosophical literature – with particular focus on those of Rawls – 
against state promotion of the good. 
 These arguments can be divided, roughly, into two closely related categories, 
paralleling (also roughly) the two most frequently presented explanations for the 
rise of neutralist liberalism in the face of increasing moral, philosophical, and 
religious diversity in western polities: neutrality as a response to diversity, and 
neutrality as a response to the moral requirement that citizens be treated equally 
and with respect. 
 The first kind of argument stresses the dangers which are alleged to lie in an 
insufficiently neutral response to the diversity of contemporary liberal 
democracies: the fears that the state may promote false values or create a divided 
and unstable society. And I have argued with regard to these fears that, while they 
are certainly grounds for concern, a principle of state neutrality is neither the only 
nor the optimal response to them. 
 The second kind of argument stresses the value of personal autonomy, and 
may take the form either of a consequentialist appeal to the good of autonomy, 
which is allegedly maximised by a refusal on the part of the state to promote any 
particular conception of the good life, or, as is to be extracted from the work of 
Rawls, the form of a deontological prohibition on the promotion of the good on the 
part of the state, which is best read as an appeal to respect for citizens as rational, 
autonomous, beings, who ought to be free to make their own choices with regard 
to the conceptions of the good life they wish to pursue.   
 I argue that no convincing version of either of these kinds of arguments from 
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autonomy has been made. The consequentialist appeal to the good of autonomy 
cannot establish the principle of state neutrality, as it cannot establish that the 
good of autonomy trumps all other goods, or any other combination of goods, in 
all conflicts of goods which might arise. The appeal to respect for autonomy, on 
the other hand, does indeed solve the problem of how to deal with conflicts 
between autonomy and other goods; this it does by advocating a prohibition on 
the state’s promoting the good, regardless of what the consequentialist calculus 
turns up. But, as I argued in the second half of chapter two, it is damaged by the 
difficulties it faces in explaining why standard reasons for promoting the good 
ought to be disregarded completely in matters of political morality. 
 In discussing the appeal to respect for autonomy I examined arguments of this 
nature contained within the writings of Rawls. I argued that he does not provide 
adequate grounds in A theory of justice for the conclusion that no conceptions of 
the good may be permitted amongst the considerations the parties in the original 
position take into account. I contended further that the appeal to the principle of 
liberal legitimacy, presented in Political liberalism, fails for similar reasons, and 
that the appeal to the burdens of judgement, also found in Political liberalism, 
assumes rather than shows that respect for the autonomy of citizens rules out 
state promotion of the good. 
 Finally I move on to discuss what we might think of as the default mode of 
political morality, given that the case for state neutrality has not been proven: 
perfectionism, the view that the state must act for good reasons, just as 
individuals must. In doing so I defend a number of aspects of the perfectionism of 
Raz, who argues that not only is perfectionist policy-making permissible, but that, 
as long as what he terms the principle of autonomy holds, perfectionist policy-
making is obligatory, in that a thoroughgoing neutral state would in fact threaten 
the capacity of citizens to lead autonomous lives, and, further, that such a state 
would also threaten other important goods.   
 I argue, however, that while Raz’s attempts to establish the permissibility of 
perfectionism succeed, his more ambitious argument regarding the necessity of 
perfectionism fails. This is because, although he is correct in arguing that 
autonomy is of no value unless the options between which citizens can choose 
are worthwhile forms of life, it does not follow that the state must promote the 
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good in any and every possible political dispensation. It is simply not the case 
that, in general, unless the state promotes the good, the number of valuable forms 
of life available to citizens will fall below the threshold which is necessary for their 
autonomy to be worth having. It is usually possible for these valuable forms of life 
to be promoted and maintained by various non-state actors. However, as the 
success of Raz’s arguments for the permissibility of perfectionism, and the failure 
of the neutralist arguments for the principle of state neutrality, show, the state may 
intervene to protect the autonomy of citizens, should it prove necessary. 
 
In conclusion, I note that defending perfectionism in this way is not to say that 
state neutrality is never acceptable or desirable; it is simply to say there is no 
convincing case for a principled rejection of any and every attempt on the part of 
the state to promote the good. While it may be that some attempts on the part of 
the state to promote the good are sufficiently damaging to citizens’ autonomy, 
sufficiently likely to promote that which is undesirable (as opposed to promoting 
the good), sufficiently likely to cause instability, or sufficiently oppressive to be 
illegitimate, it is nevertheless the case that these cases must be judged on their 
merits.   
By this I mean that I endorse the view that the state has, in general, the 
right to promote the good, but I acknowledge that there are frequently reasons 
why it should, given common circumstances, refrain from doing so. Such 
circumstances might be temporary and/or contingent, as is the case where 
peculiar ethnic or religious configurations mean that too blunt a perfectionist 
dispensation would run a serious risk of instability. But the circumstances which 
caution against promoting the good may also be connected to what appear to be 
deep features of morality or politics itself, such as the fact that many valuable 
ways of life are incommensurable. 
 Critics may note that, practically speaking, there is little to choose between 
policies attractive to philosophical perfectionists of the kind I defend and those 
attractive to defenders of the principle of state neutrality.  In this they would not be 
wrong. But this is not a refutation of the importance of articulating a perfectionist 
political morality.   
 It is not a refutation because, first, as even anti-perfectionists ought to 
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acknowledge, articulating a valid political morality is a worthwhile endeavour, an 
endeavour which a misguided commitment to the principle of state neutrality 
threatens. This is both because of the intrinsic value of pursuing a true account of 
political morality, and because of the dangers of relying on unsound arguments to 
buttress one’s political morality. If the arguments for the principle of state neutrality 
do not work, it cannot be the task of the philosopher to conceal this, even if it is 
fervently wished that they did work. I am put in mind here of what Charles Taylor, 
in another (and yet in some ways similar) context called the Maginot line strategy, 
whereby potentially illiberal conclusions are ruled out by deeming a range of 
premises which might lead to them to be false.329 Neutralists might be thought to 
be adopting a Maginot Line strategy because the fear of the abuse to which a 
conviction on the part of the government that it is entitled to promote the good can 
be put leads them to rule out any state promotion of the good whatsoever. And 
yet, in the manner of the defenders of “negative freedom” in Taylor’s article, their 
case, as we saw in chapters two and three, is not strong. Intellectual seriousness 
requires rather that we bite the bullet and agree that the state may promote the 
good, and at the same to strive to identify with all the accuracy we can muster, 
what in fact the good is.   
Second, the fact that there is little to choose between policies attractive to 
philosophical perfectionists and those attractive to neutralists is not a refutation of 
the importance of articulating a perfectionist political morality because important 
differences between the politics of perfectionism and the politics of neutrality 
always threaten to surface, particularly when there is, as there often is, a broad 
consensus on certain aspects of the good. It would therefore be an act of 
needless austerity for states to refuse to legislate on the basis of these shared 
commitments, particularly in those cases where the alleged gains in autonomy 
which such refusal promises are illusory.     
We see this in the familiar cases discussed in chapters one, two, and three: 
state support for the arts and state support for marriage illustrate the point.  
Despite widespread acceptance of the idea that a life graced with the appreciation 
of (or the production of) various arts is a good life, there are dissenters from this 
                                                
329 I refer here to Taylor’s essay ‘What’s wrong with negative liberty?’ in A Ryan, (ed) The idea of freedom: Essays in honour of 
Isaiah Berlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) pp. 175-93. 
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view.  And, similarly, the omnipresent desire for married life should not obscure 
the existence of those for whom alternative arrangements are preferable. Under 
these circumstances, it seems that a policy of state neutrality would therefore 
need to distance itself from support for the arts, or for marriage. (In fact, as we 
saw in chapter one, neutralists are often awkwardly inarticulate about the degree 
of dissent which must exist before neutrality is required: one might even read the 
principle of state neutrality as requiring state neutrality between widely-held 
conceptions of the good and conceptions which are merely conceivable.) 
But do we really want to deny the state the right to support marriage, or the 
arts in societies where these are overwhelmingly held to be valuable? Do the 
(alleged) gains in autonomy for those who regard marriage or the arts as 
worthless justify the difficulties the vast majority would encounter in pursuing the 
married or the artistic life under a state which refused these forms of life any 
support?   
 
It would seem rather, that unless one is committed to an ultimately untenable 
moral scepticism, one must acknowledge the state’s right to promote the good, 
even in controversial cases, given every citizen’s interest in living a life that is 
genuinely worthwhile.   
This, of course, is anathema to neutralists. And yet it is surely the correct 
view to take. It can hardly be denied that everyone has an interest in living a life 
that is genuinely worthwhile: the desire to do so underlies any deployment of 
practical reason, and serves as the basis of every political morality. And, as I have 
argued in chapters two and three, the case against philosophical perfectionism 
has not been made, leaving us with what has been, as Joseph Chan remarks, ‘the 
standard view of the state’330 in the western tradition.331 Thinkers as disparate as 
Aristotle,332 St Augustine,333 St Thomas Aquinas,334 and Nietzsche335 take it as 
                                                
330 Joseph Chan, “Legitimacy, unanimity, and perfectionism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 29, 1 (2000), pp. 5-42 at p. 5. 
331 He also notes that moving beyond this tradition would not reveal much different. 
332 ‘...it…becomes an essential task of the lawgiver to ensure that [citizen and ruler] both may become good men, and to 
consider what practices will make them so, and what is the aim of the best life.’ Aristotle (tr TA Sinclair, Trevor Saunders) The 
politics (London: Penguin, 1981), p. 433.  . 
333 See the selection of Augustine’s work in the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought series volume entitled 
Political writings (EM Atkins and RJ Dodaro eds) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and of course also his City of 
God (tr Henry Bettenson) (London: Penguin, 1972). 
334 See the selection of Aquinas’s work in the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought series.volume entitled Political 
writings (ed RW Dyson) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
335 See John Rawls, A theory of justice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.286. 
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obvious that governments have a duty to promote human excellence and virtue, 
and, in doing so, to favour certain conceptions of the good life over others.  And, 
in the absence of a compelling and general case for the principle of state 
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